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E x oriente lux, ex occidente luxus.” Light from the East, lux-ury from the West. Polish writer Stanislaw Jerzy Lec has been credited with coining this laconic aphorism to capture the magnetism of the two 
dominant Cold War ideologies. Aer the collapse of the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), West German design critics reappropriated the phrase in 
discussions about East Germany’s material legacy.1 They used it triumphantly, 
because from their point of view luxury had eclipsed the light. Western eco-
nomic liberalism, so it seemed, had won the war of ideologies.2 They used the 
phrase cautiously, because the lost socialist utopia, the extinguished light, car-
ried the potential to ignite nostalgia among East Germans, a longing for a past 
civilization that, by 1992, had been taken over by the West. They used the phrase 
because the aphorism so ttingly encapsulated the Cold War struggle in divided 
Germany, the confrontation of two diametrically opposed socioeconomic sys-
tems: the principled, moralizing socialist economy in the East and the lavish, 
auent capitalist economy in the West. Entrenched as these cultural critics and 
their contemporaries were in the political mindset of the Cold War, emphasiz-
ing dierence had always been a way to ensure the international recognition of 
separate German identities. In fact, it is impossible to understand the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) during the decades of division without the GDR, 
and vice-versa. Their domestic and international politics, economic policy, social 
progress, and cultural development substantially derived from the tension cre-
ated by the sheer presence of the other. Ironically, their attempts at expressing 
dierence unintentionally created a shared code of ideological inscription in 
everyday German life.3
Aer the Third Reich delegitimized nationalism as a valid form of identica-
tion, both German states faced a search for acceptable political values. Nation-
alist approaches that stressed German exceptionality had become unacceptable. 
The West German decision to remove the rst stanza from the German national 
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anthem is just one example; Germany could no longer aspire to stand “above 
everything in the world.”4 Moreover, heavy Allied involvement in state-building 
and policy development le the population with a sense of insecurity about the 
origins of their state(s), further hindering their identication with postwar Ger-
many. In an eort to create a valid political culture, governments followed the 
people literally into their homes with highly politicized debates about German 
living standards. In election campaigns, the rst chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, 
capitalized on the general social upli created by the “economic miracle” of 
swi West German industrial recovery, while East German leaders Walter Ul-
bricht and later Erich Honecker promised similar material everyday comforts 
with the New Economic Policy (1963) and Unity of Economic and Social Policy 
(1971) programs. In cooperation with cultural and economic elites, they relied 
on everyday aesthetics to create distinct national domestic cultures and empha-
size ideological demarcation as integrative concepts. Economic progress would 
promote the new political order in both national and international contexts. It 
would also substitute for traditional nationalism by providing the population 
with values that yielded a sense of belonging. This importance of economic suc-
cess for political legitimacy of the two Germanys in the East-West competition 
has long been acknowledged.5 On closer examination, however, this period of 
delineation should be understood as a prelude to the détente of the 1970s. Seeing 
that the signing of the German Basic Treaty in 1972 “normalized” the antago-
nistic relationship between the two German states, a long-term analysis that 
extends to 1989 can provide insights into a more diverse political utilization of 
German material culture—and thus into the internal German relationship—
than has been recognized so far.
One of the ways the FRG and the GDR developed and maintained the new 
national identity was by instilling material culture, specically interior design 
and furniture production, with strong political messages. However, the emerg-
ing aesthetic did more than just modernize the respective parts of Germany. 
What started as a Cold War competition for ideological superiority in the eld 
of economics quickly turned into a shared, politically legitimizing quest for an 
untainted postfascist modernity. In the process, they resurrected the “Made in 
Germany” brand to mark a rehabilitated, divided-yet-peaceful Germany that 
yearned for membership among modern industrial nations. Following furniture 
products from the draing table into the homes of ordinary Germans oers in-
sight into how converging visions of German industrial modernity created shared 
expectations about economic progress and living standards. These shared expec-
tations shaped a system of values at the juncture of economic and sociocultural 
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politics, an economic culture that bound the two Germanys together. Imple-
mented as policy, it projected internationally a pan-German interest.
That the striving for dierence created similarity in how East and West 
Germans negotiated their country’s division is a paradox that warrants expla-
nation. Examining this phenomenon highlights historical interconnections 
between the two Germanys in product design, economic structure, corporate 
ethos, trade, and consumer society. All of these are part of economic culture, 
which political scientist Paul Egon Rohrlich explained as the need to understand 
“the perceptual predisposition of national populations, based on cultural value 
systems” as the motivation behind policymaking.6 From this perspective, the 
legitimating norms for policymaking spring from contexts other than politics 
in society, yet they become visible through analysis of issue interpretation, policy 
formation, and implementation. It puts the focus on the people as historical 
actors, rather than on the state structure, to explain policymaking. In the case 
of postwar Germany, this concept oers an approach that transcends the starkly 
contrasting systems of state socialism and market capitalism. In doing so, it un-
derscores similarities in the activities of a network of politicians, entrepreneurs, 
and cultural brokers, and how they envisioned and realized economic policy in 
the two German states in their eorts to regain economic stability and political 
inuence in Cold War Europe’s order.
Like other capitalist and socialist societies throughout Europe, both the 
Federal Republic and the GDR embarked on nding solutions to postwar re-
construction problems, most notably scarce housing and furnishing, and shared 
their ndings in the myriad European design exhibitions, among them the 
Milan Triennal and the Jablonec International. Many of those solutions involved 
the mechanization of cra industries and ensuing standardization, which were 
economically ecient but were criticized by contemporaries for their monot-
ony, thus hindering cultural diversity as well as societal renement. Both Ger-
man states created institutions that not only dened the new industrial design 
profession but also invested in consumer taste education that promoted certain 
national aesthetics. Meanwhile, in the later postwar decades, growing notions 
of individualism and social distinction across all social strata pushed designers, 
industrialists, and politicians to nd more bespoke solutions. Especially in state 
socialism, the apparent contradiction between collectivist maxims and individ-
ualistic desires preoccupied high-ranking politicians of the power-monopolizing 
Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED). Eorts 
at creating ideologically conforming consumer habits reveal personal responses 
and show how the ideas that consumer education initiatives promoted became 
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pervasive among the population. Naturally, the availability and aordability of 
desired products were key to the success of these ideas.
Despite the centrality of trade in shaping the German-German relationship, 
especially aer the 1972 Basic Treaty, it has received relatively little scholarly 
attention. Economic treatments of GDR history have focused on the shortcom-
ings of the command economy in order to explain the country’s comparatively 
sudden collapse in 1989.7 Over the past three decades, the question of its forty 
years of relative political stability, peaking in the 1970s, has remained a scholarly 
focus. Controversies emerged over the stabilizing factors of communist rule.8 Yet 
the extent to which the GDR leadership secured this “golden decade” through its 
special relationship with the Federal Republic goes unnoticed or, when looking 
at trade credits, is oversimplied to portray the GDR as a passive receiver, instead 
of as an active agent in the marketplace. Alternatively, the Federal Republic’s 
economic success has diverted attention to Western integration and the devel-
opment of the European common market.9 The FRG’s economic relationship 
to the GDR has been deemed insignicant, which is true in terms of its trade 
balance but not in terms of pan-German cultural inuence and national politics. 
The following pages describe an asymmetric relationship in which economic 
and political priorities developed at times into conicting and contradictory 
dynamics. For the West, the political aspect of intra-German trade outweighed 
its economic benets, and for the East, economic necessity trumped the ocial 
policy of ideological dierentiation.
Details are sparse about East Germany’s eorts to deepen trade with the 
West. Indeed, the GDR capitalized on the territorial incertitude and the lack 
of a postwar peace settlement that would have dened borders. With the help 
of the Federal Republic, it gained special status for trade with the European 
Economic Community (EEC). Through the Protocol on Intra-German Trade, 
East German goods and services were exempt from taris that other non-EEC 
countries had to pay. Western customers bought, oen unknowingly, East Ger-
man products in department stores and through mail order catalogs, enjoying 
low prices courtesy of an eastern economic infrastructure that focused on mass 
production. By the 1970s, the Federal Republic had become an indispensable 
trade partner for the GDR, second only to the Soviet Union. From the West 
German perspective, the structurally lagging GDR economy oered opportuni-
ties for a gradual normalization of German-German relations. Hence these links 
ran deeper than simple economic transactions; they were inherently political, 
illustrating not only the place of East-West trade in the permeability of the Iron 
Curtain but also pointing to its signicance in stabilizing the GDR. Moreover, 
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in catering to foreign markets, GDR industries and their designers eventually 
aligned themselves with western tastes and aesthetics, which risked undermin-
ing cultural distinction eorts on the national level.
Beyond uncovering hitherto understudied dimensions of German-German 
relations, the economic culture perspective contributes to the literature of post-
war German history in a number of methodological and thematic ways. First, 
many cultural studies of Cold War Germany evaluate economic performance 
exclusively based on consumer satisfaction.10 It is, however, crucial to consider 
the aspirations for and perceptions of cultural modernization alongside its actual 
materiality. Including specic values in the discussion of economic performance 
reveals the signicance of a shared history, cultural norms, and economic prac-
tices in the German postwar context. Hence this work is not just about compe-
tition for preeminence between East and West Germany, but it is also about the 
rediscovery of forgotten similarities. Vying for economic and ideological supe-
riority and earnest eorts for a German-German cultural rapprochement were 
not mutually exclusive.
Second, the economic culture approach, based as it is on cultural value sys-
tems, illuminates the complex interaction of German state and nonstate actors 
across and beyond national borders in international organizations. Numerous 
avenues of communication made the inner-German border permeable and al-
lowed for the transfer or exchange of ideas, goods, people, and, of course, in-
terpretations of material culture. This book thus brings together scholarship 
on East German and West German design and consumption, which, like most 
of the historiography on postwar Germany, have heretofore developed largely 
separately.11 West Germany’s apparent untainted economic success has not only 
served as a benchmark against which to measure the East German past but has 
also allowed Germany’s eventual integration into the Western system of capital-
ism and liberal values to take on the semblance of a predetermined outcome.12
Moreover, scholars’ tendency to focus on just one part of Germany has led to the 
assumption that the two countries developed in very dierent, indeed contrast-
ing, ways, with a particular interpretation of industrial modernity in the East 
being labeled “socialist modern.”13 Yet studying the two Germanys alongside 
each other underscores how much—and at what points—they inuenced each 
other. Against the backdrop of state policy, the dynamics among designers, en-
trepreneurs, retailers, and ordinary Germans can show when and why these ac-
tors competed or cooperated over the question of what modernization meant for 
the GDR, the Federal Republic, and the relationship between the two countries.
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Designing One Nation thus seeks to oer a narrative that, as historian Kon-
rad Jarausch describes, “break[s] out of the strait-jacket of parallel stories” and 
instead looks at mutual inuence and internal relationships without losing sight 
of ideological dierences.14 Addressing the Cold War from the German perspec-
tive, a focus on trade and design oers a detailed look at instances of exchange 
and even cooperation in Europe across the Cold War divide.15 Such moments 
of German-German agreement came to the fore especially during the so-called 
Second Cold War in the early 1980s, when the Soviet-American relationship 
deteriorated and set the stage for Germany’s gradual diplomatic emancipation. 
The two German states employed the constructive message of product design 
to communicate alternatives to nuclear deterrence for European security and 
peace. These initiatives show that German elites consciously used economic and 
intellectual resources to normalize East-West relations, which eventually under-
mined the Cold War status quo and helped to pave the way for unication. The 
tentative endpoint, the unication of 1990, meanwhile, must be examined with-
out the teleological assumption that East and West Germany are easily identied 
as one nation. Aer all, almost nobody in Germany, East or West, believed that 
reunication would be possible up until the point when it actually happened.16
And yet, in examining a process of rapprochement there are always the pitfalls 
of teleology that undermine the exploration of patterns of past developments. 
Convergence theory of the 1960s predicted the inevitable harmonization of cap-
italist and socialist countries.17 Facing the same challenges of the industrial age, 
the theory assumed, both systems would solve their respective problems with 
similar technological means that eventually would create the same social and 
political modernity. East and West Germany might seem like ideal candidates 
for testing this theory. Yet, convergence implies a kind of linear development 
that glosses over the complex internal relationship that bound the two German 
states together. In fact, East German social scientists rejected the theory, as it 
hollowed out the raison d’être of the socialist project. It was seen as a Western, 
anticommunist plot, and in particular during the years of détente the GDR felt 
as a result that it needed to double down the demarcation eort in the ideo-
logical struggle with the West.18 In going beyond parallel histories of conver-
gence, changing and constantly renegotiated values and norms become visible 
in economic and foreign policy, in processes of production and consumption, in 
applied aesthetic concepts as well as in institutional and individual agency in the 
economic culture of partition. Approaching the German-German past through 
episodes of mutual provocation and cooperation in the eld of economic policy 
therefore allows for a clearer picture of the tensions that fueled their trajectories. 
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At the center stands the question of how the two Germanys turned a competi-
tive situation, the implementation of legitimizing socioeconomic orders, into a 
diplomatic tool for reconciliation.
The sources that shed light on this question come from diverse political, eco-
nomic, and cultural institutional archives, published sources, oral histories, and 
visits to factories and retailers. Among other ocial sources, the book incorpo-
rates previously inaccessible documents on the activities of the West German 
Ministry for Economic Aairs (Bundesministerium für Wirtscha, BMWi) 
and the Permanent Mission (Ständige Vertretung) in East Berlin that detail the 
mechanisms and behind-the-scenes bartering of the intra-German trade. Design 
archives in combination with the papers of the FRG and GDR foreign oces 
helped to establish how the two German states operationalized trade and mate-
rial culture in international organizations for diplomatic goals. Meanwhile, de-
sign magazines, interior design advice literature, and exhibition catalogs oer in-
sights into the changing meanings of material aesthetics. Interviews with former 
East and West German designers and politicians were instrumental in closing 
gaps in the archival documentation of technological and aesthetic development 
in product design, which the GDR referred to as industrial design much earlier 
than the West.19 Visual sources from a number of sociological studies and de-
sign journals provide a rare glimpse into the homes of East and West Germans, 
exposing their levels of taste appropriation and expressions of individuality. 
In addition, visits to furniture manufacturers and retailers helped to establish 
their technological, material, and infrastructural challenges. These wide-rang-
ing sources connect the sphere of policymaking to policy implementation in the 
everyday lives of East and West Germans. The fact that the furniture industry 
developed similarly in terms of mechanization and labor intensity in the two 
Germanys, save for the dierence in resource availability and investment stag-
nation in later decades, allows for a close examination of comparative develop-
ments in production and consumption. It is, for instance, unlike the automotive 
industry, which had disabling structural and competitive inequalities that would 
render any comparison futile from the outset.
The analysis of postwar Germany’s economic culture unfolds in ve thematic 
chapters. Wartime destruction oered an empty canvas for material reinven-
tion in Germany aer the end of the Second World War. Chapter 1 follows the 
rise and fall of disciples from the famous Bauhaus school and members of the 
architecture and design association Werkbund in the institutionalization of 
national product aesthetics in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Their goal to cre-
ate a forward-looking cultural and economic vision for Germany, which would 
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distance it from the politicized aesthetics of the Third Reich, relied initially 
on the modernist mantra “form follows function.” The GDR soon abandoned 
simplistic design in favor of highly ornamented styles to ideologically demarcate 
itself from the West. In the late 1960s, this GDR cultural policy was reversed, 
though not for purely economic reasons during a period of industrial standard-
ization as previous scholarship has proposed. Instead western debates about 
functionalism’s dogmatism enabled the GDR intelligentsia to reclaim modern 
aesthetics for the socialist planned economy.
Turning discourse on ocial aesthetics into practice set both German states 
on a track toward “nation branding.” The term describes the eorts of a network 
of designers and producers to create a narrative of political signicance around 
their products. Chapter 2 oers a behind-the-scenes look at this translation pro-
cess in the furniture industry. In particular, it underscores the business ethos of 
small- and medium-sized enterprises, the backbone of Germany’s industry, in 
both economic systems. Ultimately, this demonstrates that durable designs and 
quality materials were favored in both economic systems, although execution 
varied according to resources.
Domestic economic structures were not the only way in which national brand 
similarities were discovered and maintained. By the mid-1960s, the two German 
production cultures started to converge in a rationalized, streamlined aesthetic. 
It was not the case that, when faced with the same economic problems, capitalist 
and communist systems inevitably arrived at similar solutions. Rather, while 
the FRG successfully regained a reputation for excellence in interior design, the 
need for foreign currency in the GDR eventually led to a search for customers in 
the global market. This economic reorientation gave incentives to East German 
designers and producers to cater to western trends and tastes. Chapter 3 reveals 
how intra-German trade, strategically nanced by the Federal Republic, played 
a signicant role in undermining the Cold War division in Europe and paved 
the way for East-West cultural rapprochement.
With a focus on material culture as a means of diplomacy, chapter 4 demon-
strates how industrial design became an important part of trade as a lingua 
franca in the German Question and oered space for exploration of alternatives 
to eastern and western alignment. The analysis builds on a growing literature on 
German cultural diplomacy and expands design histories by exploring industrial 
design’s—and related questions of export trade’s—operationalization for diplo-
matic purposes in the context of German division.20 It examines cultural activ-
ities in the International Council of Societies of Industrial Designers (ICSID) 
and the friendly competition that emerged from it in the context of talks about 
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cultural cooperation following the German-German Basic Treaty in 1972. De-
spite attempts by the Federal Republic to isolate East Germany, the GDR suc-
ceeded in using membership in international organizations as stepping-stones 
toward international recognition. It is here that the potential for a “third way” 
between eastern and western integration emerged in German foreign policy.
Beyond the spheres of production and trade, consumers constituted an im-
portant factor in economic culture. Contemporary politicians and industrial 
designers were concerned about the taste levels among the population and imple-
mented a multitude of strategies, such as publications and design exhibitions, to 
educate consumers from the 1950s onward. Not only were consumers the target 
of prescriptive elite taste education, but I argue in chapter 5 that they also pre-
sented a benchmark for success in establishing particular domestic cultures that 
expressed respective political and economic goals. Interestingly, despite the ap-
parent dierences between what economist János Kornai has named the socialist 
“economics of shortage” and the western market economy of abundance, simi-
lar narratives about functionalist aesthetics emerged in East and West German 
homes. They reveal a conservative modernism shaped by traditional elements 
in social and housing policy that translated into moderated production designs 
and consumer tastes.
The Cold War determined the context for the dicult relationship between 
the Federal Republic and the GDR, and the partition le Europe with the ques-
tion of whether or not Germany should be able to unite and what role it should 
play in the region. While this “German Question” lost its political urgency 
aer the peaceful unication of 1990, it is still part and parcel of its Cold War 
history.1 The lens of economic culture and related questions of design, trade, 
and consumption in combination with the political dimensions of the German 
Question oer an intriguing alternative to traditional Cold War histories of 
Germany that emphasize rivalry. In revealing similarities and instances of col-
laboration, it refocuses Germany’s Cold War history on the special relationship 
between the two German states. The ndings help to explain the relative stabil-
ity of the division over four decades and illuminate the comparatively smooth 
transition to unication in 1990. Moreover, they show how, in particular, West 
Germany—underneath thick layers of Western integration and international 
politics that strived to isolate the GDR—invested in sustainable economic and 
cultural policies that kept alive ties across the Iron Curtain, in the end designing 
one nation.
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Ch a pter 1
Form Follows Function
Industrial Design and the Emergence of Postwar Economic Culture
I n 1967, Walter Gropius, founder of the Bauhaus School and then émi-gré to the United States, wrote a letter to the Federal Ministry for Economic Aairs (Bundesministerium für Wirtscha
, BMWi) to intervene in the 
debate about state funding for design institutions. Expressing his astonishment 
about West Germany’s limited use of design resources to enhance the national 
prestige of its production, Gropius warned that the federal government was 
making an enormous mistake: “More than ever, I am convinced that the solu-
tion to cultural-political questions touched upon by design belong at the center 
of public interest, not the periphery.” A
er all, design institutions such as the 
Deutscher Werkbund and the Bauhaus had once asserted Germany’s interna-
tional leadership in modernist aesthetics, the architect maintained. Convinced 
that the Bauhaus tradition had been appraised “inaccurately” by the political 
and cultural elites in Germany, he identi	ed “a lack of connections to powerful 
	gures in government and economy a
er the war” as the real reason for this 
negligence.1
Gropius’s intervention came at a moment of cultural crisis in West Germany 
that placed the rational-modern aesthetics of functionalism at the center of pub-
lic political debate. Material culture was one of many battle	elds on which the 
1968 generation challenged the conservative reconstruction values of Adenauer’s 
Germany. Disappointed by how little two decades of eorts at cultural reinven-
tion had achieved in terms of creating a truly democratic West German society, 
social movements demanded a more honest examination of Germany’s national 
culture, not least in regard to the Nazi past. Their requests led to the realization 
that, because Adenauer had prioritized Western integration and Cold War com-
petition with the GDR over dealing honestly with the legacy of the Third Reich, 
postwar aesthetics had lost their impetus for true democratic reform. This in 
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turn enabled the GDR eventually to reclaim modern, functional aesthetics and 
production ethics for the socialist project in the East. Curiously, the cultural cri-
sis in the West put the two German national aesthetics on a path of convergence.
While the late 1960s were thus a watershed moment in pan-German aesthetic 
development, the expatriate Gropius could not have been further from the truth 
in his evaluation of industrial design’s signi	cance in postwar Germany. An 
analysis of institutionalization processes in cultural and economic politics of the 
immediate postwar years on either side of the Iron Curtain reveals how deeply 
interlinked and invested the interwar design elites were in the construction of 
postfascist societies. In fact, interior design and questions pertaining to the cre-
ation of new ways of living in East and West Germany received much attention 
as well as resources from the governments due to pressing demands for housing 
and, consequently, furniture.
Meanwhile, the war-scarred economy required ecient use of limited re-
sources. Ocials looked for structural solutions that could cultivate an eco-
nomic culture built on greater coherence among the dierent participants in the 
production and consumption processes. Both Bonn and East Berlin supported 
proposals to develop institutions that would professionalize designers, acquaint 
producers with the merits of quality, or “good,” design, and educate consumers 
in questions of style and taste to create the “right” demand within the scope of 
available resources. Contrary to Gropius’s assertion that interwar design and its 
proponents had been forgotten, the members of the Werkbund and Bauhaus 
in particular pioneered this material cultural reinvention in both Germanys. 
Moreover, the rational aesthetic philosophy of interwar modernism served as a 
common point of reference in East and West Germany, alternating between an 
ideal to aspire to and a foil to reject, but in either case shaping German postwar 
culture. While the discourse 	rst focused on aesthetics as the visual communica-
tor of societal change and progress, this was not an entirely cultural undertaking. 
Despite vast changes in levels of prosperity and general public well-being on 
either side of the border over the 	rst two postwar decades, the discursive con-
cepts that tied the idea of “good design” to sensible economics remained stable.2
What happened during this period of design institutionalization in the years 
from 1945 to 1967 that led Gropius to assume that postwar West Germany had 
neglected the legacy of Bauhaus modernism? To answer this question this chap-
ter follows debates surrounding the politicization of aesthetics as well as their 
institutionalization in East and West Germany from a comparative perspective. 
It does so to illuminate the cultural and economic recon	guration of two diver-
gent German political systems, marred by their National Socialist past, whose 
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attempts at rehabilitation extended from the public sphere all the way into the 
homes of the population. As a uni	ed future moved out of reach with the intro-
duction of the West German Mark (Deutsche Mark, DM) or D-Mark in 1948, 
the two German states explored diverging aesthetic options to develop identi-
ties for their part of the country. Cultural concerns about reconstruction design 
and living standards, o
en fought out in the 	eld of economics, increasingly 
mirrored domestic and international tensions over the question of Germany’s 
division. It is thus important to consider how developments in both German 
states inuenced each other.
At the same time, the reconstruction challenge connected the two Germanys 
to debates that were happening in other societies, illuminating the European 
dimension of postwar cultural and economic reform. For instance, Swedish and 
British design institutions inspired the German institutionalization process and 
served as a point of reference for both the West German Design Council (Rat 
für Formgebung, RfF) and the East German Central Institute for Design (Zen-
tralinstitut für Formgestaltung, ZfF; renamed Amt für industrielle Formge-
staltung, AiF, in 1972). Britain established its Council of Industrial Design “to 
promote by all practicable means the improvement of design in the products of 
British industry” in 1944.3 Dedicated to quality control, consumer education, 
and national trademark promotion, this institution would be decisive in shaping 
a cohesive aesthetic for British national design and projecting a modern image 
abroad.4 Turning a war economy to peacetime production presented a parallel 
challenge, and thus the Germans were eager to learn. But the fact that in Ger-
many this process began under Allied occupation added another layer to the 
debate. Both American and Soviet occupiers attempted to envelop their part of 
Germany culturally into their sphere of inuence, which remained a contentious 
issue domestically and internationally throughout the reconstruction period.
Looking at political action and reactions on both sides of the Iron Curtain 
highlights exchanges across the increasingly forti	ed inner-German border and 
tenable analysis of how these exchanges shaped structural and cultural devel-
opments in East and West Germany. It also furthers understanding of how po-
litical and structural dierences inuenced the ability of modernism’s disciples 
to realize their vision of postfascist modernity in democratic and socialist soci-
eties. Cultural exchange across the Wall has been documented before, o
en as 
inuenced by Americanization or Westernization.5 While Western inuence 
certainly 	gured largely as a backdrop to Germany’s postwar consumerist turn, 
Americanization is a less helpful concept when looking at industrial design as a 
professional 	eld, as it threatens to overemphasize Allied inuence in this area of 
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German cultural development and to underplay the legacy of interwar aesthet-
ics in the German-German relationship. East German designers in particular 
have been portrayed as uninspired copyists, who followed Western trends to 
answer public demand and were thus complicit in the regime’s strategy to bribe 
the GDR population via consumer goods in return for political support.6 Such 
a view eclipses GDR design’s creative potential while focusing on the East’s con-
sumer good production output, which admittedly remained inferior throughout 
the Cold War due to the lack of appropriate machinery and quality materials, 
and mismanagement. In fact, a rich and visionary discourse took place in the 
GDR that far exceeded West German thinking about the material environment 
and its place in postwar society. Tracing the politics of German postwar design 
in both national cultures underscores mutual fertilization, while revisiting as-
sumptions about East German achievements, or the purported lack thereof, that 
have developed in public memory.
The Long Shadow of National Socialism: 
Reinterpreting German Modernism
Historical scholarship on German industrial design has established that aesthet-
ics did not change very much from 1925 to 1965: “What did change . . . was the 
cultural meaning and representation of design, as the very same objects were em-
braced by dramatically incongruous political regimes as visual markers of their 
speci	c political projects,” historian Paul Betts explains.7 This time frame brack-
ets the heyday of modernism referenced in Gropius’s comments, a time of great 
inuence for the German architecture and design reformers of the Deutscher 
Werkbund and the Bauhaus. The Werkbund, an association of architects, art-
ists, and aesthete industrialists founded in 1907, had a long tradition of involve-
ment in German cultural politics. It adopted “social aesthetics” as its cause, 
which the association promoted via exhibitions, competitions, and publications 
until the National Socialist regime absorbed it into its cultural organizations in 
1933.8 Founded by Walter Gropius in 1919, the avant-gardist Bauhaus school has 
become synonymous with German modernism in architecture, photography, 
painting, and product design.9 Germany’s politically tumultuous 	rst half of the 
twentieth  century continuously aected how the Werkbund and the Bauhaus 
operated in changing political environments.
Since the Wilhelmine period, Werkbund activities had focused on forging 
ties to political circles to fund their vision of modernity based on the moral and 
educational value of everyday objects.10 They reacted against the mechanizing 
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elements of industrialization, which had been perceived as a threat to traditional 
cra
smanship and the cultural value of goods since the second half of the nine-
teenth century. Werkbund members, theorists and practitioners alike, looked to 
reconcile industrial production (standardization) and design (spiritualization) 
in aesthetic, social, and economic regards. They strove to achieve a quality of 
objectivity “through adopting a rational approach to form-giving, guided by the 
requirements of engineering and technology, which were deeply respected.”11
Emphasizing the use of quality materials and simple, functional shapes, the as-
sociation promoted the concept of “good design” as a middle ground between 
alienating mechanical asceticism and abundant decoration to introduce a mate-
rial culture of modern everyday objects.12 In later years, the credo “form follows 
function” united the Bauhaus with these Werkbund ideas.
The post–World War I era saw an expansion and radicalization of such design 
conceptions, which developed traction particularly in urban planning and pub-
lic housing.13 The Great Depression abruptly ended a period of state-supported 
architectural experimentation in 1929, leaving many ideas for the industrial age 
unexplored, and the Werkbund henceforth struggled with its association with 
this vision of failed industrialism.14 The movement thus came under attack both 
from the political le
 and right. Werkbund ideals for industrial modernism pre-
sented a provocation to cultural conservatives who feared that industrialization 
would do away with distinctly German culture. On the le
, radical Marxists 
condemned Werkbund elites for being detached from the masses and wasting 
their talents on designing luxuries.15 With the Nazi seizure of power, the Werk-
bund ceased to exist as a private association and was brought 	rst under the 
jurisdiction of Joseph Goebbels’s Reich Chamber of the Visual Arts (Reichs-
kammer der bildenden Künste) and later under that of the Reich Chamber of 
Culture (Reichskulturkammer).16 Despite their dierent political perspectives, 
Werkbund industrial modernism and Nazi culture, with its agricultural “blood 
and soil” ideology, proved to be compatible at least in the realm of industry, 
rationalization, and propaganda.17
It was this aesthetic and political legacy against which the Werkbund had to 
reconstitute a
er World War II. Indeed, its problematic involvement with the 
Nazi regime was something that the Werkbund desired to leave in the past. In 
contrast, the 1933 closure of the Bauhaus and the resulting emigration of most of 
its teachers freed the Bauhaus legacy from any allegations of complicity with the 
Nazi regime. In postwar West Germany, the term “Bauhaus modernism” carried 
an antifascist connotation, rendering it initially a safer aesthetic reference than 
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“Werkbund functionalism” in the public sphere. Bauhaus modernism served as 
shorthand for everything that National Socialism opposed.18 As a result, this 
term distinguished the Federal Republic culturally from the Third Reich, but it 
also released both theoreticians and practitioners of industrial design from any 
inherent necessity to seriously consider design’s sociopolitical function. More-
over, modernism’s association with an untainted past made it dicult for the 
intellectual elite to critique the aesthetics and their political instrumentalization 
in postwar Germany. Associated with Western democratic values, art historian 
Frederic J. Schwartz concludes, Bauhaus aesthetics le
 the Federal Republic 
without the necessary reference points, concepts, or terminology to move be-
yond its past.19
Nevertheless, the devastated and bombed-out cities oered the Werkbund 
a new beginning and manifold opportunities for imprinting its principles on 
postwar material culture. In a turn away from the visual politics of fascism that 
emphasized the aestheticization of the relationship between people in the pub-
lic arena, such as Albert Speer’s grandiose productions for the National Social-
ist German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, 
NSDAP) mass rallies, the postfascist campaign focused on the private sphere.20
In an eort to overcome the administrative and economic divisions imposed by 
Allied occupation, the Werkbund joined forces with former Bauhaus students 
in both the eastern and western zones of Germany to encourage the institution-
alization of industrial design with the deliberate goal of maintaining a uni	ed 
cultural identity.21 Yet the aesthetic continuity with Weimar functionalism in 
spite of political change posed challenges for the successive regimes on German 
territory: how to instill new meaning into the relationship between politics and 
design, between people and things, when the material culture, for all intents and 
purposes, looked the same?
Immediately a
er the war, the Werkbund re-established regional groups in 
the eastern and western occupation zones in cities like Dresden, East and West 
Berlin, Düsseldorf, and Stuttgart. The association quickly gained ocial rec-
ognition with the western authorities. By the summer of 1948, regional gov-
ernments subsidized the Werkbund group West-Nord with DM 10,000 annu-
ally and the Bavarian cultural ministry generously gave its regional group DM 
60,000 per year.22 Public 	nancial support signi	ed an acknowledgment of 
design as a constitutive part of the reconstruction eort and an early irtation 
with modernist aesthetics in the West. Such ocial cooperation considerably fa-
cilitated the Werkbund’s later involvement in the foundation of a West German 
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design council that would continue the association’s mission to prevent the pro-
duction of kitsch and educate the consumer about the “right” consumption.
The Werkbund bid for aesthetic leadership in the Federal Republic with two 
domestic culture exhibitions mounted in Cologne and Stuttgart in 1949. New 
Dwelling and How to Dwell? showed modernist solutions for small families in 
the bombed-out cities in Germany’s west. Northern European, Swiss, and Amer-
ican inuences were immediately visible. Any con	dence in once-powerful 
Werkbund ideals existed only in the exhibitions’ reliance on abstraction for the 
product placement in the displays.23 Promoting pure minimalism in furnishings, 
New Dwelling prescribed Germans modesty in their consumer behavior. The 
exhibition encouraged moral choices based on a collective commitment to 
counter the corrupting inuence of materialism, false abundance, or pretentious 
ornamentation.24 The Werkbund tied its tradition of taste education (Ge-
schmacksbildung) to its struggle against kitsch, which had long been associated 
with social decay.25 Photographs from this exhibition show multifunctional 
room settings that are best described as empty. This decorating style stemmed 
from the poor state of the German economy, underscored by an outdated prewar 
product range peppered with barely 	nished prototypes. But it also expressed 
the Werkbund’s renewed search for socially responsible aesthetics. A poster pro-
claiming “Werkbund is no Luxury” (Werkbund ist kein Luxus) advertised a re-
incarnation of the failed interwar mission: to make aordable and well-designed 
products for the masses.26 The Economic Administration for the Tri-Zone pub-
licly embraced the Werkbund eort, which heralded the dawn of national solu-
tions to problems of Germany’s postwar housing crisis.27 Earlier that year, the 
Economic Administration had entered negotiations with the Werkbund about 
a “committee for design,” but this had not come to fruition because of unsettled 
	nances and an alleged lack of dedication on the part of the Werkbund. Never-
theless, Werkbund members publicly announced the idea for a national “council 
for industrial design” at their annual congress in June 1949 in Cologne, under-
lining again their claim to cultural leadership in the everyday.28 With West Ger-
many still under Allied occupation, the realization of such a council, however, 
hinged on the restoration of a German-led government to power and the right 
motivation for investment in cultural politics at the national level. Such motiva-
tion eventually materialized with the growing reappearance of German products 
on the global market.
Meanwhile, the Werkbund groups in the Soviet zone of occupation increas-
ingly lost their political inuence. The Soviet Military Administration in Ger-
many (SMAD) cemented political leadership with the SED in 1946, a 	rst step 
figure 1.1. Graphic designer Hanns Lohrer designed this poster 
advertising one of the 	rst postwar Werkbund exhibitions,  
the How to Dwell? show in Stuttgart, 1949. Photograph courtesy  
of Werkbundarchiv—Museum der Dinge Berlin 020627.  
© Hanns Lohrer succession.
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toward the party dictatorship that would emerge in 1949.29 Irritated by the coer-
cive centralization of most cultural 	elds, prominent Werkbund members, such 
as industrial designer Wilhelm Wagenfeld in East Berlin and architect Egon 
Eiermann in Dresden, emigrated to the West. Others committed to the Werk-
bund and Bauhaus principles holding stronger socialist ideals, such as industrial 
designers Mart Stam and Horst Michel and architect Selman Selmanagic, re-
mained in the eastern zone.30 The SMAD opened schools for the education of 
designers, beginning with the Weimar University for Architecture and the Arts 
in 1946. Weimar, signi	cant as the location of the 	rst Bauhaus school, thus 
remained a postwar center for artists, architects, and designers. Horst Michel, 
an experienced member of famed architect and interior designer Bruno Paul’s 
studio, started an industrial design program there.31 Provincial Weimar turned 
out to be the perfect setting to reconstitute East Germany’s material culture, 
oering Michel and the university the opportunity for diverse partnerships with 
local industries.32
In contrast to his West German counterparts who had practically unlim-
ited possibilities in their approach to industrial design, Michel found his work 
increasingly circumscribed by socialist ideology and constraints of nascent po-
litical centralization. The challenge lay in materially expressing the immaterial 
virtues of socialism, which, Michel recognized, entailed not only the aesthetic 
education of designers but also the education of consumers to create the right 
demand for a socialist domestic environment. In Michel’s eyes, durability, hon-
esty, eective use of materials, reduced storage and transportation costs, and the 
avoidance of moral decay and pretension of value appreciation via “unauthentic” 
materials or embellished surfaces marked good socialist design.33 These qualities 
	t perfectly with the eastern occupation zone’s plans for industrialization of 
cra
s in large-scale production. At the same time, they closely aligned with the 
Werkbund vision in the West, equally concerned with the moral perils of kitsch. 
To Michel, kitsch embodied the reverse of socialist ideals, a complex concept of 
pro	t-induced diversity that diers from today’s de	nition of kitsch as cheap 
trumpery. Like other twentieth-century cultural critics, Michel blamed kitsch 
on capitalist industrialization and mass production:
It seems to be necessary to 	ght increasingly rampant kitsch and its inher-
ent waste of resources at the level of the state and to inuence the quality 
of products from cra
s and industry. The multiplicity of shapes, more or 
less resulting from 	nancial greed, the amassing of dishonest pomp on ap-
pliances of the everyday and basic commodities, as well as the wasting of 
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resources mean an exploitation of the people and dissipation of the peo-
ple’s wealth.34
Anticipating the later GDR economic motto “if only good is produced, nothing 
bad can be sold,” Michel dra
ed a “Law Against the Exploitation of the People 
by Kitsch” and introduced it into the Thuringia regional parliament in 1947.35
While the Kitsch bill did not pass, he successfully introduced a quality seal for 
cra
s and applied arts in Thuringia: a white lily and hammer in a blue circle. Re-
tailers recognized the merits of the seal and priced these products higher, which 
in turn incentivized industry and cra
s to produce better products. With the 
cooperation of local companies, Michel also assembled household wares and ce-
ramics in large juried shows that created criteria for socialist good design. This 
practice continued in later years during standardization and Sortimentsberei-
nigung, an eort to reduce the number of models for a given product to increase 
Plan eciency and industrial output.36 These episodes illustrate Michel’s in-
volvement in ideological debates about production and kitsch even before the 
ocial founding of the German Democratic Republic. While his principled take 
on socialist good design aligned with economic policy, his aesthetic sensitivities 
would soon clash with ocial stylistic development under Soviet inuence.
Between 1946 and 1948, the SMAD worked toward the centralization of 
cultural politics in cooperation with its German partners.37 Here the SED 
hoped to ensure uniformity in the political reorganization process that accom-
panied the growing German division. By May 1948 the SED announced an 
all-encompassing claim to cultural leadership at the party’s Culture Conference 
(Kulturtag): “[The Culture Conference] has illustrated the character of the 
Party as a party of culture in the broadest sense of the word as well as the leading 
intellectual force in Germany’s democratic reconstruction.”38 Henceforth, prin-
ciples of party control, rather than artistic and aesthetic concerns, guided East 
German cultural and educational policies. Consequently, the Kulturtag marked 
the end of any assumed or aspired cultural unity between East and West. The 
decision to pursue a “socialist” culture in the eastern zone of occupation allowed 
the SED to model its part of Germany on the Soviet example, in contrast to the 
liberal cultural fabric of the Federal Republic. These contrasting approaches to 
cultural policy set the stage for similarly divergent national aesthetics in East and 
West Germany during the reconstruction period.
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Separate Economies, Separate Design
The nascent cultural division between East and West deepened as the West-
ern Allies took measures to solidify the war-damaged German economy. The 
Marshall Plan and the currency reform of 1948 cemented the separation, cre-
ating two German economies. Acting against the Allied agreement on Germa-
ny’s economic unity at the 1945 Potsdam conference, Britain, France, and the 
United States merged their occupation zones and treated this territory of the 
so-called Trizone as a single economic unit while de facto excluding the Soviet 
zone of occupation.39 Eventually, the subsequent Soviet blockade of Berlin be-
tween June 1948 and May 1949, challenging joint control over Berlin, eectively 
foreclosed Allied cooperation in Germany and complicated the status of Berlin. 
These events dashed hopes for a uni	ed future and le
 Germany to emerge as 
the ideological battleground of the Cold War.
When East Germany achieved statehood as the German Democratic Repub-
lic in the fall of 1949, cultural delineation from the West became a pressing ideo-
logical concern. The construction of a national identity by the GDR included 
the socialist remaking of society and all its underlying structures. Toward these 
ends, early state socialism and its artistic proponents took a comprehensive ap-
proach to the human environment, discussing new ways of feeling, thinking, 
and living speci	c to the working class.40 Such eorts followed the example of 
the constructivists in the Soviet Union of the 1920s, an avant-garde movement 
that had shi
ed the focus from art for art’s sake to an active engagement in 
processes of sociopolitical restructuring inspired by the goals of the Bolshevik 
Revolution. The constructivist understanding of artistic production rendered 
every aesthetic decision a political one.41 Aesthetic expressions were meant to 
impact the population in its evolution toward revolutionary consciousness.42
Art and the material environment therefore played an important role in the 
education of the socialist individual and the creation of collective socialist 
identity.
While the constructivist bond between politics and culture had remained 
strong under Stalin, the carefully cra
ed relationship between art and the ev-
eryday was replaced by material culture that favored form and emotionality over 
function, a style commonly known as socialist realism.43 Socialist realist archi-
tecture, for instance, explored extremes, achieving monumental, heavily orna-
mented, and pompous aesthetics.44 Instead of integrating art into the everyday, 
under Stalin art came to dominate the design of everyday objects, betraying the 
ideas of the Bolshevik avant-garde. The GDR arrived at similar juncture in its 
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socialist aesthetic development about twenty-	ve years later, an outcome prede-
termined by the Soviet example.
During the years of occupation, the SMAD demanded German recognition 
of Soviet cultural superiority.45 While Soviet inuence remained considerable 
a
er 1949, East Germans increasingly commanded their own state apparatus 
and decision-making, at least in regard to domestic policies. Consequently, the 
SED faced the task of creating the parameters of a German socialist culture, 
which not only encompassed high culture forms of the arts in literature, paint-
ing, and music but also the culture of everyday life. Industrial design, the ma-
terial manifestation of socialist thought and its realization at the crossroads of 
applied arts and economic planning, became part of this aesthetic reinvention.
East Germany’s socially conscious approach to cultural rebuilding did not go 
unnoticed in the West.46 A
er Werkbund member Wilhelm Wagenfeld, one 
of Germany’s most inuential Bauhaus-trained designers, had le
 the East, he 
warned Hermann Veit, the minister of Economic Aairs of Baden-Württem-
berg, in 1949: “I am from Berlin and, therefore, from the Germany beyond the 
zone border. I have seen that we can counter the East only with a new intel-
lectual world and, thus, with new social empathy and thinking.”47 Wagenfeld 
understood the intellectual appeal of socialism as he himself held le
ist political 
views and had remained loyal to the Werkbund mission that promoted design-
ers’ social responsibility. Most important though, by suggesting that western 
material culture was to be inscribed with moral meaning, Wagenfeld pointed to 
the need for a deeper rethinking of social and cultural structures to counter the 
lure of socialist material collectivism. At the same time, his remarks show that 
industrial design became a competitive 	eld in the German Cold War, which 
began to shape the West German discourse in contrast to the quickly developing 
socialist alternative in the East.
Wagenfeld’s warning to the Baden-Württemberg administration echoed 
West German intellectuals’ earlier antifascist campaigns for a complete break 
with the German past. Their vision included an alternative material and so-
cial philosophy that stood in opposition to the so-called war-mongering forces 
of nationalism and capitalism. They envisioned a social revolution that would 
give birth to a humanized, non-Marxist Germany in the middle of a united 
Europe led by the young generation with “its perceived condition of alienation 
from the German past.”48 Yet this radical new beginning did not occur. Instead, 
supported by the Western Allies, the older Weimar generation took control in 
Bonn and quickly marginalized the le




 emerged most clearly in West Germany’s foreign trade am-
bitions. As the country gradually reintegrated into international economic cir-
cles as a contributor to the reconstruction of Europe, West Germans longed to 
rekindle export relations and publicized their adherence to Western capitalist 
principles and peaceful economic competition.49 To test the waters, the Trizone 
participated in the Decorate Your House exhibition in New York in early 1949. 
It was the 	rst time since World War II that the occupiers granted German 
industrialists permission to take part in an international trade event. In his 
opening remarks to the German industry show catalog, Ludwig Erhard, the di-
rector of the tri-zone economic administration, expressed his hope that the West 
German display would prove to the world that “the German people’s only desire 
today is to strive diligently for the improvement of human and social welfare and 
to show that they have kept their strength and ability for the accomplishment of 
this desire despite all the mistakes and the terror of the previous decade.”50 Yet 
Erhard downplayed the materialistic and commercial components of Germany’s 
participation in the fair, thereby missing an opportunity to establish a cultural 
bond based on shared attitudes toward trade and consumption with the West, 
particularly the United States. Instead, he placed German economic recovery in 
a moral and social context, thus emphasizing the ethical importance of aesthetic 
reinvention. New German aesthetics, he pronounced, should display industri-
ousness and eciency in the service of the common good, which implied a re-
jection of the pompous aesthetics connected to the public displays of National 
Socialism. Moreover, Erhard’s statement expressed the perhaps naïve sentiment 
among the West German political and economic elites that economic prosperity 
could replace, if not redeem, the vices of the Third Reich in public memory. In 
this way, politicians began to instill German products with symbolic meaning 
that went beyond economic values, but fell short of a progressive social vision.
Erhard embraced these material promises for a better future and promoted 
them abroad as new West German virtues. He described the New York exhi-
bition displays as conveying the “honest work of German hands and minds.”51
The German trade show participation in New York thus marked a watershed 
moment in cultural diplomacy, which was henceforth wrapped in a rhetoric that 
equated aesthetic quality and material reliability with moral deliverance from 
the Nazi past, which, it was hoped, would improve West Germany’s interna-
tional standing.52 These initial years of western economic activity coupled with 
a new morality laid the foundation for a West German democratic identity based 
on economic success that came to fruition during the “economic miracle” of the 
late 1950s and 1960s.
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While the catalog clearly presented the message of a recivilized Germany, the 
material content of the New York displays failed to convince its intended audi-
ence.53 Showcasing curved, heavy recliners and an embellished display cabinet 
made of mahogany, the German exhibition received reviews that ranged from 
ridicule to outrage at what was regarded as impractical, pompous kitsch.54 Inse-
cure about what kind of aesthetic could best demonstrate Germans’ reformed 
postwar attitudes, exhibitioners relied on best-selling Bavarian arts and cra
s 
and Louis XV–style furniture. Such bold designs with extravagant use of mate-
rials, though, felt inappropriate amid the postwar scarcity of resources and living 
space. Critiques centered on the impression created of a culturally backward 
and arrogant Germany, the failure to break culturally with the Nazi past, and 
Germany’s abandonment of its heritage of international modernism.55 It gave 
cause for concern that products “made in Germany” could again gain a negative 
reputation on the global market.56 A
er this opprobrium in New York, West 
Germany’s political and industrial elites 	nally realized that aesthetic reinven-
tion warranted more organized approaches.
The Struggle to Institutionalize Modern German Aesthetics
The following period from 1950 through 1953 proved critical in German state-di-
rected industrial design as intensifying cultural debates led to the creation of 
design councils in East and West. A
er decades of lobbying, the Werkbund 
goals 	nally intersected with government interests in the early 1950s to create 
a modern German identity. Notably, the acknowledgment of the economic di-
mension of design in both Germanys resulted in the same conceptual shi
: Both 
the East and West German governments created central institutions dedicated 
to the development of national aesthetics.
In stark contrast to the centralized state administration in the East, the fed-
eral organization of West Germany assigned the individual states authority for 
culture, education, and regional economic development. Within this pluralistic 
and decentralized state-building process, lobbying became a strong feature of 
West German political culture. The Werkbund aimed its lobbying activities at 
making the institutionalization of industrial design a governmental priority. 
The creation of a national Werkbund umbrella organization in 1950 under archi-
tect Hans Schwippert’s leadership decisively shaped the course of events.57 This 
united Werkbund successfully impressed upon the Adenauer administration the 
notion that a centralized governmental institution should oversee West Germa-
ny’s commodity aesthetic. With its close ties to Bonn’s political elite—Theodor 
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Heuss, the 	rst president of the FRG, was a member—the Werkbund mem-
bers were able to discuss the idea with representatives of the Federal Ministry 
of Economics and to win the support of parliamentarian Arno Hennig (Social 
Democratic Party, SPD) for the design council plans in the Bundestag.58 In Oc-
tober 1950, Werkbund member Heinrich König was invited to bring the plans 
for a national design council before the Bundestag Committee on Cultural Pol-
icy. Reminding the parliamentarians of the embarrassment at the New York 
exhibition, König connected Germany’s international reputation to domestic 
reconstruction needs: “Instead of handy, functional, and comfortable things to 
furnish the small apartments of public housing, producers oer heavy, pomp-
ous show-pieces of impractical arrangement.” König concluded that it created 
a situation in which “production continued with no regard to the real needs of 
the masses.”59 While economic connections between design and export rates 
dominated the ensuing discussion, the limited mentions of aesthetic consider-
ations emphasized shaping a national style. Referencing national brands of world 
renown, such as Murano glass, Brussels lace, and French luxury commodities, 
expert witness Max Wiederanders reminded the committee to demand qual-
ity production that German consumers could trust. Although assimilation to 
foreign tastes was thought to increase exports, he regarded this to be of second-
ary importance as German workmanship in quality products would speak for 
itself.60 What was needed, according to the Werkbund and its supporters, was 
a national institution capable of executing a prescriptive and holistic aesthetic 
reform program. Yet, gaining unlimited support for a national design council 
proved dicult in the early years of the FRG, because it countered the trend of 
cultural decentralization.
At the same time, the heightened anticommunism of the early Cold War as 
well as the existence of the East German socialist alternative made the parlia-
ment suspicious about le
ist inuences on national aesthetics. Given this parlia-
mentary apprehension and its historic connections to le
ist reform movements, 
the Werkbund changed its strategy to complement the government’s two main 
interests in industrial design: export increase and the diplomatic value of mate-
rial culture. At subsequent parliamentary hearings in 1950 and 1951, Werkbund 
representatives again invoked the embarrassment of the New York fair to stress 
the economic gains that the Federal Republic could acquire through the national 
organization of design activities. Eventually, the evident economic opportunity 
trumped concerns about undermining cultural federalism as the Bundestag 
voted in favor of the initiative with only one opposing vote in 1951.61 This vote 
swi
ly formalized the Federal Republic’s claim to Weimar modernism, ensured 
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Werkbund control over design politics, and set the country on the path to 	nd-
ing a West German aesthetic that could withstand Americanization.
Indeed, the Western Allies, particularly the American military administra-
tion, intensi	ed eorts to integrate West Germany culturally into the ranks of 
Western democratic nations. Financed by the Marshall Plan for Western Eu-
rope, the traveling exhibition We Build a Better Life introduced modern home 
design to the West German population in 1952. During its three-week run, it 
drew half a million visitors in Berlin (40 percent of them from the East), Ha-
nover, and Stuttgart. The exhibition catalog announced that “the same taste, 
same needs, and same interests bond the Atlantic community tightly together.”62
This “same taste” was a commitment to a modernist aesthetic reminiscent of the 
Bauhaus, with clear lines, sparsely furnished rooms, and the limited use of pat-
terned fabrics and ornamented household wares. Many of the objects had been 
recycled from the annual “good design” exhibitions at New York’s Museum of 
Modern Art (MoMA), as Edgar Kaufmann Jr., curator of its industrial design 
department, had been hired for this Marshall Plan initiative by the US State De-
partment.63 Much eort went into subduing the impression of cultural Amer-
icanization. US information ocers stressed the inclusiveness of the aesthetic 
in press releases, and West German media conveyed the message: “There are 
dierent versions of one style and one way of life typical for a ‘western bourgeois’ 
household. Nothing is foreign to us, whether it comes from Berlin or Los Ange-
les, from Stockholm, Sicily or New York.”64 Nevertheless, many of the modern 
kitchen appliances had been imported from the United States and were unat-
tainable by the average West German at the time.
In general, West German attitudes toward American patronage in industrial 
design were conicted. US inuence could not be completely avoided in the 
early years of the Federal Republic as American funding co	nanced a number 
of public institutions. For example, industrial designer Walter Kersting, an out-
spoken US critic, registered his concerns that American funding for the Ulm 
School of Design (Hochschule für Gestaltung Ulm, HfG Ulm) in Baden-Würt-
temberg would give Americans control over German design. In a 1951 letter to 
Ludwig Erhard he wrote, “Above all, the idea that the United States will guide us 
to a new culture of design is no gain for the German reputation in the world.”65
Instead, Kersting pleaded for the founding of an exclusively German industrial 
design school, but to no avail. Eventually, Inge Scholl joined with Swiss designer 
Max Bill, a Bauhaus student and head of the Swiss Werkbund, in 1953 to found 
the school with American support that would provide a model for responsible 
political education. Its curriculum was to address the materialization of politics 
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through design, giving design a moral authority in de	ning the character of 
postwar life.66 The goal was to “educate a democratic elite as a counterforce 
against the tides of intolerance.”67 The HfG Ulm labeled itself the “New Bau-
haus” in 1955, thus signaling to the world that antifascist resistance and inter-
national modernism were alive and well in the Federal Republic.68 It moreover 
reinforced West Germany’s claim to Bauhaus modernism as its cultural heritage. 
Financed mainly by the Scholl Foundation, the project was also funded by the 
regional government of Baden-Württemberg and the American high commis-
sioner, John J. McCloy. Despite taking American money, HfG Ulm quickly de-
veloped a design vision with an anti-American stance that objected to Western 
mass consumerism. Bill, Scholl, and Scholl’s graphic designer husband Otl Ai-
cher strove to develop designs that were driven by rational and systematic think-
ing, rather than style and fashion. “Within this,” art historian Jeremy Aynsley 
has observed about Ulm design, “the notion of timelessness was invoked as an 
figure 1.2. Interior of the Marshall Plan exhibition We Build a Better Life that 
traveled to Germany in 1952. It combined an Eames chair in the middle anked by two 
Danish ones, and a table lamp designed by Isamu Noguchi for Knoll International. 
Photograph courtesy of Werkbundarchiv—Museum der Dinge Berlin D7020-7039. 
Photographer unknown.
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important criterion, de	ned against the phenomenon of conspicuous consump-
tion and in-built obsolescence of the American system of industrial styling.”69
The HfG’s story illuminates how the FRG, caught between the Western Allies’ 
vision for a new Germany and the ever-present communist alternative of East 
Germany in the early reconstruction years, needed its own strong institutions 
to shape its postfascist identity.
Encountering similar reconstruction challenges, the GDR fought its battles 
over the cultural policy of aesthetics that had the potential to turn East Ger-
mans into socialist citizens. In the early 1950s, the so-called Formalism Debate, 
an ideological-artistic dispute involving SED politicians and artists, discussed 
a more holistic approach to the aesthetics of the socialist material environment. 
Deeming socialist realism the ocial aesthetic, the party announced a radical 
reorientation of all areas of cultural activity at the Third Party Congress in July 
1950.70 By displaying cultural coherence with the Soviet Union, the GDR gov-
ernment strove to present a contrast to West Germany. Yet, from the beginning, 
socialist realism also connected artistic expression to the task of enlightening 
and ideologically reeducating the working population in the spirit of socialism. 
Stressing modes of socialist production and class struggle, socialist realism fo-
cused on everyday work heroes, who built the socialist utopia, to inspire popular 
ideological identi	cation. Folk culture, materially articulated in artisanal tradi-
tions, provided German national substance to the style.71 At the same time, East 
German politicians, led by State Council chair and general secretary of the SED 
Walter Ulbricht, a cabinetmaker by trade, denounced modern functionalism as 
artless, international, and cosmopolitan. Its lack of ornamentation, according 
to the SED, signi	ed the missing element of national culture, and the reduction 
of its design to simple shapes made this aesthetic formulaic. The fact that West 
Germany embraced functionalism as its ocial aesthetic only reinforced the 
GDR’s political and ideological resolve to reject interwar modernism.
For a centrally organized state, East Germany’s cultural reorientation had 
far-reaching consequences for the freedom of artistic expression. To protest 
what was eectively censorship, the artistic community publicly challenged the 
party’s sweeping decision, but with minimal success. Over the course of three 
years, the government repeatedly defended its stance in newspapers and at public 
events. In this way, the Formalism Debate became less cultural and increasingly 
political in content. Alignment with the Soviet bloc outpaced the search for a 
homegrown modern socialist aesthetic that Horst Michel and others had begun 
and, eventually, the nationalistic values embedded in the realist aesthetics of 
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cultural Stalinism held sway. In January 1954, the GDR Council of Ministers 
commanded the furniture industry to develop aesthetically pleasing furnish-
ings “based on the national cultural heritage.”72 Reminiscent of the style and 
ornamentation of the so-called founders’ period (Gründerzeit, c. 1870–1890), 
German cultural heritage in the GDR was therea
er to be expressed in artful 
decorations, curved lines, and expensive handicra
 techniques. For instance, 
East Germany’s 	rst major public housing project in East Berlin, the Stalinal-
lee, showcased wedding cake–style facades, heavily adorned with sculptures and 
mosaics depicting workers and farmers. A coherent vision for the apartments’ 
interiors followed in a 1952 exhibition held in the 	rst 	nished high-rise. The 
furnishings were bulky with patterned upholstery fabric. Pleated lampshades, 
lace curtains, and squat-shaped porcelain added a curious petit-bourgeois atmo-
sphere.73 This emphasis on ornamentation came to represent simultaneously a 
search for a politically untainted past, a demonstration of integration into the 
Eastern Bloc, and cultural delineation from West Germany.
While some historical analysis has cast doubt on the political signi	cance of 
the Formalism Debate—for instance pointing to the possibility that the SED 
used it to create the illusion of a participatory pluralistic public sphere—there is 
evidence of ideologues and functionalist designers, architects, and artists being 
figure 1.3. Apartment with sample furniture in the 	rst completed building at 
Weberwiese in Stalinallee, 1952. Bundesarchiv 183-14563-0005.  
Photograph: Heinz Funk.
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publicly embattled.74 First, a number of applied art schools founded on Bauhaus 
teaching principles already existed in East Germany by 1950 led by steadfast so-
cialists like Michel. The country depended on these schools to create consumer 
goods for reconstruction and thus wielded considerable inuence. Second, the 
fact that the debate lasted approximately three years and was conducted in pub-
lic speaks volumes about the earnestness with which politicians and cultural 
elites immersed themselves in the making of East German ocial culture.75 In-
terpretations of the Formalism Debate as a predetermined aair risk to miss 
the initial stage in negotiations between designers and the state over the place 
of interwar modernism in GDR design and the struggle against an unfamiliar 
culture of Soviet provenance.76
Although praised in the initial reconstruction phase, Bauhaus modernism 
and its students comprised the main target of the political campaign against “for-
malism.” Despite the risk of losing their livelihood, the GDR Bauhaus disciples 
resisted state intervention in artistic expression. Mart Stam, a Dutch architect 
appointed as the 	rst director of the new School for Applied Arts (Hochschule 
für angewandte Kunst) in Berlin Weissensee in 1950, became the most promi-
nent casualty of the conict. Stam had introduced the Bauhaus curriculum and 
methods in Weissensee. A socialist idealist, he had worked with architect and 
urban planner Ernst May on the New Building (Neues Bauen) public housing 
projects in Frankfurt on Main in the 1920s and helped build the industrial cit-
ies of Magnitogorsk, Makeyevka, and Orsk in the Soviet Union between 1930 
and 1933.77 Stam additionally founded and headed the Weissensee Institute for 
Applied Arts (Institut für angewandte Kunst), the 	rst inception of the East 
German design council.78 When cultural Stalinism gained the upper hand in 
the Formalism Debate, Stam and his wife le
 the GDR in 1953, disenchanted 
with the country where he had hoped to contribute his vision for a socialist way 
of life to a true Marxist state.
Stam’s departure simultaneously marked the end of the Formalism Debate 
and the beginning of the institutionalization of cultural Stalinism in East Ger-
many. The remaining Bauhaus community viewed this development critically. 
In a surprisingly candid 1985 interview, Bauhaus-educated Selman Selmanagic, a 
highly regarded urban planner, interior designer, and architect, who had worked 
with Stam at both the Weissensee Institute and the School, lambasted the trans-
formation of the institute into a government agency a
er Stam’s emigration.79
He saw Walter Heisig, Stam’s successor at the Weissensee Institute, as a person 
“without comprehension,” who “designed orets on ceramics and such kitsch.”80
Labeled as “German cultural heritage,” this naïve representation of reality was 
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henceforth the ocial aesthetic of the GDR. However, the practical inuence 
of the institute on broader culture remained limited under Heisig’s leadership 
and he does not appear to have been a strong force in the search for an East Ger-
man national aesthetic.81 The remaining Bauhaus disciples in East Germany le
 
Berlin and went into artistic exile in the provincial centers of the GDR.82 For 
example, Stam’s student Martin Kelm started the independent Halle Institute 
for Design and Development with fellow Stam student Günter Reissmann in 
1958. Many years would pass before East German disciples of modernism and 
their vision for the “workers and peasants’ state” regained political inuence.
As it faded in the East, functional modernism was gaining political and cul-
tural inuence in the West a
er the Bundestag resolved to create the design 
council on 4 April 1951, to enhance the Federal Republic’s image abroad and 
promote the country’s exports.83 The council’s tasks, such as advising industry, 
helping to re-establish Germany’s competitiveness at international exhibitions 
and trade fairs, supporting design education in applied arts schools and profes-
sional training, and instructing traders and consumers about quality and de-
sign, imbued it with extensive inuence over industry and consumers.84 The 
Werkbund seemed to have 	nally reached its goals of being the arbiter of West 
German good taste and reviving the prewar reform project.
Centralization of cultural power in the hands of the Werkbund, though, was 
counteracted by two factors: funding and personnel decisions. Industrial design, 
emerging as a new profession in postwar Germany, competed for state funding 
with the 	ne arts. While the Federal Ministry of the Interior supported the arts 
	nancially, industrial design did not fall under their jurisdiction.85 The con-
nections politicians drew between industrial interests and design considerations 
resulted in the subordination of this new council for design (Rat für Formge-
bung) to the Ministry for Economic Aairs (BMWi). This decision, primarily 
based on budget considerations, inherently linked design to the promotion of 
products for export. In June 1953, the RfF was established in Darmstadt, Hesse, 
as a non-pro	t organization. West German economic interests, rather than the 
Werkbund’s cultural hegemony, subsequently played a key role in determining 
the state’s plan for the design council. The Werkbund could only eectively in-
uence the planning of international exhibitions. This initial and fundamental 
conict continued to generate strong in	ghting among dierent factions in the 
design council until the Werkbund ocially withdrew from it in 1968.
The second factor undermining Werkbund inuence from the start per-
tained to the selection criteria for RfF board membership. The original goal had 
been to create an advisory body of distinct personalities that took on cultural 
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leadership in the young republic. Yet the BMWi quickly abandoned this plan 
and, instead, pushed for including representatives from all economic 	elds. Min-
ister of Economics Ludwig Erhard (1949–1963, Christian Democratic Union, 
CDU) initially appointed to the council sixteen designers and industrialists, 
almost all of whom were Werkbund members and aesthete industrialists. But 
Erhard then appointed twenty more unsalaried consultants—representatives 
of varying concerns such as cra
s, labor unions, consumer organizations, and 
public administration—which caused discord between the government and the 
initial council members.86 The Werkbund especially objected to the appoint-
ment of Eduard Schlafejew as council director. Schlafejew had been a competent 
economic administrator in Erhard’s BMWi, which, in their eyes, made him a 
“puppet of industry” who lacked design expertise.87 Instead of an innovative and 
modern aesthetic mission, the Werkbund lamented, the council would become a 
pawn for economic interests, a “second Federal Trade Oce.”88 This, the Werk-
bund feared, would strip the design council of cultural assertiveness and dimin-
ish its leadership in material culture.89 Lobbyist König, worried about a loss of 
control and inuence, likened the situation to the Werkbund’s 	rst experience 
with failing state-cooperation in the Weimar Republic under the Reich art su-
pervisor (Reichskunstwart).90 A
er more than a year of negotiations with the 
ministry and threats of withdrawal from the project altogether, the Werkbund 
eventually chose to compromise. Leading members decided to work within the 
ministerial framework, which they believed to be a watered-down version of 
their design institution.91 They accepted Schlafejew’s appointment on the con-
dition that longtime Werkbund member Mia Seeger be named general secretary.
With Seeger’s appointment, the Werkbund gained lasting artistic inuence 
over the RfF. Seeger was an experienced “cultural broker of German modernism” 
whose organizational work included important Werkbund exhibitions, most no-
tably the 1927 architectural exhibition Weissenhof Settlement (Weissenhofsied-
lung) in Stuttgart.92 The legal status and the funding of the design council, how-
ever, remained contested between the Werkbund and government. In a pamphlet 
introducing the council and its agenda, the presidium labeled it a government-ini-
tiated “self-administrated organization” instead of a state institution. Both the 
federal government and the Bundestag had operated “from the assumption that 
broad segments of the German economy will recognize the importance of indus-
trial design and support it.”93 In the end, it became clear that Bonn supported the 
council only due to Werkbund connections to the economic elites represented 
in the Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Indus-
trie, BDI). A
er initial hesitation, West Germany’s business community strongly 
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supported the RfF. Large companies, such as Siemens and AEG, set up a foun-
dation for industrial design, from which the design council drew some funds.94
Through overlapping membership the BDI was well represented in the Werk-
bund and vice versa.95 This overlap in membership further demonstrates that 
only a small group of designers and entrepreneurs shaped the inception of West 
Germany’s central design institution. Bonn’s increasing involvement in setting up 
the council, however, disabused industry of the notion that it could control the 
council, and therefore limited industry commitment in the long run.
Without wholehearted industry support the design council had major 	-
nancial problems throughout its 	rst two decades of existence. In its 	rst 	ve 
years from 1953 to 1957, the RfF received a moderate DM 70,000 annually.96 By 
comparison, the GDR later 	nanced its design institution with state subsidies 
of 796,000 East German marks (Ostmark, M97) in 1963, its 	rst 	scal year.98
The British Council of Industrial Design had an annual budget of over DM 
6 million, of which the state provided 3.5 million by 1967.99 At that point the RfF 
budget had grown to DM 220,000—still only a fraction of the funds available 
to the British Council of Design that year and less than a third of what the East 
German industrial designers had had in its 	rst year of operation. In part this 
stemmed from West German industry bodies reneging in later years on their 
formal promise to support the RfF 	nancially.
In the GDR, the creation of a central design institution comparable to the 
RfF began with the Weissensee Institute for Applied Art in 1952. In contrast 
to the West, the East initially thought design to be purely a part of the cultural 
development of a socialist society. The initial positioning of the institute under 
the Ministry for Culture indicates that the East German government still cate-
gorized industrial design as applied arts and not as an asset to economic develop-
ment in the early 1950s. This notion possibly stemmed from the country’s focus 
on heavy industry in the early years of reconstruction, because of its importance 
for ful	lling the reparations that the Soviet Union demanded. And yet, by allo-
cating most of its resources to coal mining and steel production, the GDR also 
emulated the economic principles that had catapulted the Soviet Union from 
the agricultural to the industrial age. However, this policy neglected consumer 
industries at the expense of living standards within the GDR.100 This meant an 
unfortunate delay in grati	cation for the hard-working population that suered 
under consumer product shortages, while work norms simultaneously increased 
in 1952 and 1953 through these measures of economic Sovietization.101
In the wake of Stalin’s death in the spring of 1953, this economic policy un-
derwent a partial shi
. The post-Stalinist New Course announced on June 9 
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reversed some of the measures, yet the work quotas remained in place and fueled 
the pent-up frustration among the population.102 Construction workers began a 
protest against the work norms on 16 June, and the demonstration spread from 
Berlin throughout the country the following day. The spontaneous uprising 
of some 	ve hundred thousand people was put down with the help of Soviet 
tanks.103 In the a
ermath of the bloody protests, the SED became even more 
aware of the political dimension of living standards. Public support, the regime 
learned, could be gained by improving the population’s material situation. This 
led to an emphasis on consumer products, exempli	ed by the shop window com-
petition in divided Berlin in the 1950s.104
The sealing of the German-German border on 13 August 1961 further 
heightened the political signi	cance of consumer products. The Wall not only 
stemmed the tide of westward mass migration, but also temporarily cut o the 
ow of western goods into the GDR. This blockage aggravated the GDR’s sup-
ply problem, and it underscored the line between prosperity in the West and 
scarcity in the East. Investment in consumer product development became a new 
priority. The hope was that an ocial industrial design institution would create 
a distinct aesthetic in commodities that would represent an East German na-
tional identity and at the same time stave o popular desires for western goods. 
This endeavor was helped by international developments. In the wake of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 the United States and Soviet Union implemented 
a policy of peaceful coexistence between the Cold War blocs. The military de-es-
calation reinvigorated the ideological competition in other 	elds, among them 
consumer products and their design. GDR ocials noted: “Peaceful coexistence 
has at its root the decisive, forceful battle against all manifestations of bourgeois 
ideology. Speci	c artistic problems are also to be classi	ed in this broader po-
litical context.”105 That year, the newly founded Council for Industrial Design 
(Rat für Industrieform), a link to industry, joined the Weissensee Institute at 
the Ministry of Culture to implement state initiatives in the 	eld of industrial 
design and to “supervise their realization through economic institutions, trade 
organizations and specialized institutes.”106
At this critical point, Mart Stam’s student Martin Kelm utilized the central-
ized industrial design eort to increase the political responsibilities of the Weis-
sensee Institut für angewandte Kunst under the new name of Central Institute 
for Design (ZfF) in 1963.107 Shortly therea
er, the ZfF under Kelm’s leadership 
began its ascent to prominence within the East German planned economy, fore-
shadowing the eventual success of functionalist design within East Germany’s 
production industries. The ZfF was the 	rst East German government body 
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committed to forging a cohesive aesthetic that also exercised increasing inuence 
in the economic planning process. Thereupon, throughout the 1960s, indus-
trial design became more deeply anchored in the economic structures of the 
GDR.108 In 1965, the ZfF moved to an institution dedicated to standardization 
and product testing, the German Oce for Standardization and Product Test-
ing (Deutsches Amt für Messwesen and Warenprüfung, DAMW), a transfer 
that signi	cantly changed the perception of industrial design’s role in the East 
German economy. The SED leadership began to see industrial design as part of 
a scienti	cally measurable process that enhanced products and optimized their 
competitiveness on the international market, rather than simply as a super	cial 
beauti	cation process.
The leadership change deposing Walter Ulbricht from power in 1971 facil-
itated Kelm’s rise on the career ladder. The new First Party Secretary General 
Erich Honecker, for whom Kelm’s wife worked as personal secretary, turned the 
ZfF into a government institution in its own right in 1972 and renamed it the 
Oce for Industrial Design (Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung, AiF). Kelm 
had already been a member of the Council of Ministers, but as the director of 
the Oce, he ocially joined the economic planning apparatus. This gave him 
far-reaching authority in design decisions with power over other ministers.109
Two laws ensured that the central design institution remained the main arbi-
ter of taste in the GDR and became crucial stepping stones for Kelm’s lasting 
inuence over East German industrial design and the prevalence of the func-
tionalists. First, the 1965 law required all nationalized companies (Volkseigene 
Betriebe, VEB) in the production industries to employ designers and, second, 
the 1973 law obliged all factories to “outsource” their industrial design work ex-
clusively to the AiF.110 Whereas few people in the GDR design scene had praised 
Kelm’s artistic vision—in fact, some even criticized him as “uninspired”—he 
de	nitely was known to the political elite as a superb bureaucrat with excellent 
connections.111 Günther Mittag, a member of the Politbüro since 1958 and sec-
retary of economics in the Central Committee since 1962, took Kelm under his 
wing.112 Mittag oversaw Kelm’s dissertation about the role of industrial design 
in socialism and vouched for his party credentials as well as his aesthetic vision 
for a socialist way of living.113
The ascent to power of a functionalist like Kelm was noteworthy for com-
pletely contradicting GDR cultural policy. The 1965 transfer of the ZfF from 
the Ministry of Culture to the DAMW had seemed logical in the contempo-
rary economic climate of standardization and production streamlining. Yet an 
interpretation of this event as the natural outcome of the East’s progress toward 
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economical production aesthetics would undervalue the ideological determina-
tion with which the political elite had shaped the discourse on socialist realist 
aesthetics. In fact, the SED apparatus was painfully aware of the ideological 
inconsistencies among industrial designers and their lack of loyalty to the o-
cial party line. In 1964, the Culture Department at the Central Committee of 
the SED (Zentralkommittee, ZK) reported, “Revisionist attacks from the ap-
plied arts against the cultural policies of the Party [that] are supported by some 
members of sta of the ZfF” to the secretariat. The industrial designers argued 
“against a connection between applied arts and our socialist ideology as well as 
against the designer’s task being to work according to the newly developing aes-
thetic necessities of socialist men.”114 Fearing that these challenges from within 
would break applied arts away from the “edi	ce of socialist aesthetics” and could 
even result in attacks on the principles of socialist realism in the 	ne arts, the 
Central Committee demanded a strict response to bring the ZfF back in line. 
Instead, the problem was avoided by relocating the institute from the realm of 
culture to the DAMW. Kelm and his unruly institute were essentially “kicked 
upstairs” to avoid further meddling in cultural politics, though Central Com-
mittee members knew that “the supporters of this wrong opinion [that applied 
arts and ideology should be separated] will interpret the Central Institute break-
ing away from the Ministry of Culture as a con	rmation of their opinion.”115
The conict between the Central Committee and industrial designers over 
the implementation of socialist cultural principles points to a lively ideological 
debate around socialist realism in the 1960s. Indeed, the SED never achieved 
full aesthetic control in the 	eld of industrial design. The ideological deviance 
of the ZfF indicates that there was space for practical arguments that favored 
functionalism on the basis of its more economical use of resources, which stood 
in contrast to the expensive embellishments of Stalinist aesthetics. Rather than 
this constituting a break away from Soviet socialist realism in ocial policy, as 
others have proposed, the late 1950s and early 1960s in fact saw a so
ening of 
aesthetic guidelines only in practice, albeit not in discourse.116 Nevertheless, it 
was evident to the SED government that representative wedding cake build-
ings, such as the houses on Stalinallee, were costly, work-intensive, and required 
scarce resources, such as marble and hard wood, that the GDR could not aord 
for public housing. The turn to prefab housing blocks in the late 1950s, starting 
with Neu-Hoyerswerda in 1959, was only later followed by a rethinking of the 
interior, including a general shi
 toward functionalist furniture design in the 
mid-1960s.117 Thus, the practical dilution of cultural Stalinism in the GDR oc-
curred only some years a
er Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization in the Soviet 
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Union, as Ulbricht’s personal taste for power delayed the Thaw in East Ger-
many.118 Modernist design would not be ocially rehabilitated until later in the 
decade, and it took until the 1970s for Kelm to be able to furnish the interiors of 
Honecker’s state guesthouses using Bauhaus designs.119
Politics of Design: The Rise and Fall of Functionalism
Whereas the GDR experimented with dramatically dierent German styles 
during the 	rst two postwar decades, the Federal Republic developed its na-
tional aesthetic incrementally, continuously testing international reaction. 
International representation was at the core of the RfF’s mission and it took 
most of the 1950s for it to create a clear vision for the postwar reinscription of 
everyday material culture. The design council dismissed the international style 
of Nierentisch organicism, which was popular among West German consumers 
at the time, and established a design style based on functionalist principles. The 
development of the council’s aesthetic was apparent in the contrast between the 
1954 Milan Triennial, the 1957 Milan Triennial, and the 1958 World Exposition 
in Brussels. An increasing emphasis on humility and transparency distinguished 
the postwar state from the monumental architecture and folk home design that 
had characterized the Third Reich aesthetic.120
In these exhibitions, the RfF decreased the number of arts and cra
s ob-
jects and increased the industrial design goods on display. By 1958, the materials 
featured in the German pavilion at Brussels were clean and modern, such as 
glass, tubular steel, concrete, and wood.121 While viewed with suspicion by West 
Germany’s own national media, this new, subdued aesthetic won acclaim from 
the foreign press and international audiences for its openness and simplicity. 
Captivated by its “spiritual functionalism,” the London Times hailed the West 
German pavilion as elegant, transparent, and radiant.122 Paranoia about inter-
national perception had led to a West German cultural policy that embraced de-
pendable and high quality products for the improvement of daily life as ambassa-
dors of the Federal Republic’s emerging economic culture and national identity. 
In Brussels, the German emphasis on everydayness decidedly contrasted with 
the attention-seeking displays of other nations.123 The groundbreaking exhibi-
tion successfully linked West German industrial design with postfascism and set 
new standards for how the Federal Republic used interior design and architec-
ture to communicate its postwar identity abroad in the Adenauer era.124
Despite this international acclaim, the work of the RfF came to a complete 
standstill between 1964 and 1965. The Federal Republic’s government remained 
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reluctant to turn the design council into a proper public agency, and the coun-
cil was dependent on business involvement and private sponsorship.125 In 1965, 
RfF president Ernst Schneider, at the time also president of an industry-led 
industrial design interest group called BDI Committee for Industrial Design 
(Arbeits kreis für Industrielle Formgebung), wrote to the Minister of Economics 
Kurt Schmücker to convince him that the council would be able to tackle its 
figure 1.4. Transparency and leveled perspectives in the West 
German pavilion at the 1958 Expo in Brussels. Photograph courtesy of 
Werkbundarchiv—Museum der Dinge Berlin. Photographer unknown.
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growing challenges if given new organizational and 	nancial footing. To this 
end, Schneider set the council’s national signi	cance in global perspective: “The 
idea that the Rat für Formgebung ful	lls a socio-political function has been 
recognized as a state task and honored as such in the Federal Republic as well as 
in many other industrial countries.”126 But the government refused to take on 
what it perceived as the responsibility of the speci	c industries that would 	nan-
cially bene	t from the council’s work. A
er almost two years of unproductive 
negotiations and mutual accusations, the BDI Arbeitskreis attained administra-
tive control over the RfF in early 1967. Schneider served as president, porcelain 
manufacturer Philip Rosenthal as his deputy, and architect Fritz Gotthelf as 
managing director of both institutions, decisively diminishing Werkbund in-
uence. With this step, the RfF lost its independence and freedom from private 
interest.127
Following this crisis, funding for the council resumed and the extension of 
the council’s ocial responsibilities was reassessed. The ministry, though, saw 
little promise in the proposed changes based on the work of the last three years, 
which had been limited by the ongoing power struggles. Only two-thirds of 
the budget had been spent in 1966 and 1967. Schmücker’s successor Minister of 
Economics Karl Schiller and his advisors at the BMWi criticized the council’s 
personnel structures as a continuing impediment to greater eciency and suc-
cess and supported only a few practical proposals, such as the creation of a na-
tional industrial design prize (eventually endowed as Bundespreis “Gute Form” 
in 1969), an industry-initiated International Design Center (Internationales 
Design Zentrum, IDZ) in West Berlin, and triennial global exhibition tours of 
excellent German design.128
Werkbund members began to fear that their cultural ideals would be side-
lined or undermined by industry interests, which led to a public falling-out be-
tween the Werkbund and the BDI Arbeitskreis in 1968–69. The Werkbund 
maintained that the public design council had been swallowed up by private 
interests and demanded a “complete institutional and personnel separation” 
from the BDI Arbeitskreis and reassertion of the RfF’s democratic legitimacy.129
However, the organizational structures, including Schneider’s joint presidency 
of both institutions, remained unchanged.130 In the end, the Werkbund repre-
sentatives resigned from the RfF in the summer of 1969. Its board of directors 
published a statement lamenting that “the Werkbund cannot identify with the 
Rat für Formgebung as it had once been able to” under the circumstances.131
The feeling was mutual. A promotional pamphlet that the RfF produced in 1989 
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about its history and purpose completely omitted the Werkbund’s integral role 
in the inception of the design council.132
Alongside these battles over design council leadership, functionalism as 
a sociopolitical and moral agenda underwent a crisis in the Federal Republic. 
Prominent participants in the 1950s discourse on architecture and design, who 
had enthusiastically embraced the credo “form follows function” as the spirit 
for West German reconstruction, became uneasy about neofunctionalism as a 
revisionist ocial aesthetic in the 1960s. The debate revolved around the shi
 in 
functionalism from a social program—aimed at reforming societal strati	cation 
through material upli
—into an iconic style that papered over persisting social 
relationships.
The origins of the philosophical void can be traced back to the previous de-
cade, when even Werkbund members, once 	rmly committed to the language of 
social upli
, struggled to 	nd any underlying welfare concepts in West Germa-
ny’s striving domestic culture. For instance, in anticipation of the 1957 Interbau 
architecture exhibition in Berlin, a key event in international modern public 
housing construction, the RfF previewed the furnishings for one of its projected 
apartments at H55, an interior design summit in Hälsingborg, Sweden. Instead 
of explaining how the design would improve living conditions for the popula-
tion, however, in the catalog Mia Seeger attributed the interior design solutions 
to the fact that both the exhibition space and the H55 concept had restricted 
the German committee to space-saving furniture.133 There was no mention of a 
vision for a reformed postwar German domestic culture, a democratization of 
design, or material redistribution.
Given her professional background working with progressive architects and 
designers, Seeger should have been able to articulate a new West German social 
outlook on design, that is, if there had been one. Her expertise in the 	eld of re-
form aesthetics only underscored the de-emphasis on the social question in West 
German domestic culture. Other European countries, particularly Scandinavian 
ones, were better able to communicate the postwar challenges in public hous-
ing and general welfare. In comparison, West German postwar functionalism 
looked insubstantial and had lost its reform vision.
Even earlier in the 1950s, the new ideological threat from the GDR, the social-
ist alternative across the border, had exposed le
ist ideals to criticism in the Fed-
eral Republic. Attacks on reform design as a guiding principle had come from 
within the Werkbund, among others, in the so-called Bauhaus Debate of 1953. 
Cologne church architect and Werkbund member Rudolf Schwarz published an 
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essay in which he rejected Bauhaus rationalism for the rebuilding of Germany.134
He targeted the Bauhaus and Gropius’s avant-garde projects as un-German and 
communist. Instead, he promoted a conservative “modernism of the middle.”135
His contemporaries rushed to the defense of Gropius and the Bauhaus, though 
none of them were Werkbund members.136 Schwarz’s attacks contributed to the 
successive diminishing of le
ist reform ideas in the Federal Republic’s postwar 
design and architecture, and his populist comments exemplify a pervasive anti-
communism in Adenauer’s Germany.
The prevalence of this sentiment is indirectly con	rmed by the absence of 
social reform ideas in West German design institutions and their teachings, 
which created generations of “socially unconscious” designers. Rolf Heide, one 
of Germany’s most inuential neofunctionalist designers to date, began his ca-
reer in 1950 as a cabinet-maker and went on to study architecture at the Muthe-
siusschule in Kiel, an institution of higher education named a
er Werkbund 
founder Hermann Muthesius.137 His colleague Peter Maly followed a similar 
path, beginning a cabinet-maker apprenticeship in 1955 and later studying at the 
technical college for interior design in Detmold.138 When asked about the social 
vision behind their designs, both responded that they made things to be beauti-
ful, not socially responsible.139 Admired and critically acclaimed designers, Maly 
and Heide also embody the absence of a social philosophy in the West German 
discourse on material culture.
The HfG Ulm, Germany’s only educational institution founded on the as-
sumption that material culture necessarily represented political consciousness, 
is a prime example of the institutional repercussions of this change in intellec-
tual climate. Ulm had developed a philosophy of aesthetic and material auster-
ity that became its trademark in the years of want. However, the sudden and 
strong public criticism of design without a social message in the 1960s led to 
the school’s eventual downfall at the height of the economic miracle.140 Situ-
ated on a hill overseeing the city, the school was not only physically but also 
conceptually removed from the life of the people “below.” The HfG Ulm was 
an institutional stronghold of die-hard functionalism that correlated with the 
RfF’s aesthetic postwar vision for a culturally and economically liberal Federal 
Republic. Rejecting popular taste and consumer demands as guiding principles 
in the design process, Ulm found itself increasingly criticized in the press.141 In 
particular, a damaging article about the institute in the West German political 
magazine Der Spiegel caused the Baden-Württemberg government to review its 
	nancial commitment to the school.142 Tensions in the relationship between 
Ulm’s design principles and wider societal trends led to it losing funding from 
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the regional government in 1968, and the HfG Ulm closed its doors that Novem-
ber. The criticism of Ulm was not the only one leveled against elite institutions 
or functionalism.143 1967–68 witnessed worldwide social change and rejection 
of a democratic consensus, which the HfG Ulm and the RfF claimed to materi-
ally express in their aesthetics of good design. The closure of the Ulm institute 
marked disillusion with the moral power of functionalism as a distinct West 
German aesthetic. Ulm’s modern aesthetic rigidity, nonetheless, had a tremen-
dous inuence on German material culture through, for example, the school’s 
collaboration with the electric appliance producer Braun, its corporate design for 
the German national airline Lu
hansa, and its design for the elevated trains of 
the city of Hamburg. The school’s closing showed, however, that functionalism 
had run its course by the end of the decade.
German intellectuals from the political le
, motivated by the general pop-
ulation’s rising concerns about capitalism’s shortcomings, contributed to the 
critique of neofunctionalism. The escalating Cold War arms race and the pol-
itics of nuclear deterrence had shown that trade and collective prosperity had 
failed to ful	ll the promise of world peace.144 Modernist design, which from 
its inception had attempted to temper industrial production with human ar-
tistic sensitivity, began to represent the failure of a humanistic capitalist order. 
This was especially catastrophic in West Germany, where democratization had 
become closely intertwined with the concept of Western economic integration 
and social advancement. In his 1965 critique of “Functionalism Today” at the 
annual Werkbund conference, le
ist philosopher and Frankfurt School member 
Theodor Adorno chastised the inhumane postwar application of modernism.145
A renowned critic of mass culture, he historicized the functionalist rejection of 
ornamentation, emphasizing that one era’s indispensable design feature could 
easily be seen as obsolete ornamentation by the next generation. Yet this did 
not mean that functionalism as a stylistic concept had any claim to an aesthetic 
truth.146 To Adorno, the functionalist demonization of historical styles uncov-
ered it as a political dogma. The prescriptive idea inherent in functionalism, 
the de	ned relationship between form and utility, Adorno argued, rendered the 
functionalist object “unfree.” The remedy, he suggested, would be for society to 
create more humane objects by opening up materiality to unknown functions.
As the debate continued in subsequent years, the West German design peri-
odical Form published a series of articles that grew increasingly critical of func-
tionalism. The articles highlighted some of its shortcomings as a design style. 
One fundamental problem was that the designers considered to have fathered 
functionalism, Henri Labrouste and Louis Sullivan, who had coined the phrase 
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“form follows function,” had never actually de	ned what function meant: the 
practicable, the useful, or the technically optimized?147 On closer examination, 
functionalism started to look more like an ideology than an aesthetic truth. 
Contributors to this discussion demanded the sacri	ce of the “sacred cows” 
that had been labeled “good design” in divided Germany since the 1950s. By 
1969, Form pronounced “grandpa’s functionalism” dead.148 Thus, functionalism, 
with its fetishization of geometric forms, durability, utility, and (in theory) need-
based consumption, was revealed to be inherently production-oriented, while 
ignoring the consumer.
At this very point Bonn withdrew its commitment to the RfF, marking the 
end of West Germany’s crisis of functionalism. In an eort to salvage the na-
tional functional aesthetic, the debate moved on to consider Adorno’s proposed 
extended functionalism, one that designs objects to serve humanity rather than 
maltreat it with sharp edges.149 Already in 1950, designer Wilhelm Wagenfeld 
had worried that the Federal Republic would lose sight of the social signi	cance 
of materiality on its path toward capitalism. Wagenfeld’s concern could not only 
be seen in the language of functionality but also in the teachings of his contem-
poraries. To theoreticians and practitioners of design, this demonstrated that, 
for two decades, West German material culture had failed to pursue an agenda 
that stood for human improvement.
Interestingly, functionalism’s western crisis enabled the East to 	nally reconcile 
its economic and cultural policies and claim the once opposed aesthetic for the 
socialist project. In general, any motivation to think about the human aspect of 
design at this point, it seemed, originated from the socialist Germany. Within so-
cialism, designers intrinsically considered how their designs improved the human 
condition, while limited resources forced them to 	nd economical solutions.
Yet also in the East the philosophical and aesthetic elements of postwar de-
sign remained subject to criticism, and they underwent constant change from 
the reconstruction years onward. Ulbricht had purged Weimar modernism and 
its disciples from GDR institutions by 1954, but it proved dicult to enforce a 
cultural consensus around socialist realism in the applied arts. Kitschy products, 
combining styles such as rococo, classicism, and Biedermeier, were produced for 
the cultural rebirth of the East German state. This style also favored ornamen-
tation over functionality and hygiene, an especially important consideration 
for household wares. Kitsch and petty-bourgeois coziness (Gemütlichkeit) were 
privileged over economic considerations and production ethics.150 Some cultural 
critics remained at odds with the new cultural doctrine, such as Horst Michel, 
who proclaimed that “the person who buys Rococo china in 1950 shows bad 
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taste.”151 He reiterated this position in 1952 at the 	rst conference for interior 
design at the Deutsche Bauakademie: “This [cultural policy] cannot end in pro-
viding ‘princely’ furniture to the working people. We shouldn’t talk them into 
things that look like bourgeois riches, instead we need to give them real riches 
that serve humanity.”152
Given his opposition to the aesthetics of socialist material culture, it is some-
what surprising that Michel remained an inuential 	gure in the GDR. His 
work gained recognition abroad in 1957 when the West German Institute for 
New Technological Form (Institut für neue technische Form) in Darmstadt 
organized an exhibition featuring the designs of Michel and his Weimar col-
leagues. West German designers perceived these Weimar designs as the East’s 
return to functional shapes, celebrating the emergence of a “functionalist Ger-
man style” on both sides of the German-German border.153 However, this was a 
premature celebration of shared aesthetics. At the Culture Conference of 1957, 
the SED renewed the claim for a socialist-realist culture, declaring cultural work 
a political issue that concerned the very fabric of the working class. The follow-
ing year the political leadership connected cultural reform with its economic 
goals at the Fi
h SED Party Congress in East Berlin.
In the spring of 1959, the Bitterfeld Conference, a writers’ conference that in-
cluded representatives of the government, the SED, workers, and the intelligen-
tsia, discussed the prospects of assimilating workers and farmers into socialist 
realism. A resulting program that aimed at overcoming the previous separation 
of the arts and workers became known as the Bitterfeld Path (Bitterfelder Weg). 
The Bitterfeld Path included industrial design as a 	eld of applied arts and suf-
fused all areas of the economy to avoid the pitfalls of pro	t-oriented mass pro-
duction that, according to the SED leadership, ignored social responsibility.154 
The Bitterfeld critique of capitalism played an important role in the regime’s 
strategy to counteract suspicions of socialist mass production and promote the 
possibility of responsible socialist serial manufacturing. In the same vein, Michel 
wrote the pamphlet “The Industrial Designer on the Bitterfeld Path,” in which 
he criticized the lack of cooperation between designers and workers in socialist 
production, but used this reasoning to target socialist-realist kitsch. Arguing 
that only the laborers knew their own needs, Michel maintained that the state 
should rely on them to eliminate the production of “commodities that do not 
comply with our Zeitgeist. Bourgeois kitsch, modernist Formalism, decadence 
and snobbism are not be	tting for us.”155
Meanwhile, economic planners struggled with the implications of economic 
socialism for the population’s consumption habits. This discourse paralleled the 
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cultural debates at the Bitterfeld Conference and aligned centralization, ratio-
nalization, and standardization with Ulbricht’s cultural vision. Fears that a rigid 
restructuring of production would atten the cultural value in socialist materi-
ality led to the question of how to retain a “domestic culture despite standard-
ization.”156 At the 	rst standardization show in Leipzig in 1959–60, the GDR 
interior design journal Kultur im Heim (Culture at Home) discussed how to 
combat the impression that standardization would necessarily lead to uniform 
apartment furnishings.157 Alongside pictures of the 	rst standardized living 
room furniture sets, the journal asked its readers, “Would you have guessed that 
these are standardized pieces?” However, no matter how tasteful the execution, 
standardization and streamlining of the product range logically resulted in lim-
ited choices for consumers.
To quell consumer discontent, the ZfF needed to justify the monotony of 
standardization. By introducing the ideas of le
ist cultural intellectual Giulio 
Carlo Argan into the debate, designers and policymakers tried to reconcile 
uniformity with individuality. Designer and ZfF employee Ekkehard Bartsch 
quoted Argan’s formalistic critique of Weimar modernity, stating, “When in-
dustry exclusively reproduced shapes that were meant for cra
s, that is as sin-
gular pieces, monotony resulted from the repetition of these formal specialties.” 
On the contrary, he argued, standardization celebrated the generalized shape 
because “the machine has no other job than to make a thousand pieces of it” 
and thus “identity and not uniformity results, because every object will keep 
the character of an original.”158 According to this interpretation, uniformity 
was only present in form because of its assigned function. Identity, on the other 
hand, was inherent in standardization, because it was le
 to the owner to as-
cribe a product’s speci	c function, thus leaving the object to ful	ll individual 
expectations:
The individual can develop freely and creatively only on the basis of stan-
dardized production. Only when humans stop seeing the fruits of their 
material ambitions as a marker of their social status and attitude will they 
	nally be able to bene	t from technological innovation. Products become 
real servants of his [sic] existence, he himself stands in the center, not his 
supporting equipment.159
This position had much in common with Adorno’s suggestion for an extended 
functionalism that made the human being the central category for evaluating 
the functionality of an object. Argan is thus an essential stepping stone in the 
discursive realignment of eastern and western aesthetics. Although the FRG and 
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the GDR faced very dierent challenges in changing social relations through 
material culture, by the mid-1960s they had arrived at similar ways of thinking 
about the place of objects in industrial society.
In practice, however, GDR planners and designers soon realized that ecien-
cy-oriented organization of mass serial production rendered a small number of 
furniture models ubiquitous. This, in turn, led to the feared “moral deteriora-
tion” of the individual designs and thus a loss of their cultural identity.160 The 
challenge was to 	nd a compromise between industrial productivity and socio-
cultural demands. It was neither in the interest of the GDR leadership nor its 
goal to make public and private life entirely uniform; it always wanted to keep 
up the appearance of a dictatorship with a human face.
What all of these contradictions between design dogmata and production 
practice brought about was an increasing insecurity about what GDR design 
actually embodied ideologically and, in turn, how this ideology could be ex-
pressed materially. It is thus no surprise that even with the bene	t of hindsight 
seasoned East German designers failed to make sense of 1960s GDR design. This 
is visible in a concept for a 1990 AiF design retrospective entitled From Bau-
haus to Bitterfeld. While the curators concluded that the diversity of permissible 
forms increased in the early 1960s, they had diculties explaining the formal, if 
arbitrary, limits to artistic expression that continued to exist. For instance, they 
were unable to satisfactorily explain ocial disdain for designer Hubert Petras’s 
cylindrical, plain white vases, which had been exhibited at the 	
h Dresden 
Art Exhibition in 1962. In the end, the curators pinned the critique on the de-
sign’s lack of joie de vivre: “The strict, compromise-less cylinder shapes delin-
eated themselves from shallow industrial mass production. Yet ocials agreed 
that they ran counter to the optimistic attitude towards life of a civilized people 
with a happy future.”161 While the vases ful	lled antikitsch requirements, they 
apparently failed to show the right upli
ing spirit that the leadership demanded 
for GDR material culture. Each object, it seems, was judged on its own merit 
and sometimes arbitrarily censored without considering what socialist material 
culture tried to achieve, namely a contribution to the cultural-ideological edu-
cation of the New (Wo)Man. A response to needs, the avoidance of kitsch, and 
timeless designs immune to moral decay—these were the maxims of the time. 
In fact, Petras’s designs 	t that bill.
Cultural policy in the 1960s slowly but steadily moved away from socialist 
realism and toward modern idioms, which confronted arbiters of taste such 
as Michel with the opposite extreme—fashionable and modish designs with 
an aesthetic life span of only a few years.162 In response, Michel shi
ed from 
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criticizing backward-looking stylistic historicism to warning against exagger-
ated originality and avant-gardism. Michel reiterated his concerns in 1964 on 
the occasion of the ZfF’s reorganization under the DAMW, which included the 
implementation of standardized design criteria for technological product eval-
uation. Pointing out that quality in mass production was dicult to maintain, 
he rejected the argument advanced by producers and retail that “products are 
designed badly because of popular taste and demand.”163 The guest books from 
a 1965 interior design exhibition attest to the fact that at least parts of the pop-




h German Art Exhibition in Dresden,  
Karl-Heinz Hagen wrote a propaganda article for Neues Deutschland, 
criticizing Hubert Petras’s cylindrical vases as “artless” in 1962.  
Petras Roehren-03, Günter Höhne, 2008.
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visitors saw Modern Dwelling in Hoyerswerda, and for the 	rst time in a de-
cade, their opinions were not only recorded but also were used to evaluate the 
success of a new, holistic exhibition concept that oered the atmospheric eect 
of a decorated room.164 Not so surprisingly, the modern way of living found 
broad acceptance.165 Michel suggested that the eorts previously undertaken 
to achieve better designs had been insucient. A
er all, “in every type of taste, 
in every style, tasteless products exist. It is the task of the designer to create 
something decent in every individual or seasonally conditioned taste,” he main-
tained.166 Rejecting doctrinaire one-sidedness that favored a speci	c style or 
slavishly followed ocial cultural policies, Michel saw material socialism play 
out in the relationship between the product and its user. With the standardiza-
tion of product ranges, he hoped to have more control over what was produced 
as well as distributed to the East German home.167 This did not foreclose di-
verse styles, as long as they moderately interpreted a taste or fashion. Michel 
did not believe in coercion and taste dictation. Rather he strove to enlighten 
retail buyers and consumers to positively inuence production through the right 
demand. Michel thus helped establish a modern vision during the reconstruc-
tion years and the Bitterfeld Path in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but he was 
unable to leave a mark on the Formalism Debate between 1951 and 1953 and 
the later years of modish production. In these phases, which overlapped with 
heightened Cold War tensions and deteriorating German-German relations, 
moderation contradicted the ambitions of the GDR, a country that tried to 
propel its economy forward with centralization and Five-Year Plans. A distinct 
national culture and socialist mass production presented two ways in which East 
Germany aimed to gain a higher pro	le in the postwar world and to compete 
with the Federal Republic.
Toward the end of the 1960s, amid the crisis of functionalism in the Federal 
Republic, the GDR 	nally gained greater clarity about how to align its cultural 
and economic outlook. Here again East German industrial design elites took 
the lead, suddenly and publicly embracing the le
ist politics of interwar mod-
ernism. On the occasion of the GDR’s twentieth anniversary in 1968, the ZfF 
organized an exhibition that positioned GDR design at the intersection of the 
Bauhaus/Werkbund tradition and Soviet constructivism. The exhibition’s his-
torical section addressed a range of artistic expressions that the GDR designers 
saw themselves indebted to: 1840–95 historicism and eclecticism, 1895–1915 arts 
and cra
s reform movements and stylistic art such as art nouveau and neoclas-
sicism, and 1918–33 new objectivity, expressionism, and functionalism.168 This 
exhibition concept was the 	rst to include the latter two among the roots of 
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socialist design in East Germany. In a break with previous cultural policy, the 
exhibition text also paid special attention to the le
ist politics of some of the 
Bauhaus’s protagonists.
In the 1970s, a
er functionalism’s gradual rehabilitation in the previous de-
cade, the East German design magazine Form und Zweck (Form and Function) 
became the forum for a discussion about the merits and the pitfalls of func-
tionalist design. This critical debate was not dissimilar to the 1960s exchanges 
in the West German design periodical Form.169 The term “good design” now 
found usage on this side of the Iron Curtain as well, but it gained a dierent 
meaning.170 GDR good design embodied two sides of the same coin: It used re-
sources and labor eciently, while at the same time it was dedicated to ful	lling 
the needs of the population without providing dispensable luxury. With eco-
nomic considerations shaping the conversation, the East German functionalism 
debate was less politically loaded and instead presented a historic perspective 
on German modernism’s original intentions. Cultural critic Karin Hirdina in-
tervened in this debate, reclaiming the legacy of western functionalist dogma-
tism for socialism in 1975: “In fact, de	ned as a program and a method, not as 
a style, functionalism represents a Utopian vision of a non-capitalist order of 
relationships between Man and his environment. Strictly speaking, function-
alism does not work in the capitalist system. It does not arm capitalism, it 
transcends it.”171
East German designers and politicians thus slowly regained con	dence in 
their modernist heritage, a development epitomized by the reopening of the 
Bauhaus Dessau in 1976.172 What seems like a long overdue realization to the 
outside observer took the GDR leadership two decades to understand: The 
good design principles of utility, resourcefulness, and timelessness were perfectly 
matched to the GDR discourse on a socialist domestic culture. In contrast to 
West Germany, the social program of interwar modernism 	t neatly into the 
state ideology.173 In the GDR, design debates had always involved morality, be-
cause everyday culture was understood as a central part of a holistic approach to 
creating a socialist society. Hirdina’s practical, or in Adorno’s words “extended,” 
understanding of functionalism refrains from creating stylistic maxims and 
taste regimes.
A decade and a half a
er Michel’s Darmstadt exhibition had triggered pre-
mature declarations of German-German aesthetic rapprochement, GDR state 
approval and the eventual alignment of cultural goals and economic plan-
ning resulted in East German interior and furniture design free from earlier 
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contradictions and ambiguities. This revitalization of interwar design principles 
also marked the 	rst steps toward an all-German economic culture.
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Producing Modern German Homes
The Economy of Nation Branding
I n turning the discourse on ocial aesthetics into economic success both German states engaged in practices of “nation branding.”1 The term describes a branding eort at the national level that substantially follows 
similar logics as those that develop the speci
c properties of a product brand. 
Such branding evolved in the postwar period from simply harnessing 
rm rep-
utation to employing symbolic values, such as cultural or historical factors.2
Coherent communication was crucial for the success of branding. To reinvig-
orate the “Made in Germany” brand, a network of designers and producers cre-
ated a narrative of political signi
cance around their products. In the furniture 
industry, their narrative moved meaning from “the culturally constituted world 
to the consumer good,” associating established cultural categories and principles 
with home furnishings.3 Nation branding is thus part of collective sense-making 
in economic culture, by which economic actors invoke a “structure of values that 
reacts to economic indicators and constructs domestic economic mechanisms.”4
It is a cognitive process that narratively manifests national policy-legitimizing 
norms and values in consumer products based on cultural perception.
Politicians adopted the practice of assigning greater meaning to everyday 
objects, because it 
t the political climate of the Cold War period, when an im-
portant component of German-German relations emphasized competing ways 
of living. This German Cold War over living standards constituted part of the 
1950s East-West confrontation in Europe, as threat of mutual destruction in the 
ongoing superpower arms race increasingly yielded to a competition for popular 
support tied to economic prosperity. Both sides had an interest in keeping the 
Cold War “cold” in Europe and thus sustained a minimal level of communica-
tion and exchange. But even here, provocations remained the rule rather than 
the exception, as Richard Nixon and Nikita Khrushchev showed during the 
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famous Kitchen Debate at the American National Exhibition in Moscow in 
July 1959.5 In short, material well-being became a proxy for political prowess in 
the East-West conict.
Similar to a product brand, the products of national domestic culture were 
intended to oer both German populations a sense of identity as well as pro-
mote their cultural achievements abroad.6 A coherent aesthetic that bolstered 
that narrative, however, hinged upon strategic cooperation and communication 
among the political leadership, designers, industrialists, and consumers in East 
and West Germany respectively—which proved quite dicult to accomplish. 
Rival ideas about German modern domestic culture undermined the necessary 
narrative coherence for the promotion of East or West German “corporate iden-
tity” at home and abroad, which le the two German states vulnerable to exter-
nal inuences and set the stage in the late 1960s for their unintended aesthetic 
convergence.7
A focus on industry reveals the breakdown of the national aesthetic narrative 
in practice. The practical dilution of the initial postwar cultural Stalinism in 
East Germany and rigid functionalism in West Germany in production indus-
tries in fact ran in parallel by the 1970s. The problem was one of political rhet-
oric versus economic reality: Why, aer decades of invoking German-German 
cultural delineation, did both states fail to assert an ocial style, a particular 
East or West German “national aesthetic” in workshops and homes? Taking into 
account the fundamental structural dierences between the economic and po-
litical systems of the FRG and GDR, this chapter traces how policymakers inter-
acted with the industrial sector to link ideologically conforming ways of living 
to economic reconstruction and prosperity. Norms and values behind economic 
and political mechanisms in East and West Germany explain what impaired the 
consistent implementation of ocial aesthetics in furniture production. In the 
process, both Germanys moved toward a shared idea of economical production 
and comfortable living.
The Role of Economic Success and Political Legitimacy in 
the West German Struggle for Aesthetic Coherence
It might be expected that the German-German competition for superiority in 
industrial design and production would have 
rst and foremost a unifying eect 
on either economy. The East and West German design councils certainly aimed 
each to de
ne and defend one coherent national aesthetic to strengthen the eco-
nomic reputation of the FRG and GDR respectively at home and abroad. Yet, 
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at times, domestic actors—the government, regional administration, and indus-
tries—followed diering or even opposing agendas in the national economy. 
These diverging forces undermined the creation of a cohesive national brand.
Of course, the fact that Germany has always had a regionally diverse culture 
partially explains the context in which the struggle for national product aesthet-
ics developed.8 As the tradition of tensions between region and center predated 
the German partition of 1945, a strong culture of regionalism already existed in 
both Germanys when they reached statehood. In the years aer the war, the cul-
tural element of regionalism was reinforced by the new economies. In contrast 
to the centralized war economy of the Third Reich, new economic planning 
organizations were anchored at the regional and municipal level.9 The signi
-
cance of regional administrative thinking in the economy also had implications 
for the implementation of cultural policy in the postwar period, particularly in 
West Germany. Without local institutional cooperation, the realization of a uni-

ed product aesthetic was highly unlikely. Centralized approaches, namely the 
institutionalization through a design council that de
nes and executes cultural 
and economic policies for the entire nation, strove to disable regionalism and 
activities which economically assisted one region or favored a regional aesthetic 
identity over a coherent national style in the long run.
From its inception in 1951, the West German design council RfF, as a na-
tional institution, stood in direct conict with the regional reorganization of 
the economy. The contradictory notion of cultural and economic centralism in 
a federalist political system was contested by politicians and apparent to contem-
poraries. “It may seem surprising that government-controlled agencies should 
act as arbiters of taste in industrial design and assume a frankly partisan or even 
doctrinaire attitude in promoting modern design,” observed art historian Lo-
renz Eitner in 1957. “This is possible in Germany (where the State has oen 
played an active role in such matters) because since 1945 the weight of ocial 
approval has come to rest on the side of modern art, modern architecture, and 
modern design.”10 Indeed, the permissiveness vis-à-vis the RfF based on a social 
and political consensus on modern design that the council claimed to represent 
in the 1950s. Initially, it was successful in projecting this image at home and 
abroad. However, because of the decentralized organization of West Germany’s 
economy and the fact that much of the council’s funding came from the private 
sector, informal agreement with industry about which aesthetics could best en-
capsulate the spirit of a postwar Germany was crucial to the RfF’s success.
To a large extent, the design council’s bid for leadership in the Federal Re-
public’s material culture was critically linked to the success of the social market 
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economy. Economic prosperity contributed greatly to public support for the 
young democracy and thus to West Germany’s internal and external political 
legitimacy.11 Since many Germans had experienced the stock market crash of 
1929 and the resulting depression, which made them suspicious about demo-
cratic rule in the postwar period, economic progress and the acceptance of a 
new democratic state went hand in hand.12 Therefore, the unprecedented social 
improvement that resulted from the economic growth of the 1950s encouraged 
the population to identify with the FRG.13 The work of the RfF was part of this 
project, yet it would have remained inconsequential without the cooperation 
of industry.
Fortunately for the design council, organized industrial interests, represented 
by the Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Indus-
trie, BDI), shared the belief that the state and private interest needed to collab-
orate to achieve economic recovery. In fact, the BDI became a trusted ally in 
the conservative Adenauer government’s economic policies early on.14 In 1950, a 
lack of capital, multiple allied production restrictions, and decreased domestic 
demand caused the unemployment of more than two million workers. As the 
social market economy experiment threatened to fail, American pressure to in-
stitute some degree of state regulation of the economy grew as well. In a step to 
avoid reversing the liberal elements of the postwar economy, Adenauer turned 
to industrial associations for help. Consequently, the BDI took on the task of 
distributing scarce resources and organizing exports.15 Corporate traditions thus 
found their way back into the market economy of the Federal Republic, which 
raised the question of whether the republic would be able to withstand strong 
economic corporatism in the long run.16 With regard to industrial design, the 
answer to this question was clearly no.
The role that industry played in West Germany’s cultural revival cannot be 
overemphasized. The philanthropic committee of the BDI, the Culture Com-
mittee (Kulturkreis), awarded fellowships and organized art shows to support 
the arts in Germany from 1951 onward.17 BDI lawyer, art enthusiast, and CDU 
member Gustav Stein largely initiated this cultural engagement and invoked the 
historical responsibility of entrepreneurs as patrons of the arts. Convinced that 
art could function as a social force to connect people, he strived to prevent the 
negative experience of the Weimar Republic from repeating itself. He strongly 
believed that infusing everyday life with cultural objects could prevent the disin-
tegration of society.18 While the Kulturkreis members’ taste in art was as diverse 
as its membership, the BDI followed ocial aesthetics in its award practices 
and thereby became Germany’s biggest patron of abstract modern art and, later, 
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industrial design.19 Big businesses such as Thyssen, Krupp, and Reemtsma rein-
vigorated the concept of the collector-benefactor in the new republic.20 Yet the 
motivation behind this kind of cultural philanthropy was not entirely altruistic. 
Patronage helped the industry enhance its image, which had been badly dam-
aged during years of collaboration with the Nazi regime.21
Evidently, the modernist consensus that the RfF encouraged found approval 
and support from the business elites, and the relationship became mutually ben-
e
cial when the design council connected business and large-scale customers. 
Holding a gatekeeper role, the RfF served as a source of information in particu-
lar for government institutions, which were in dire need of oce furniture, mess 
kits and atware for cafeterias, and art to decorate the administrative build-
ings in West Germany’s new capital.22 By advising to prestigious construction 
projects in Bonn and numerous international exhibitions, the design council 
possessed considerable inuence between 1952 and 1965. With the BDI and the 
RfF promoting the same modernist aesthetic, this more or less voluntary co-
operation under the leadership of Economic Minister Erhard strengthened the 
national brand.
Yet early on, the BDI sowed the seeds for an eventual divergence. In 1952, it 
established an independent project similar to the design council, the Committee 
for Industrial Design (Arbeitskreis für Industrielle Formgebung). Fourteen of 
the thirty-six associations represented by the BDI were present at the consti-
tuting assembly of the Arbeitskreis, demonstrating industrialists’ considerable 
interest and work on issues of form and design. This initial success quickly led 
to the BDI becoming involved in a second, more pragmatic area of design ac-
tivism.23 It organized special shows of selected, well-designed products at the 
annual industrial fairs in Hanover, Frankfurt, and Cologne.24 And in order to 
publicize its work more prominently, the BDI Arbeitskreis started the non-pro
t 
organization Industrial Design (Industrieform) in the city of Essen, which fo-
cused on displaying well-designed products.25 Gustav Stein became a prominent 

gure in this process, working behind the scenes to give willing industrialists the 
opportunity to advertise their wares in these two dierent venues. In particular 
Industrieform’s permanent exhibition with industry-sponsored displays aimed 
at improving sales by educating the public about good design. Within three years 
of its opening in November 1955, more than 492,000 visitors had viewed the 
exhibition.26 This popular demand to learn about the features of modern fur-
nishings and appliances encouraged the industry to maintain its own eorts, in 
parallel to its cooperation with the RfF, well into the 1960s.
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Nevertheless, the increasingly aggressive role of industry in questions of de-
sign eventually disrupted the peaceful cooperation between cultural politics and 
enterprise. Rivaling the mission of the RfF, the BDI Arbeitskreis attempted to 
take the lead in the education of designers and the promotion of rational and so-
cially responsible industrial design.27 The furniture industry branch of the BDI, 
for instance, hosted a press reception in 1960 at which presenters elaborated on 
topics such as “On good and bad taste,” “Serial furniture and its signi
cance for 
today’s apartment,” “Thoughts on the issue of ‘modern,’” and “On the meaning 
of furnishing.”28 Such issues were at the core of contemporary debates in the 
applied arts, a domain that the Werkbund traditionally considered to be their 
expertise. The industry-controlled initiatives eventually led to diminished com-
mitment to the RfF. Industry’s willingness to cooperate with the Werkbund 
members in the design council seems to have decreased proportionally as inde-
pendent BDI projects grew in signi
cance.
By the mid-1960s, the activities of the BDI Arbeitskreis, reconstituted as the 
BDI Design Committee (Gestaltkreis) in 1965, signaled an eventual divergence 
between state and business interests.29 Entrepreneurs pinned this on a dierence 
of opinion over the purpose and direction of German industrial design. The 
secretary general of the Study Group of Industry for Product Design and Prod-
uct Planning in Stuttgart implicitly criticized Bonn’s lack of practical thinking: 
“Our study group came together to help members replace abstract intentions 
with methodological thinking. The group members no longer want to talk about 
the cultural-political goals of the design concept, but want instead to search for 
practical ways to realize these.”30 While in earlier years the visions of the RfF and 
the BDI had overlapped when industry supported the idea of moral recovery via 
aesthetics, they came apart once repairing the country’s international image was 
deemed unnecessary and West German products had regained their good repu-
tation in the global market. At this point, the business community returned to a 
pro
t-oriented interpretation of design.31 Consequently, West German industry 
moved away from the dogmatic rigidity of postwar functionalism and toward 
catering to consumer tastes.
This shi coincided with strife between the Werkbund and BDI factions 
on the board of the RfF, which came to a head between 1967 and 1969. The 
design council’s formal restructuring of 1967–68 that brought the RfF under 
BDI control played out as a hostile takeover. It seems as though the BMWi was 
largely responsible for the breakdown of the relationship between the Werkbund 
members and the BDI representatives in the RfF, as the minister’s rejection of 
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earlier requests for more 
nancial state support le the public design council 
little choice but to seek money elsewhere and under new terms in order to con-
tinue its work. As a result, the mission of the design council became increasingly 
industry-oriented at the expense of its cultural foundations.32 Coupled with a 
weak management since Mia Seeger le as RfF general secretary in 1967, the 
design council lost its independence. Strictly speaking, the ocial aesthetic 
promoted by the RfF henceforth only existed in government-sponsored foreign 
trade industrial shows or other international exhibitions as part of West German 
cultural diplomacy.
Regional actors took advantage of the state of distraction that the RfF’s in-

ghting caused. A growing number added their own voices to the debate about 
good design in the 1960s. Munich’s Neue Sammlung, a tax-supported gallery of 
modern design, and regional chambers of commerce, especially that in Stutt-
gart, not only maintained permanent collections of well-designed products but 
also assembled traveling exhibitions. In addition, West German cities founded a 
network of Wohnberatungen, information centers equipped with pattern books 
where interior designers counseled West Germans on how to furnish their 
apartments. By 1961 Wohnberatungen could be found throughout the Federal 
Republic, many of them funded by public housing agencies or local chambers 
of commerce, though the Wohnberatungen in West Berlin, Mannheim, and 
Munich also received Werkbund money.33 Most of the initiatives for a mod-
ern “German” taste correlated with the furnishing boom of the 1960s, when 40 
percent of all households were buying furniture.34 Fueled by such demand, the 
1960s and 1970s became the most exciting decades in West German furniture 
development. For the RfF, however, this meant ample competition for aesthetic 
leadership in interior design.
Aside from maintaining their own collections of “good design,” the Länder 
chambers of commerce created regional design centers that served local industry 
and rivaled the RfF in inuence. Two among them, the design centers in Stutt-
gart (Baden–Württemberg) and in Essen (North Rhine–Westphalia), developed 
powerful ideas for industrial development in regions that were already more eco-
nomically successful than the rest of West Germany. In the 1970s, Stuttgart’s de-
sign center even applied repeatedly for independent membership in an interna-
tional design organization, the International Council of Societies of Industrial 
Design (ICSID), where the RfF was a founding member and representative of 
German interests. Relations between the Stuttgart Design Center and the RfF 
hit a new low when the latter became involved in Stuttgart’s ICSID candidacy 
process. Throughout the Cold War, most countries appointed only one design 
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society to this international organization in order to project a cohesive nation 
brand in the realm of industrial design. Stuttgart’s application triggered an ex-
change between the ICSID board and the RfF in which information about the 
relationship between the design council and the Stuttgart Design Center was 
solicited in an eort to determine membership fees. If the council vouched for 
a close relationship, the Stuttgart Design Center would pay reduced fees. But 
Herbert Ohl, RfF’s technical director and ICSID board member, was unwill-
ing to do so. “I should think also,” Ohl sarcastically added, “that they would 
themselves not like to be regarded as part of the Rat für Formgebung, since 
we are a national institution.”35 Ohl’s reaction was indicative of irreconcilable 
dierences between the two institutions on the matters of regional and national 
industrial design policy. The higher membership fees, as Ohl well knew, had not 
been budgeted for by Stuttgart’s center, and he knowingly jeopardized a stronger 
West German presence in this international body for the sake of national brand 
cohesion. Nonetheless, the Stuttgart Design Center reached an agreement with 
the ICSID and became a member in 1979 without Ohl’s support.
These episodes make it abundantly clear that the West German design coun-
cil failed to maintain its leadership of the nation brand as time went on. The 
growing number of participants in the industrial design discourse, the diverging 
objectives between industry and state interests, and the lack of sustained support 
from the government undercut RfF activities and curtailed the council’s ability 
to exert inuence over production aesthetics and the West German brand.
Modernizing the GDR Brand:  
Streamlining, Mechanization, and Standardization
In contrast to the Federal Republic, central planning, nationalization of indus-
try, and collectivization of cra businesses in the GDR should have facilitated 
the creation and maintenance of a coherent nation brand based on socialist re-
alist aesthetics.36 But this process remained incomplete until the very last days 
of the GDR.37 Moreover, the GDR only belatedly moved industrial design mat-
ters from the Ministry of Culture to the German Oce for Standardization 
and Product Testing (DAMW) in 1965, 
nally anchoring it in the centralized 
planning structures.38 The fact that this institutional restructuring was done 
in order to keep industrial designers from further interfering in SED cultural 
policy, rather than to acknowledge that designers could contribute to savvy 
economic policy, says much about the limitations that the design council ZfF 
faced. In fact, the development of economic policy from the 1953 New Course to 
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Ulbricht’s New Economic System of Planning and Management (Neues Öko-
nomisches System der Planung und Leitung, NES) rather tells a story of struggle 
in the creation of a coherent aesthetic in GDR production culture, in which the 
ZfF only occasionally appears.
While the partition of Germany created favorable conditions for the West 
German economic miracle, the eastern side was le wanting. Traditional agri-
cultural areas in the east were cut o from industry in the west, especially the 
Ruhr region, southern parts of Lower Saxony, the Rhine-Main region to the 
Rhine-Neckar region and the region surrounding Stuttgart in the south. The 
GDR held industrial centers in Thuringia and Saxony, but northern East Ger-
many had close to none. It also lacked a waterway like the Rhine river system, 
which easily transported consumer and bulk goods to the northern European 
ports, thus facilitating West German overseas trade. The shipping industry on 
the Elbe River, for instance, was disrupted by the inner-German border and pre-
dominately served to supply West Berlin.39 Meanwhile, because of its location at 
the edge of the Eastern Bloc, the GDR lost its importance in the east-west trade 
once the Iron Curtain came down. Moreover, the Federal Republic possessed 
most of the coal and ore reserves, while the resource-rich areas in the east had 
been surrendered to Poland aer 1945. West Germany also had a larger percent-
age of climatically favored and consumer-oriented agricultural areas, as well as 
ice-free ports.40 Finally, the partition spared the west from having to support the 
agrarian east. These factors, coupled with a modi
ed free-market economy, le 
West Germany well positioned to quickly increase production, satisfy consumer 
demand, and regain foreign markets, which triggered an industrial boom that 
lasted well into the 1960s.41 The Federal Republic’s success posed a great chal-
lenge to the economically weaker GDR, even though it was the most successful 
Eastern Bloc economy.
The GDR also suered disadvantages as it shouldered the lion’s share of 
Soviet war reparation claims.42 Aer postwar negotiations between the Allies 
failed, the Soviet Union extracted a minimum of 10 billion dollars’ worth of 
machinery and products from the eastern zone of occupation. Until 1949, en-
tire factories were relocated to Soviet territory.43 The Saxon furniture company 
Deutsche Werkstätten Hellerau (DWH) was completely dismantled down to its 
workshop lamps and light bulbs, which were transported eastward along with 
expensive machinery.44 The need to pay reparations also led to the restructuring 
of large-and medium-sized industry, which, together with large land holdings, 
had been largely nationalized during occupation. As the Soviet Union asked in 
particular for goods from the automotive and heavy engineering sectors, these 
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industries expanded with the Plans of 1949–50, 1951–55, and 1956–60, while in-
vestments in light industry and food production slowed.45 Furniture production 
therefore had to re-establish itself largely without large-scale investment plans 
in the 1950s. Yet as this industry was central to housing reconstruction, living 
standards, and consumer satisfaction—topics closely linked to East Germany’s 
political legitimacy—it oers great insights into how the GDR leadership be-
came increasingly inuenced by the West German “other.” Despite SED prom-
ises of economic improvement, West German prosperity set an unattainably 
high benchmark for the GDR. Explanations for the failure of the centralized 
GDR economy commonly center on oen contradictory Five-Year Plans.46 Pol-
itics trumped economics in the planning process, and recent scholarship points 
to eciency—or rather the lack of it—as an important analytical category for 
understanding the role of political leadership in the socialist planned economy.47
Companies learned to navigate East Germany’s centralized economy by hiding 
their real capacities with the goal of being assigned the lowest possible produc-
tion quota with the largest possible resource allocations.48 The entire system 
further diminished productivity and encouraged wastefulness by disabling prin-
ciples of market competition both domestically and internationally, where the 
state’s monopoly on foreign trade stied innovation from the outset.49
One central problem in enforcing a national brand in the GDR industrial 
production continued to be individualistic 
rms and regional identity. While 
opportunistic behavior of companies and local operatives undermined quan-
titative goals and labor eciency, there was opposition to cultural policy in 
the light industries as well. For instance, one of the country’s largest furniture 
collectives, the Saxon furniture complex Dresden-Hellerau that had been built 
around the core company DWH, opposed the SED’s socialist realist diktat and 
continued to design furniture with its signature simple, modernist aesthetic as 
long as it could.50 DWH’s founder, Karl Schmidt, had been an inuential leader 
in the turn-of-the-century workshop movement (Werkstättenbewegung) and a 
founding member of the Werkbund.51 Bruno Paul, a famous art nouveau inte-
rior designer and architect, had conceived DWH’s 
rst serial furniture program, 
the “Growing Apartment” (Wachsende Wohnung). It oered dierent furniture 
pieces that could be assembled as a living or dining room set according to the 
customers’ individual needs and brought modern design to the middle classes.52
Although DWH became nationalized in 1951, Schmidt’s aesthetic philosophy 
and production ethics remained in force. DWH continued to produce the 
Wachsende Wohnung as Model 558, until it was discontinued because of mount-
ing political pressure in 1958.
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To curtail Hellerau’s popular modernist inuence, Ulbricht himself became 
involved early on. In 1953, he personally stopped the publication of a booklet 
about DWH on the grounds that the furniture photographs in the book contra-
dicted the SED’s ocial aesthetic guidelines.53 The market, however, liked the 
practical furniture that Hellerau produced. For example, when a home furnish-
ing exhibition in East Berlin’s Alexanderplatz in 1953 showed models that tended 
to bulky proportions and lacked stylistic cohesiveness, visitors asked instead for 
Paul’s Wachsende Wohnung and demanded furniture that they considered to be 
well-proportioned and aordable.54 Increasingly, however, producers found their 
design options limited by the Construction Academy of the GDR (Bauakade-
mie der DDR), a scienti
c institution in charge of construction and architec-
ture. The Bauakademie took control of furniture design development as well, 
reviewed product catalogs, and, if deemed necessary, dictated speci
c models 
in line with socialist realist style. Following the Minister Council’s order to the 
furniture industry on 21 January 1954, which required that furniture aesthet-
ics invoke the German cultural heritage, it created development departments, 
so-called E-Stellen, that reported to the Bauakademie with the directive to ex-
ecute aesthetic guidelines.55 In order to avoid economic and political marginal-
ization or even closure, DWH started to integrate style elements in line with 
ocial cultural doctrine into new designs, a change in strategy to appease the 
SED. Most of Hellerau’s workers, it seems, disliked the change, as they indicated 
their preference for modern aesthetics during a viewing of these new furniture 
designs.56 That October, the DWH head of development emphasized that, while 
his department endeavored to follow ocial guidelines in developing a socialist 
domestic culture, “it ought to be our goal to maintain Deutsche Werkstätten 
[Hellerau]’s noted good style or, rather, to win it back.”57 Surely, DWH was only 
one site of resistance the SED encountered in the production sector. 58 Yet it 
oers important insight into the mechanisms that were put in place to control 
the creative process in the furniture industry and ensure aesthetic cohesion in 
the national brand. Ulbricht’s censorship of the company and the increasing 
controls on production aesthetics meant to stie the individual character of 
businesses such as DWH were followed by further collectivization of industry 
in 1958–59.59
At the Fih Party Congress in 1958, Ulbricht declared the new goal for the 
East German economy: to surpass West Germany in per capita consumption.60
Workforce mobilization was a crucial part of this plan. Letters to the workers 
called on them to join the eort to eradicate overlapping production and waste 
of resources. At the height of the Berlin Crisis in 1959, one of these open letters 
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was addressed to “Furniture Workmen in the German Democratic Republic”: 
“In this situation, West Germans look to us. They observe how we live. Our 
successes in the social and cultural arena are great and lack an equivalent in the 
Bonn Republic. We have made progress in the 
eld of material consumption as 
well. And it is in material consumption where we must advance faster to over-
take West Germany.”61 For workers in the furniture industry, the connection 
between the socialist way of life, expressed in Wohnkultur, and the fruits of their 
labor was especially evident.
The idea behind accelerating the development and production of a distinctly 
socialist furniture culture, forward-looking and comfortable, aimed at coun-
teracting images of abundance coming from West Germany.62 To this end, Ul-
bricht announced further integration and concentration of nationalized small 
and medium industry within their district through the Association of Nation-
alized Companies (Vereinigung Volkseigener Betriebe, VVB). Since earlier 
collectivization processes had created even more regional activity, the new as-
sociation was intended to eectively control regional industry, steer production 
aesthetics, and maximize eciency by creating intermediate-level institutions 
located between the Planning Commission and enterprise that could organize 
industry transregionally.63 The new administrative units coordinated produc-
tion by redistributing “tasks to allow greater specialization, standardization and 
the use of spare capacity,” and by taking greater control over research and de-
velopment, which was previously located at the individual company level or, in 
the case of collectivized state-owned industry, at the core company.64 However, 
the introduction of the VVBs ended up creating rivals to the central planning 
institutions. Focused on their own industry, the VVBs did not uphold a cohe-
sive narrative of nation branding. Furthermore, the VVBs of the same industry 
remained subdivided in districts across the GDR, a fragmentation that would 
become increasingly dicult to overcome with growing specialization and com-
partmentalization between and within districts.
The Thuringian furniture industry was the 
rst to unite private and 
state-owned furniture companies in the Gera and Jena area under the name 
VVB Möbel Zeulenroda/Thüringen in 1959.65 It combined sixteen VEBs and 
six semi-state owned companies, and twenty-two private enterprises among oth-
ers in Eisenberg, Gera, Greiz, Jena, Lobenstein, Pößneck, Rudolstadt, Saalfeld, 
and Zeulenroda.66 Cooperative relations between enterprises of all ownership 
forms, the underlying theory suggested, would yield increased resource eciency 
and organize entire industries horizontally. The 1959 open letter to the furniture 
industry workers had already announced Zeulenroda’s future as a Musterbeispiel, 
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a model for specialization and cooperation among 
rms of dierent ownership 
forms.67 Zeulenroda had been chosen because its core company specialized in 
stylistically overwrought furniture (Stilmöbel), a natural 
t with the ocial East 
German socialist realist production aesthetic of the 1950s. It oered a promising 
case study for the streamlining of the furniture industry alongside the successful 
implementation of cultural centralization in the GDR.
Yet by 1962 the myriad of ownership forms in the GDR economy continued 
to complicate concentration eorts (see table 2.1). Of 14,520 furniture-producing 
companies, 13,698 were in private hands, of which 13,542 were small cras and 
trade. The fragmentation caused labor ineciency: about 96 percent of smaller 
furniture companies, employing 48 percent of the manpower, produced only 
34 percent of the national production volume. In addition to the apparent un-
tapped labor potential, the fragmentation also caused a technological challenge. 
As a big portion of companies were artisan businesses, they could rarely be trans-
formed into large-series producers (Großserienproduzenten). However, from the 
1950s onward, the ultimate goal of any restructuring of the furniture industry 
had been mass production to ful
ll growing consumer demands.
In 1964, the VVB Möbel began yet another attempt at restructuring furni-
ture production, based on a report which found that, until 1963, furnishings 
constituted only about 2 percent of the GDR’s total industrial production but 
showed great promise as an export industry—15 percent of all export consumer 
products came from the furniture industry.68 The report pointed out that East 
Germany’s outdated technological standards and lack of investment had lowered 
the country’s international competitiveness. Furthermore, it noted, a large va-
riety of styles and models inhibited economies of scale. For example, there were 
between 1,200 and 1,400 dierent furniture models in the upholstery sector. 
Every time a company switched to a new model, processes, machines, and tools 
needed to be recalibrated, which meant an interruption in production.
The 1964 structural reform aimed at addressing these shortcomings, shied 
investment strategies to mechanization and modernization of furniture man-
ufacturing, and opened a new chapter in supplying national retail and foreign 
trade. It eliminated the fragmentation of production through company merg-
ers, cut down on specialized production by increasing mechanization, incorpo-
rated modern processing and manufacturing technologies, used materials that 
corresponded to international quality standards, and implemented serial mass 
production.69 The Planning Committee increased annual investments to the 
furniture industry from 30 million Ostmark in 1964 to 50 million Ostmark 
from 1966 onward.70 The funds were exclusively allocated for machines 
t for 
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serial production; existing factory buildings had to suce, as the investment 
plan was aimed solely at raising standards of technology.71
The 1964 reform also deepened the restructuring of regional clusters of in-
dustry. It created combines (Kombinate) throughout the 1960s, which basically 
replaced the VVBs as mid-level control bodies. However, clustering and coordi-
nation were only successful in traditionally dense industrial areas. Big companies 
focused on the mass production of serial furniture, while small cras businesses 
were to respond to short-term changes in demand and 
ll gaps in the product 
range.72 Consequently, companies specialized either in a particular model or fur-
niture ensemble, in certain technological processes or steps in the production 
Table 2.1. Ownership forms in the East German furniture industry,  


















 average  
(%)
GDR total 1,730 100.0 14,520 100.0 92,250 100.0
Industry total 1,143 66.0 563 4.0 48,015 52.0
State-
owned (VEB) 866 50.0 178 1.3 32,705 35.5
Partially state-
owned (HSB) 218 12.6 228 1.6 11,670 12.5
Privately owned 58 3.3 156 1.1 3,590 3.9
Industrial 
co-operative 1 0.1 1 0 50 0.1
Cras total 587 34.0 13,957 96.0 44,235 48.0
Cras 
co-operative 225 13.0 415 3.0 14,325 15.5
Private small 
trade/cras and 
small industry 362 21.0 13,542 93.0 29,910 32.5
Source: BArch, DE 1/ VS II 12173, concept, “Zur Entwicklung der Möbelindustrie der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik Berlin,” September 1964, p. 1. Note: MDN (Mark 
der Deutschen Notenbank) is an abbreviation for the East German currency, or Ostmark, in 
the 1960s.
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process, or in assembling certain parts.73 Where industry was thinly spread out, 
these attempts at concentration, cooperation, and specialization did not take 
hold. Nevertheless, the modernization and rationalization measures shied 
the emphasis in nation branding activities: Instead of the backward-looking 
“keeper of German heritage” narrative, the modernization eort reconnected 
East Germany’s cultural vision to that of other industrialized countries in a 
forward-looking way.
The 1964 furniture industry reforms were an integral part of the NES (1963–
68), which continued in modi
ed form under the name Economic System of 
Socialism (Ökonomisches System des Sozialismus, ESS) until 1971, when the 
Politburo aborted this economic program and returned to the authoritative 
Plan. Ulbricht’s NES program aimed at allowing more exibility for all levels 
of planning—most notably by giving individual companies greater discretion—
and at working toward greater eciency and growth. It recognized the lim-
its of socialist economic thinking as the GDR strove to re-enter international 
markets aer a period of extreme isolation following the erection of the Berlin 
Wall.74 Economic levers played an important role in NES, which attempted to 
combine central planning with indirect steering of enterprise via mostly mon-
etary incentives. These economic levers, including net pro
t deductions, taxes, 
prices, and the cost and availability of credit and fund formation, became meth-
ods for indirectly aligning enterprise with the Plan.75 Bonuses and other 
nan-
cial incentives were aimed directly at motivating the workforce. Nevertheless, 
the introduction of market elements stressed quantitative as well as qualitative 
performance.
The Planning Commission expected the furniture industry to produce a 
complete and continuous range of functional and modern furnishings to meet 
domestic demand and export commitments. During the 1964 reforms, it de-
manded “superb quality, technologically state-of-the-art” furniture that should 
contain a higher “moral” value, meaning that it should be more durable, have 
greater functionality, and be simpler and lighter in construction.76 These new 
guidelines revised the previous emphasis on ornamentation and arts and cras 
techniques in furniture production. GDR furniture industry was thus encour-
aged to implement simpler aesthetics, which taste reformer Horst Michel and 
other former Werkbund members and Bauhaus disciples had envisioned back 
in the late 1940s. Part of the plan was to compensate for a scarcity of natural 
resources and quality materials by modernizing furniture design. Chipboard 
and 
berboard, new surface materials, and chemical manufactures were used 
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to reach these new standards. Rather than traditional materials like wood, the 
planners favored man-made materials, such as plastic and synthetics for drawers, 
doors, frames, and entire chairs.77 But more than just an economic program, 
this new focus on chemistry had cultural aims as well. Horst Redeker’s 1960 
pamphlet “Chemistry adds Beauty” (Chemie gibt Schönheit) set the tone for 
this period.78 In the furniture industry, synthetic materials were mainly used in 

nishing treatments and cushion foams. While the ultimate goal was, literally 
and 
guratively, to enhance the socialist surface, this mostly resulted in a gloss-
ing over of the lack of quality materials underneath. In this way, the leadership 
changed the GDR national brand to one of forward-looking synthetic moder-
nity in the mid-1960s.
Eventually, the scienti
c ideas that accompanied the centralization measures 
of the 1964 reform impacted industrial design rhetoric. Internal ZfF commu-
nication shied emphasis from cultural directives to questions of socialist sci-
enti
c progress.79 The main prerequisite for the institute’s work remained the 
improvement and design of the “socialist way of life,” but urgent technological 
and economic considerations surpassed purely cultural concerns. One challenge 
that remained was how to de
ne the everyday needs of this “socialist way of 
life.” Ulbricht vaguely described the function of domestic culture in his presen-
tation on “Basic Tasks for the Year 1970” in connection with the ongoing GDR 
housing crisis: “The quality of housing inuences work productivity and devel-
opment of the socialist identity. People reproduce their labor mainly in housing 
areas. With the evolution of a socialist mode of life, though, qualitatively new 
demands on housing develop.”80 The design of the home and of kitchen furni-
ture was to be purposeful and pragmatic in order to free up time to do “more 
pleasant and useful things, such as cultural activities or educating ourselves.”81
Aesthetic considerations too impacted this practical approach: “Bad shape and 
color eects in tools, home textiles or furniture limit our joy of habitation.”82
The government thus understood the home to be an important part of the 
workers’ state, a place of recuperation and recovery from and for work as well 
as a space for self-improvement. Aesthetic concepts continued to play a great 
ideological role in shaping Germans into good socialists. However, determining 
these visual markers of a socialist way of life more concretely was le to the ZfF. 
By turning the aesthetic reconstitution of East German material culture into a 
scienti
c experiment, the GDR aligned its conception of the human environ-
ment with the scienti
c-economic interpretation of socialism that prevailed in 
the Eastern Bloc in the 1960s. This was an eort to catch up with Khrushchev’s 
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rationalization of the Soviet everyday, which proclaimed technology as the locus 
of communist modernization.83
Alongside the structural reorganization and scienti
cation of the East Ger-
man furniture industry, more eorts were made to standardize production. 
Those measures included the standardization of furniture measurements in co-
operation with the construction industry, the nationwide streamlining of assort-
ments (Sortimentsbereinigung)—a speci
c type of product range rationalization 
based on cultural and political motivations—and tight quality control.84 Sorti-
mentsbereinigung dramatically reduced the numbers of models in the market 
and was a crucial prerequisite for the furniture industry to venture into mass 
production. In this way, the ZfF hoped to simultaneously achieve greater pro-
ductivity and conserve raw materials.
This rethinking of furniture included machine-produced boards and self- 
mounted furniture series. Economic planners found the answer to their prob-
lems in modular storage furniture (Schrankwand). Ironically, at this point the 
leading furniture combine Zeulenroda with its stylistically fraught furniture fell 
out of favor with the political leadership, and the SED reconciled with DWH, 
which it had previously viewed with suspicion. The furniture “modularization” 
program that Rudolf Horn designed for the Dresden-Hellerau combine in 1966, 
called Model German Workshops (Modell Deutsche Werkstätten, MDW), 
perhaps best embodies this new strategy. Instead of creating one variant of a 
hundred types, Horn changed the underlying concept to producing a hundred 
variants of one furniture type, substituting one distinct function with multiple 
functions for a piece or part of furniture. Wooden boards and panels consti-
tuted the basis of the construction concept, which relocated production from 
the work-and resource-intensive furniture industry to the wood prefabrication 
industry that simply provided the panels.85
The program was based on a vertical modular grid that optimized storage 
functionality and warehouse turnover. The pieces measured 96 mm vertically 
and 600 or 800 mm horizontally and included shelves, doors, tabletops, desk-
tops, and drawers. Its aesthetic appeal lay in the combination of matte-
nished 
surfaces on the basic structure and shiny veneers with real-wood visual appear-
ance on the front. MDW became a best-selling item because of its modulariza-
tion, availability, exibility, and the degree of customization it allowed the 
nal 
user. Consumers could assemble the pieces at home themselves. The system’s 
simple modular assembly and disassembly made it easy to move the furniture to 
a new location or to add supplementary parts as needed. MDW basically grew, 
or shrunk, over the course of the consumer’s life. Horn redesigned it twice in 
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figure 2.1. A studio photograph of East German system furniture  
Modell Deutsche Werkstätten (MDW) with larch veneer. Designed by Rudolf Horn 
for VEB Möbelkombinat Hellerau in 1967/1972. SLUB/Deutsche Fotothek,  
Friedrich Weimer, 1976.
figure 2.2. The Schrankwand became a popular solution for bed and living room 
storage in both German states. Hülsta modular furniture series Universa in mahogany 
and white wood, catalog no. 5002. © Hülsta-werke Hüls GmbH & Co. KG, 1978.
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the 1970s and 1980s, ensuring its production until the collapse of the GDR.86 It 
eventually incorporated upholstery modules from neighboring companies and 
combines. MDW and its supplier network thus perfectly embodied the division 
of labor that rationalization had brought to the modernization of the East Ger-
man furniture industry. MDW was one of the longest-selling and most success-
ful furniture lines before Ikea products became a global phenomenon.87
MDW also entailed a complete rethinking of relations between production, 
retail, and 
tting. Retail had to be reorganized to provide 
rst-time buyers with 
Wohnberatung, interior design counseling that would create the best solution 
for any given house, apartment, or room. Stores had to oer assembly in a timely 
manner, though consumers could choose to assemble the pieces themselves with-
out professional help. However, Horn envisioned close cooperation between fur-
niture stores and industry. He quoted Ulbricht’s guidelines from the Seventh 
Party Congress in 1967: “It is here that retail 
lls out its role as contributor to the 
People’s economy—for the good of the economic eciency.”88 Wohnberatungen 
had existed in the GDR before, but the projected MDW counseling exceeded 
prior institutions in scale and ambition, revealing a systematic attempt to pro-
mote both an aesthetic and a utilitarian vision to the broader public.89
Although NES and the Chemical Program incentivized a host of reforms 
in the furniture industry, enabled investments, and facilitated greater coordi-
nation—for which MDW was an exceptionally successful example—not ev-
erything went according to plan. In hopes of increasing the potential for in-
novation, NES gave combines and VEBs more freedom with regard to product 
development and planning. This leeway, however, made quality control more 
dicult, and thus necessitated extra incentives for industry to produce goods 
consistent with the ocial aesthetic. It is here that the ZfF used its industrial 
design expertise to participate in the economic planning process. As a unit of 
the DAMW, it issued a new quality seal for “Good Design” and awarded medals 
at the semi-annual Leipzig trade fair from 1964 onward. Winning companies 
could increase prices for their domestic retail and export products and thus reach 
their annual production quota faster. However, the measure did not achieve the 
desired eect, because the economic levers introduced by the NES did not erad-
icate self-interested company behavior. By 1970, the SED party organizations in 
the furniture industry blamed poor quality of products and lack of innovation 
on the VEB and combine directors. They requested an end to the “ideology 
of omission,” the tendency to mass produce only those furniture designs that 
required the least material and labor resources.90
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Family Businesses and Aesthete Entrepreneurs
The 1964 restructuring of the GDR furniture industry was closely related 
to the state of West Germany’s furniture production. Investments in mecha-
nization technology had propelled the Federal Republic to the top of storage 
furniture-producing nations, while education and professional training had 
given West German products a reputation for quality workmanship and inno-
vation.91 West Germany’s successes became the implied benchmark for the GDR 
furniture industry in the 1960s. To complete the modern brand narrative, how-
ever, the GDR planners, despite concentration measures that theoretically in-
creased control over the design process, still depended on the cooperation of the 
industrial sector, just as western design councils needed to work hand in hand 
with entrepreneurial elites. The results of these eorts were mixed, and both 
risked losing a key actor in their brand narrative endeavor: the entrepreneur.
In the postwar era, a number of German family businesses that produced fur-
niture grew from small 
rms that competed in niche markets into international 
companies. Nonetheless, the families maintained their ownership as well as their 
inuence on business culture and leadership. Alongside big industry, the family 
business has been identi
ed as one of the two routes to Germany’s industrial 
modernity.92 The economic strength of small-and medium-sized businesses, the 
so-called Mittelstand, shaped West German capitalism, while they played a less 
important role in the GDR.93 There the social capital and economic prowess of 
entrepreneurial families were frequently overlooked because of the policy focus 
on state-owned companies and large production clusters.
Owners’ 
nancial and personal involvement in family and Mittelstand busi-
nesses oen created speci
c organizational structures.94 Specialized regional 
networks of artisanal work emerged through associational cooperation, a “de-
centralized industrial order,” before and alongside big business, strengthened 
by the distinctive social ethos of the Mittelstand entrepreneurs.95 In West Ger-
many, most of the furniture industry was clustered in Baden-Württemberg, 
Bavaria, and North Rhine–Westphalia.96 Through mechanization and mutual 
support in regional networks, the industry found creative ways to sustain itself 
even during economic downturns, such as the oil crises of the 1970s, and the 
onset of market saturation. Whereas 40 percent of the population in the Federal 
Republic bought furniture during the furnishing boom of the 1960s, just 20 
percent did at the beginning of the 1980s. Yet the expenditures doubled from 
DM 318 to DM 646 per purchase.97 This was partially due to collaborations 
between dierent branches of the industry. For example, upholstery and storage 
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furniture manufacturers together created attractive modular programs that of-
fered solutions for the entire house and enticed consumers to spend more money 
in a single purchase. Technological progress contributed to the sustainability of 
medium-sized furniture production as well. By the 1980s, the industry mecha-
nized with remarkable speed, resulting in greater output using less manpower.98
Most of these 
rms were still medium-sized companies with workforces of less 
than one hundred.
In the realm of design, the personal involvement of family members and the 
ability to draw on regional artisanal skills oen made family businesses drivers 
of innovation. The North Rhine–Westphalian furniture company Interlübke 
exempli
es how timeless designs, quality production, and long product life span 
became the cornerstone of family business success. Founded by brothers Hans 
and Leo Lübke in 1937, the company became a household name by the 1960s. 
Based on the ideas of Swiss interior designer Walter Müller, the Lübke brothers 
developed an “endless” closet and shelving system in 1963 that revolutionized 
the West German living room. The Schrankwand, a modular furniture system, 
could be rearranged or added to as needed, just like the MDW storage solution 
in the GDR a few years later. While there were other people working on similar 
solutions to provide exible storage in the living room, the Lübke closet system, 
called Interlübke 63, won over consumers with its durability and simple elegance. 
Interlübke did not follow trends or listen to consumer surveys but rather relied 
on its own taste to create progressive and modern high-end furniture.99 As trend-
setters, the Lübke family represented the ideal type of aesthete industrialists in 
the Federal Republic: a family business that excelled in quality design and whose 
interests eventually aligned with the aesthetic mission of the RfF. However, 
companies that could aord to cater only to a selective and exclusive clientele 
with expensive, modern taste were the exception also in the Federal Republic.
Even during periods of enormous growth, the Mittelstand ethos remained 
visible in the 
rms’ political activism. Members involved in the BDI Arbeits-
kreis oen came from small-and medium-sized enterprises and family compa-
nies.100 The smaller scale of their businesses allowed Mittelstand entrepreneurs 
to combine traditional crasmanship with serial production. They were in 
general more likely to consider questions of design alongside production ethics 
that valued premium materials and durability, and less prone to Americanize 
their business methods than their big business counterparts.101 In the postwar 
decades, American production and management methods, such as rationalized 
mass production to increase pro
t margins, systematic data collection to max-
imize productivity, and mass distribution, including marketing techniques, to 
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create demand, had become inuential in German big business.102 While Ger-
man industrialists were fascinated by the productivity and prosperity of US in-
dustries, they rejected American production practices that consciously cut short 
product life span with super
cial styling and mediocre materials and construc-
tion.103 Instead, German Mittelstand entrepreneurs shared a belief in quality 
materials and timeless shapes with other European countries that had adopted 
reform ideas from social design movements, such as the Swiss Werkbund (1913) 
and the Dutch De Stijl (1917), into their national value system in the 
rst de-
cades of the twentieth century. The furniture industry particularly upheld these 
standards because technologies of wood processing had not advanced enough 
to mechanize production entirely, and for the most part small series production 
prevailed. West German furniture production thus combined aesthetic charac-
teristics with social responsibility by necessity as well as by intention. This value 
system persisted until well aer reconstruction and was rearmed in 1965 by 
the BDI. Gustav Stein summarized the position as follows: “If everybody took 
part in the conscious quality reduction coming out of America, then there is 
only one recipe for success for us: technological quality with its ‘Made-in-Ger-
many’ seal shaped by ‘good design as a quality factor.’”104 Business elites thus saw 
their products as part of a national brand that stood for high standards with a 
commitment to aordable value. From their point of view, German aesthet-
ics and production ethics stood in opposition to those associated with Ameri-
can methods.
Like industrialists in the Federal Republic, the economic planners of the 
GDR idealized quality design and quality products. East Germans upheld du-
rability and social responsibility as the underlying principles of production. This 
is supported by the fact that the DAMW established quality control bench-
marks and mechanisms with the goal of prolonging product life span.105 This 
policy was partially motivated by the scarcity of consumer goods. Increasing 
demand, so the idea went, could be stemmed if the available goods remained in 
households long enough. For instance, economic planners expected living room 
and bedroom furniture to last 
y years, a view they shared with a sizable part 
of the wider population. As late as 1984, almost a third of East Germans main-
tained that furniture should be bought only once in a lifetime.106 The fact that 
Germans in East and West opposed the American “throwaway society” thus 
suggests that Americanization cannot explain all facets of Germany’s postwar 
cultural and economic development.
In East German socialism, the space for entrepreneurial activity shrunk 
during waves of intensi
ed collectivization and expropriation in the 1950s, 
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1960s, and 1970s, in spite of the fact that private ownership persisted in segments 
of the arts and cras. In response, East German companies steadily migrated 
westward in search of better economic and more liberal political conditions. 
As early as 1953, about one in seven East German industrial 
rms, more than 
four thousand in total, had moved to the Federal Republic, taking their skilled 
workers and managers with them.107 This exodus marked an enormous brain 
drain, as the average GDR refugee was young, educated, and highly adaptable.108
Loss of talent hampered the country’s technological-scienti
c development and 
damaged its industrial progress. This migration ow was only halted by the con-
struction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961.
Innovation, while desired among East German entrepreneurs and family 
business owners, found little space in the socialist economy as NES and ESS 
drew to a close in 1970. The new national brand narrative of synthetic modernity 
that was deeply anchored in industrial research and development (R&D) put 
even more pressure on the Planning Commission to keep up with the interna-
tional industrial competition. With a mix of paranoia and hunger for success, 
the GDR increasingly fostered its technological development through industrial 
espionage.109 However, the practice risked turning away potential allies in the 
national brand narrative and increasingly undermined the entrepreneurial spirit 
of Mittelstand business owners.
Such spy activity intersected with entrepreneurial expertise in the family 
business Bruchhäuser in Güstrow, Brandenburg. The 
rm was founded by Wer-
ner Bruchhäuser and his son Axel joined, aer earning an engineering degree, 
to manage technical development and marketing. During the standardization 
eorts of the early 1960s, the DAMW took note of the high quality standards 
and continued improvement of production technology in the Bruchhäuser com-
pany.110 By the late 1960s, this enterprise, a private company with majority state 
shareholding, produced couches, chairs, and other seating that were successful 
on the western export market.111 The case of Axel Bruchhäuser oers an illustra-
tion of how a 
nancially well-situated middle-class family that seemed to have 
come to an understanding with local and national party operatives could feel 
stied by the state’s one-size-
ts-all policy solutions to advance East German 
technical production.
In 1969, Axel Bruchhäuser requested assignment as Reisekader, a person who 
was granted ocial permission to travel outside of the GDR for business or po-
litical purposes without undergoing the long visa process.112 This would allow 
him to visit the Federal Republic to meet with his business contacts in the west-
ern furniture industry. His father, Werner, had been a Reisekader ever since the 
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company started exporting furniture to West Germany in 1966, and it may have 
been either the request for the second travel permit for one 
rm or the fact that 
the father had not proven to be a good and reliable Stasi (Ministry for State 
Security) informant that put the Bruchhäuser family on the radar of the GDR 
intelligence service.113
Aer long deliberations, followed by an extensive background check, the Stasi 
decided not only to grant Axel the travel permission but also to hire him as an 
unocial informant (Inozieller Mitarbeiter, IM), a collaborator of the intelli-
gence service.114 His research in synthetic 
llers for upholstery cushions coupled 
with his engineering knowledge made him an ideal candidate for industrial espi-
onage. Moreover, Axel had never openly criticized the regime, had a clean record 
in the required socialist youth mass organizations, and had become an expert in 
chemical technology. Even the fact that he had not been politically active and 
came from a middle-class family helped his case. The Stasi concluded that this 
“bourgeois” pro
le would make western business partners more likely to trust 
and speak openly with him.115 Once his IM training was complete, the Stasi 
showered Bruchhäuser with 
nancial incentives to work for them.116
For two years everything went smoothly. Bruchhäuser and his father both 
went on trips to Western Europe and reported back to the Stasi on the political, 
economic, and social situations of their host countries. Speci
cally, Bruchhäus-
er’s mission consisted of collecting
operational intelligence regarding oensive economic activities in the 
economic realm, the in
ltration of the adversary structure, intelligence 
of adversary companies and their centers of interference, accumulation 
of scienti
c-technological information and documents from non-socialist 
countries, recruitment of western economic cadres, and intelligence on op-
erationally interesting persons from non-socialist countries.117
The list reveals that investigating external “interference” in the GDR economy 
seems to have taken precedence over uncovering foreign industry secrets. But 
informant Bruchhäuser provided the Stasi mostly with technological informa-
tion about West German businesses that worked in the 
eld of polyurethane 
chemistry and not with intelligence about suspected western economic warfare. 
He also went to the IMM Cologne Furniture Fair in 1970 and 1972 to evaluate 
and report back on the international standards of technological development in 
furniture production.
In 1972, aer Erich Honecker had succeeded Ulbricht as general secretary of 
the SED, the entrepreneurial situation in the GDR took a turn for the worse. 
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Already majority-owned by the state, the Bruchhäuser family business became 
expropriated under the auspices of a new nationalization policy. Having endured 
partial expropriation in 1960, this was more than the Bruchhäuser family was 
willing to accept.118 A few weeks aer the announcement of the nationalization 
policy, the Stasi inadvertently sent father and son simultaneously on trips to 
western countries, giving them an opportunity to ee the GDR. Reuniting in 
West Germany, they joined forces with an old business contact in Lauenförde, 
Lower Saxony, and proceeded to take over a furniture company called Tecta, 
which they converted to specialize in Bauhaus designs and other high-end fur-
niture.119 Taken by surprise, the Stasi tried to force the Bruchhäusers to return to 
the GDR by holding Axel’s mother and his three sisters hostage. For two years, 
the Stasi followed their every step but eventually gave up in 1974.
This episode shows to what lengths the GDR went to catch up technolog-
ically with the West, especially the Federal Republic. The Stasi risked involv-
ing father and son in their IM program and provided transportation as well 
as funds to enable them to deepen their business contacts in the West. More-
over, Bruchhäuser’s mission also illuminates the suspicion and paranoia with 
which the GDR leadership viewed the FRG. Nevertheless, the investment in 
Bruchhäuser could have paid o. Axel did report back on new ideas about how 
to combine chemical components that could substitute for scarce natural re-
sources such as wood or 
llers in cushions.120 Among the East German projects 
that his expertise and industrial espionage facilitated were the new synthetics 
works in Schwedt. In a letter he sent to a friend in Güstrow aer he had ed 
the GDR, Bruchhäuser pointed out that the technological standard in Schwedt 
was tremendous and that people in the West were “tearing their hair out seeing 
how little such technological expertise was put to use” in the GDR.121 This in-
ability to fully bene
t from captured industrial secrets may be traced back to 
shiing power relations in industrial development since the late 1960s. To be in 
full control of the R&D process and to monopolize information, the Stasi cut 
ocial lines of international, and at times even internal, communication and 
substituted technological and scienti
c exchange with industrial espionage. In-
stead of incremental change through experimentation, R&D departments were 
ordered to copy illegally procured western products. This meant that industrial 
espionage became the sole source of progress in key industries for the GDR’s 
modernization, such as microelectronics, and that these industries were always a 
step behind the international competition.122 As Bruchhäuser’s story illustrates, 
this was also true for the chemical industry, an increasingly important contrib-
utor to furniture production.
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The way in which the SED handled industrial research thus suppressed both 
home-grown innovation and the entrepreneurial spirit.123 Espionage surely in-
formed technological development in the GDR furniture industry, though fully 
taking advantage of these advances depended on visionary entrepreneurs. How-
ever, such 
gures had been lost to the other side due to the expropriation and 
surveillance policies of the state. Whether Mittelstand industrialists physically 
emigrated to the West like Bruchhäuser or refused to cooperate, the government 
lost a crucial building block in the nation branding process.
Consumer Reception and Market Research
Postwar nation branding and the narratives it created around products estab-
lished a direct link between correct production and the “right” consumption. In 
the case of West Germany, over the course of the 1950s the brand had become na-
tional by design, but shared its modern edge with design work done in other Eu-
ropean countries. In the East German case, the branding message changed from 
presenting the GDR as the keeper of traditional German aesthetics in the 1950s 
to articulating a socialist synthetic modernity more international in character 
in the 1960s.124 Successful implementation of these narratives in everyday life 
via consumption necessitated the inclusion of the population in the brand. Here 
we see the eorts of industry and state-supported design institutions diverge 
again. Increasingly, industry’s vision for design as part of the national brand 
had a pragmatic and hence a more inclusive emphasis than that of state institu-
tions when it came to listening to consumer opinion. Meanwhile, the RfF design 
council in the West and the ZfF, the DAMW, or the Bauakademie in the East 
attempted to streamline or even control speci
c interior design aesthetics. The 
dierence in approach was guided by customers’ buying power alongside market 
research that facilitated producers’ acceptance of dierent tastes and purchasing 
decisions.
From the early days of the GDR, design educators made a great eort to in-
clude the population in the branding of postwar East Germany. Interior design 
shows oered an opportunity for design visionaries to directly interact with the 
general public. In 1952, the Institut für angewandte Kunst (the later ZfF) or-
ganized an exhibition of modern household goods that presented the ocial 
vision of the SED leadership. At its Industrial Products of Today show the in-
stitute asked the population to assess the displayed products, considering it an 
“important democratic cultural task” to judge the current industrial produc-
tion “with the goal of inuencing their further development and of scrutinizing 
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those distributers and buyers who brought the mediocre and the bad instead 
of the best into retail.”125 The GDR thus strengthened the link between pro-
duction and consumption by actively involving consumers in writing a national 
narrative, at least until the Formalism Debate and its aesthetic diktat curtailed 
the conversation.
Shortly aer the Formalism Debate, the GDR design council’s exhibitions 
oen stood in stark contrast to the ocial style guidelines. Customers le angry 
comments in response to the displays in the guestbook of the 1956 show Indus-
trial Products—Functional and Beautiful at East Berlin’s Alexanderplatz. They 
felt misled by the modern sample furniture in the exhibit that were not being 
mass-produced at that time. It further highlighted the drab oerings in stores 
and uncovered the shortcomings of East German consumer goods production. 
One visitor even called the exhibition a “smoke screen” hiding the bleak state of 
the socialist interior design industry.126
This guestbook oers testimony to popular discontent by the second half of 
the 1950s, once it became clear to the population that the GDR leadership would 
be unable to deliver on reconstruction-period promises.127 Visitors’ frustration 
with the apparent inability to put modern products in East German stores re-
sulted in pilgrimages to West Berlin. “It’s always the same. Retail, that is the 
government, has only to blame itself if we go to the West to see or even buy 
well-designed products!” one visitor remarked, deeply disappointed aer having 
seen such unattainable furniture displayed in the exhibition. “This [exhibition] 
is proof that we also have such things. Where can I buy the nice little upholstered 
lounge chairs from Hellerau?”128 Consumer comments cleverly employed ideo-
logical rhetoric to engage and challenge economic planners: “Ful
lling personal 
needs is the best cultural education (Kultur-Erziehung). How can we bene
t 
from the most beautiful exhibition if everything is destined for export?”129 Most 
of the commentators signed their critique with their full names and addresses, 
which indicates that they neither feared repression nor punishment for their 
candor. “This book with its contents can be described as an ‘arraignment’; an ar-
raignment because it uncovers openly and consistently the idleness of retail and 
partially even that of the industry,” reads one of the last comments, summarizing 
the general tone of responses in the guestbook.130
Ten years later, in 1965, at the furnishings show Modern Dwelling in Hoyers-
werda, similar comments about retail’s failure to embrace modern furniture 
again appeared in the guestbook. The show’s visitors especially blamed retail 
buyers and proposed that “the HO and Konsum buyers of Hoyerswerda should 
acquire good taste by seeing the original [in this exhibition]. Hopefully then 
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there will be good products available in our stores.”131 Assuming buyers had been 
whiplashed by the Formalism Debate and the o-changing SED style directives, 
the public urged them “to buy and act bravely!”132 Ample evidence exists that 
many GDR citizens preferred modern idioms to the opulent kitsch of socialist 
historicism. It is safe to say that the leadership and the populace did not agree 
on a single style for German socialism in the 1950s and the 
rst half of the 1960s. 
Representing large state-owned retail organizations, HO and Konsum buyers 
grew insecure; they either safely complied with the SED guidelines on socialist 
realism or simply followed their oen uneducated personal taste. By the mid-
1960s, when the national brand narrative changed to a synthetic modernity that 
included simpler, functional designs, production and retail had to undergo a 
complete restructuring in order to ful
ll this new vision.
In the long run, economic organization by districts seems to have caused con-
sumption disruption and inhibited modernization. The industry in each district 
was supposed to cover the consumption needs of the entire region, which posed 
fewer problems in regard to foodstus or articles of personal hygiene and clothes 
than with furniture. Despite eorts to align the furniture aesthetic across the 
GDR via cultural policy, each of the furniture combines maintained its own 
speci
c style. The inexible organization by district severely limited interdistrict 
exchange of goods, which negatively aected the availability of speci
c furniture 
sets and add-on systems across the country at the close of the 1950s.133 For some-
body who had decorated a home in the district of Dresden with ready access to 
the very particular furniture of Hellerau, moving to, for instance, Schwerin at 
the Baltic Sea coast meant either starting over, going to the expense of furnishing 
the home with new furniture, or adding pieces of furniture produced in the new 
home district, potentially compromising the previous aesthetic vision. While 
these problems might seem trivial, they negatively aected the quality of life in 
the GDR and the popular support for the national brand.
In an eort to improve domestic economic planning, the GDR established a 
market research institute in 1962 to coordinate supply and demand.134 The in-
creasing interest in consumer demand had originated with the New Course and 
was rearmed by the 1958 Fih Party Congress, which heralded gradual shis 
away from an economy exclusively based on heavy industry.135 As early as 1953 
GDR retail sales personnel were already writing down daily comments and crit-
icisms of customers and sending the feedback up the levels of the economic plan-
ning apparatus, which were then summarized for the Planning Commission. As 
paradoxical as conducting market research in a centrally planned economy might 
sound, the Institute for Consumption Research (Institut für Bedarfsforschung), 
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renamed Institute for Market Research (Institut für Marktforschung) aer 1967, 
contributed tremendously to the con
guration of Five-Year Plans. It conducted 
polls among consumers, compared past production rates with actual demand, 
and calculated and analyzed the predicted consumption of goods to perfect the 
Plan. The institute saw its mission as one of “understanding and explaining the 
antagonism between production and consumption, supply and demand, com-
munal and individual interests, communal and individual consciousness” via 
consumer motivation research.136 In this way, market researchers searched for 
ways to address discrepancies in the socialist “planning of the market.” Foresee-
ing business landscapes in 
ve-year increments based on this data presented an 
insurmountable task, yet the planning apparatus continued to attempt to reach 
budget conclusions and anticipate demand despite recurring proof that both the 
consumer and the producer estimates were o.137 Nonetheless, the presence of a 
market research institute in a planned economy speaks to the GDR’s attempt to 
balance ideological boundaries and the uniformity of standardized materiality 
with consumer behaviors.138
By 1971, a period when prefabricated housing blocks had become the pre-
ferred building form in the GDR, consumers continued to prefer functionality 
over pomp and ornament.139 According to a market survey, half of the popu-
lation liked the new add-on furniture systems, such as MDW. More than 40 
percent of the population liked the idea of extra storage for clothes in the living 
room. Among consumers who had a one-bedroom apartment, where the parents 
used the living room as their bedroom, this number almost doubled. With re-
gard to interior design taste, the population was split down the middle. While 
49 percent favored a cohesive style for their living room furniture, 44 percent 
preferred to have dierent styles or shapes in supplemental small furniture, such 
as side tables or owerpot stands. Regarding dining tables and chairs, the per-
centage of consumers preferring aesthetic cohesion with their storage furniture 
(Behältnismöbel) was even higher at 53 percent. Eighty-two percent indicated a 
preference for natural materials in their furniture, especially real wood.140 The 

ndings of the study indicated to the economic planners that the population 
had speci
c ideas about their living environments, with a preference for modern 
design idioms made of natural materials that enabled maximum exibility and 
practicality.
Synthetic materials, increasingly applied in accordance with the Chemical 
Program and modernization concepts of the mid-sixties, did not make the list 
of preferences, indicating that the narrative of synthetic modernity failed to 

nd full support among the GDR population. Antiques and inherited wooden 
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furniture also continued to be a substantial part of GDR interiors. When the 
Council of Ministers later encouraged this trend to combat a shortage in raw 
materials and consumer products in the 1980s, these makeshi solutions were 
absorbed into the brand narrative.141 For instance, the interior design magazine 
Kultur im Heim and such articles as “Biedermeier in the Modern Building?” 
(Biedermeier im Neubau?) and “Second-hand Furniture” (Möbel aus zweiter 
Hand) promoted the appropriate incorporation of old furniture into socialist 
living environments.142 The key to keeping the home “socialist,” they suggested, 
was to avoid treating the piece as ornamentation, no matter how historic or pre-
cious, and instead to assign it a speci
c function.
GDR consumer research also illustrates how popular attitudes toward home 
furnishings changed over time. The number of households that wanted to re-
place their furniture more than doubled from 21 percent in 1971 to 43 percent 
in 1984.143 While this 
gure is still comparatively low, it indicates the growing 
expectations of material well-being among the East German population in the 
later years of the GDR. Honecker’s consumption-oriented promises of the Unity 
of Economic and Social Policy program at the Eighth Party Congress in 1971 
had likely spurred expectations. Nevertheless, the planned economy failed to 
ful
ll these hopes for improved furniture availability. While the nonful
llment 
of production quotas was one factor here, this was signi
cantly compounded by 
the fast progress in prefabricated housing that led to increased demand.144 The 
public housing programs of the 1960s through 1980s started a large migration 
from decaying inner-city housing to these new high-rise apartments on the out-
skirts of cities, which oen necessitated the purchase of additional furniture.145
Although the production capacity was great enough to cover the unexpected 
demand even when unful
lled production quotas are taken into account, East 
Germany’s increasing dependence on export revenues meant that a large percent-
age of the national production was instead sent abroad. The furniture industry 
eventually failed to keep up with both domestic and export demand.
As the supply gaps widened, the population grew increasingly disgruntled. 
In Eingaben, complaint letters to the communal, regional, or national leader-
ship, consumers decried their plights with the retail sector.146 Eingaben were 
not consistently retained, but from a number of preserved letters it appears that 
the population mainly used them to criticize and not to compliment the goods 
supply. They oer insight into how GDR consumers negotiated with the po-
litical leadership over its failure to provide adequate material comfort. Einga-
ben performed a particular rhetorical function, with highly stylized content. 
It followed a general pattern where GDR citizens 
rst presented themselves as 
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righteous socialist citizens and then threatened to appeal to higher levels of the 
administration, quoting political leaders to legitimize their appeals.147 These 
letters were part of a carefully craed illusion that suggested to consumers that 
they could bring their concerns directly to the people in power, an emulation 
of direct participatory democracy and another “smoke screen” employed by the 
government to maintain domestic stability. Just like the guestbooks at design 
exhibitions, Eingaben functioned as pressure valves where consumers could re-
lease their frustrations, without the SED having to actually make changes in 
the slow-moving economic system.148 They seem to have gained traction only in 
Prisma, a popular GDR television program that featured complaints and for-
warded Eingaben to the responsible people, which annoyed economic planners 
and policymakers.149 Ironically, Prisma did more of a disservice to consumers, 
because it took the focus away from the wrongs in the system and directed it 
instead toward individual cases that, aer some moralizing on national TV, in-
dustry and retail were able to 
x. For quite a long time, the leadership succeeded 
in creating the impression that the socialist economy was able to ful
ll demands, 
but the cracks in the facade were exposed in the late 1980s. The Ministry for 
District and Food Industries, which was responsible for the furniture industry, 
reported for the 
rst six months of 1987 that the tone of the Eingaben became 
more acrimonious.150 Rather than the complaints being framed by the acceptable 
limits of ideological discourse, some Eingaben openly challenged the purported 
advances of socialism. In a letter to the furniture collective Dresden-Hellerau, 
the Licht family from Dresden complained that 15 percent of the delivered parts 
for a self-assembled children furniture set were faulty and concluded that “we 
cannot imagine that customers in the non-socialist West would be content with 
this. Yet we deem the damage that is done to the population’s trust in the prod-
ucts of our socialist industry more severe.”151 This and other Eingaben show the 
extent of pent-up frustration among the public and that the SED’s mechanisms 
of population control began to fail by the late 1980s.
In the market economy of the Federal Republic, consumer demands neces-
sarily shaped attempts to forge a cohesive aesthetic. In 1954, the Institute for 
Opinion Polling Allensbach conducted a survey about consumer tastes in fur-
niture among females over eighteen years of age.152 The results revealed the chal-
lenge that West German industrialists and ocial arbiters of taste faced as they 
dealt with diverse tastes in their quest for aesthetic revival. The overwhelming 
majority, 60 percent of the women interviewed, preferred owered kitsch, dark 
woods, and curved lines on living room buets and recliners. Thirty percent 
liked what could be described as subdued modern or Swedish style with clear 
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lines, blonde woods, and unadorned surfaces, the style closest to the function-
alist aesthetic of the national brand. Only 7 percent of the respondents, mostly 
younger women between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine, showed inter-
est in the organic shapes of 1950s American-inuenced, “international” design. 
A further breakdown of this group reveals that better educated female wage 
earners and entrepreneurs from mid-sized towns favored the modern idioms 
(Swedish and International styles). These numbers revealed a slowly growing 
trend toward modern, simple aesthetics among wealthier consumer brackets. 
Industry intended to accelerate this trend through taste education initiatives, 
such as the Wohnberatungen and industry-sponsored permanent exhibitions of 
well-designed objects.
Yet attempts to streamline West German taste in interior design met with 
little success. In 1963, sociologist Alphons Silberman conducted a similar study 
in the city of Cologne and the small town of Bergneustadt. Respondents again 
preferred an aesthetic that was bulky and ornamented, especially those in the 
higher income brackets.153 A few years later in 1969, the by then industry-led RfF 
started a quality initiative similar to the economic levers employed by economic 
planners in the GDR, awarding outstanding designs from industry and design 
students that reected ocial aesthetics with a government-endowed prize, also 
named “Good Design” (Gute Form) like that of the GDR.154 The idea was not 
bad, as West Germans regarded good quality to be the most important factor in 
their furniture purchasing decision.155 However, the prize failed to get noticed 
by West German audiences and was oen confused with the much older Good 
Industrial Design (Gute Industrieform) quality seal awarded annually at the Ha-
nover Fair.156 Subsequently, the winning designs were showcased in a traveling 
exhibition sent around Western and Eastern Europe to highlight West German 
ingenuity, unfolding more impact abroad than at home.
Aside from policies, design, and production, retail played an important role in 
supporting or undermining nation branding eorts. As in the GDR, the avail-
ability of modern designs depended largely on their distribution through buyers 
and retail organizations, which became the object of inquiry for the Nurem-
berg Society for Consumption Research (Gesellscha für Konsumforschung, 
GfK).157 In the spring of 1972 the GfK conducted the 
rst research on furniture 
retail and distribution with a view to oering the industry better data on the 
challenges ahead. It found that due to increasing production capacities and a 
growing number of competitors (close to 10,000 retail businesses were counted) 
the struggle for customers already intensi
ed.158 Over a period of six years, the 
market further expanded from over DM 9 billion in sales in 1972 to over DM 15 
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billion in 1978. The furniture industry grew steadily in the Länder of Bavaria, 
Baden-Württemberg, and North Rhine–Westphalia; the latter expanded from 
2,532 retail businesses in 1972 to 2,990 in 1978. Despite the economic downturn 
aer the 1973 oil crisis, the furniture sector remained highly competitive, which 
meant that industry and retail increasingly followed consumer tastes, instead of 
implementing the national brand narrative.159
One of the largest German retailers was the Neckermann mail order business, 
which sent out catalogs to ten million West German homes in the early 1970s. 
Asked how Neckermann conceptualized its product line, Eckart Rittmeyer, its 
head buyer, responded that the company did not perceive itself as educating con-
sumers but rather that it allowed demand to dictate the choices in the catalog. 
Unfortunately, he continued, designer furniture and low prices seldom matched 
up, but even if they did, he thought that the RfF jury for the Good Design prize 
was too avant-garde in its tastes and missed the mark with respect to both the 
needs and demands of the population.160 Gerhard Krahn, the general manager 
and partial owner of the small furniture store Gessmann and the larger furni-
ture center Europa-Möbel in Frankfurt, shared Rittmeyer’s view. Whereas the 
typical Gessmann customer was usually well-to-do, Europa-Möbel catered to 
the lower-income strata. Asked to speculate about the promises of functional 
furniture at aordable prices, Krahn said that it would not change lower-income 
consumer behavior, “because this furniture with clear lines doesn’t oer enough 
on an emotional level.”161 He also pointed out that even the auent oen pre-
ferred stylized furniture over functional furniture. However, Krahn observed 
that the functional avant-garde designs eventually began to sell at the Gessmann 
store and, increasingly, at the Europa-Möbel center.162
In the end, despite all the eort devoted to educating consumers about good 
design, West German policymakers never succeeded in completely eradicating 
the bulky-style furniture commonly known as Gelsenkirchner Barock, a kind 
of opulent Biedermeier that came to embody German popular taste during the 
economic miracle.163 Middle-income groups especially liked to demonstrate 
their auence with heavy, wooden furniture, elaborate patterned fabrics, and 
numerous knick-knacks. To this social group, functionalism and good design 
represented the scarcity and shame of the postwar years that most Germans 
wanted to leave behind. While the Federal Republic understood the centrality of 
prosperity in its postwar narrative of nation branding, the selected aesthetic style 
did not 
t the self-image of a large segment of the population. By the early 1970s, 
though, a noticeable change in taste took place, as demand for and aordability 
of modern furniture increased, evidenced by the international success of Ikea.
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In both Germanys, then, similar struggles over centralized cultural policy, 
regional economic organization, and popular reception shaped and necessarily 
altered the nation branding narrative over the course of forty years. Policymak-
ers, designers, industry, retail, and consumers came to the market with dierent 
expectations. Paradoxically, the eorts to create national brands by infusing 
German homes, East and West, with styles that conformed to their respective 
narrative continued to bring the two aesthetics closer together, particularly be-
cause the underlying norms and values regarding product quality remained sim-
ilar. The emphases on durability over modishness and technological precision 
over super
cial styling are features with which German product design and en-
gineering have become synonymous. Even if GDR production failed to uphold 
these principles in practice because of shortcomings in the socialist economic 
system, ocials continued to demand world standard quality. It is, in fact, this 
proud “Made in Germany” brand that exempli
ed the aspired economic culture 
in both Germanys.
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Ch a pter 3
Intra-German Trade and the Aesthetic Dialectic  
of European Integration
A t the 1963 Leipzig Trade Fair, West German industrial designer Friedrich Koslowsky approached leading East German politicians and economic planners with his idea for a “House of Life” in East Berlin. 
His proposed furniture store project would oer East German producers the 
possibility of presenting their products to West German buyers. Based on the 
hope that trade across the border, and thus a shared material culture, would 
overcome Germany’s physical partition, he sought to build bridges between the 
GDR and the Federal Republic that went beyond mere economic contacts.1
Koslowsky’s plan never came to fruition, but his concept of cultural rapproche-
ment through trade was one of many contemporary eorts to combine progress 
and German politics to preserve the notion of a common economic culture.
Moreover, intra-German economic contacts proved to be equally important 
for the eorts by the two German states to rebuild themselves as internation-
ally signi	cant export nations. With the immediate postwar needs for housing 
and furnishings ful	lled, both German states shied their attention to export 
industries, which included the intra-German trade. Exploring how this trade 
“preserved rudimentary structures of all-German economic unity” and how 
the two Germanys instrumentalized it for strategic and tactical goals in the 
German-German relationship can oer insight into their respective stance on 
national unity.2
The change of economic policy from reconstruction to trade pitted the two 
economic systems directly against each other in a competition for economic su-
periority, while at the same time the interconnected economic infrastructure 
glossed over the Cold War division. The latter was aided by the pan-German 
principles 	rmly anchored in West Germany’s Basic Law and Germany Policy 
(Deutschlandpolitik) that claimed the territory of the GDR as part of the postwar 
German state. Bonn’s position in the German Question relied on two principles: 
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the Federal Republic’s policy of nonrecognition (Nichtanerkennungspolitik) and 
its claim to sole representation (Alleinvertretungsanspruch) vis-à-vis the GDR, 
which the Hallstein Doctrine implemented globally.3 The Federal Republic wel-
comed economic interactions with East Germany precisely because they oered 
an opportunity for East-West dialogue that did not necessitate ocial political 
recognition of the GDR. Like Koslowsky, Bonn regarded trade not only as a way 
to maintain ties but also as a way to transfer cultural ideas. In terms of trade and 
economic development, East Germany oen looked toward the West in later 
decades, playing into West German policies when it served their own economic 
interest. In spite of very dierent motivations, intra-German trade emerged as 
a lifeline for a shared German economic culture and shaped broader European 
economic foreign policy.
Limiting the analysis of cultural-economic transfer to the two German states, 
however, would not account for the increasing complexity of economic policy 
aer the Federal Republic entered the European Economic Community (EEC) 
in 1957. Commitment to a future of Western European unity held the potential 
for conict with German attempts to uphold connections between its two parts. 
The contested territorial situation and the special nature of intra-German trade 
made the GDR practically an unocial member of the Common Market, which 
caused tensions between the Federal Republic and the other EEC member states. 
The fact that intra-German trade permeated the Iron Curtain places any discus-
sion of it squarely in the context of economic exchange between the Cold War 
blocs in Europe, rendering exports a fundamental element of economic foreign 
relations.4 Therefore, this chapter examines how export trade shaped East and 
West Germany’s national brands as they used it to project their reformed post-
war image abroad. At the same time, European economic integration brought 
with it cultural change that culminated in a convergence of German aesthetics 
in the 1980s. This process ultimately led both to adapt their aesthetics to chang-
ing economic and political climates on the international markets and connected 
them to broader European ideas of modern culture.
An examination of West German attempts at balancing European integration 
with the German Question brings into focus aesthetic convergence of East and 
West German design in the Mittelstand furniture industry. Friedrich Koslowsky 
never built his House of Life, but his vision to erect cultural bridges via product 
exchange was realized through the intra-German trade and the European Com-
mon Market. The Federal Republic’s economic foreign policy with pan-German 
interests at its core not only created economic dependencies in the East but also 
facilitated German-German economic cooperation that undermined the Cold 
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War division of Europe. It presents the GDR as an early example of European-
ization that reached beyond the Iron Curtain, and thus beyond the borders of 
the Common Market.5
Traditionally, historians have discussed Europeanization as the colonial im-
pact of European values and technology on other regions of the globe.6 But with 
the increasing interest in the structural and political growth of the European 
Union, debates about supranational policymaking and its eects on member 
states relocated the concept within the borders of the European Union with a 
focus on institutionalization and policy implementation.7 Although the follow-
ing analysis explores identity formation through industrial design from a stand-
point closely tied to European economic integration, it looks beyond the borders 
of the EEC. It extends the analysis of processes of Europeanization to consider 
the mutual transfer of cultural values in economic interactions with the GDR by 
understanding Europe as a social and cultural community in constant ux that 
is constructed through discourse and social practice.8 In the realm of industrial 
design, this approach examines how European economic integration aected 
material culture as an expression of national identity.9 While the two German 
states maintained their special relationship in intra-German trade and used it to 
inuence the population on the other side of the border, they also changed their 
cultural outlook through interactions with Western Europe. At the end of this 
process, both Germanys contributed to a modern European aesthetic that did 
not follow one dogmatic style but rather produced stylistic diversity.
When East Meets West:  
Encounters at the Leipzig and Cologne Fairs
It was no coincidence that Koslowsky proposed his plan for the House of Life at 
the Leipzig fair. Ever since the German partition, trade fairs had functioned as 
sites of East-West encounters. In the competitive Cold War climate, the fairs also 
gained political signi	cance as places for comparison between the two Germa-
nys’ alternative visions of modern material identity and technological advance-
ment. At the same time, the countries used the fair to keep the transfer of ideas 
open. For the furniture industry, the Leipzig Fall Fair and the International 
Furniture Fair in Cologne evolved into important arenas for the promotion of 
East and West German Wohnkultur, on which both countries based claims to 
political legitimacy and economic preeminence. The interplay between aesthet-
ics and ideology instills material markers of economic culture, in this case inte-
rior design products, with the ability to communicate cultural values and social 
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relations that go beyond the mere exchange value of the objects in question.10 In 
this way, purely economic transactions gain cultural and political signi	cance.
As a locus of concentrated encounters between consumer products and the 
general public, fair displays could thus achieve a visual eect that combined eco-
nomic and representative interests. In the early twentieth century, fairs had tran-
sitioned from sale fairs (Warenmesse) to sample fairs (Mustermesse). Whereas 
trade remained the main incentive for holding a fair, producers increasingly lim-
ited themselves to exhibiting samples instead of selling on site.11 As a result, exhi-
bitioners paid more attention to the composition of their product displays, which 
showcased advances in design and technology. Appealing displays certainly ad-
vertised the exhibited goods, but they also represented the political order that 
had produced them. Accordingly, producers became ambassadors of either East 
or West German cultural identity and values, which placed their products and 
the messages they conveyed to the public at large under scrutiny. Both German 
states were fully aware of the larger issues at stake. For example, while attending 
the 1960 Cologne Furniture Fair, West German intra-zonal trade representatives 
noticed displays of GDR system furniture, which were priced well below West 
German furniture of similar quality and aesthetics.12 This caused surprise and 
unease among Bonn’s trade specialists. Without the pressure for high pro	t mar-
gins, the GDR pricing policy made commodities aordable to the low-income 
strata of the population, thus threatening to convince West German consumers 
of the GDR’s socialist-egalitarian promises.13
Hosting a commercial event that advanced market principles became an ideo-
logical challenge for the Soviet zone of occupation early on. To circumvent this 
problem, the Leipzig Fair reinvented itself as a political event.14 The adminis-
tration claimed that the fair was of paramount importance in bringing about 
German economic unity (deutsche Wirtschaseinheit) and presenting German 
goods to the world. In a pamphlet published in 1947, the fair administration 
spoke of a “compulsion for export” should reconstruction eorts and the revival 
of economic life in Germany become a success. To reach this goal, the two Ger-
man states needed to work together. Preproduction for export products on the 
other side of the zone border tied the two economies together. If fair activities 
and economic promotion continued to be hindered by occupation zone borders, 
the pamphlet argued, it would inadvertently hurt “the German product” and 
contradict pan-German interests.15
The 1947 Leipzig Fair pamphlet oers early evidence of eastern pragmatism in 
navigating the dierent economic orders emerging in occupied Germany. It should 
be seen against the backdrop of the American reconstruction aid plan for Europe 
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that resulted in the Marshall Plan in 1948. The eastern zone held the position 
that only a uni	ed economic policy could secure Germany’s survival and reemer-
gence as a global brand. To drive the point home, the brochure related anecdotes 
about the Soviet occupation zone’s true eorts for German economic unity from 
the prior fair: “Passengers on special trains from all parts of Germany understood 
their unhindered passing at the zone borders as a symbolic act: a dividing line was 
crossed and, 	nally, there was space for dealings and action once again.”16 Similar 
spatial analogies connecting East and West Germany appeared throughout the 
pamphlet, culminating in the exclamation “Contemplation of the whole!” (“Be-
sinnung auf ’s Ganze!”) that paid lip-service to the East’s purported commitment 
to German unity.17 Likewise, economic representatives of the western zones wel-
comed Leipzig’s all-German activity as a way to improve intra-zonal trade. Leipzig 
complemented similar eorts to preserve economic ties at western trade fairs, such 
as Hanover or Cologne.18 Nevertheless, both German economic systems mutually 
depended on each other for the rebuilding of viable economies during the recon-
struction. Relatively poor in natural resources, they developed strong export in-
dustries whose success was based on 	nishing processes that added product value. 
With the focus on the fairs as places for encounter, both sides acknowledged the 
initial interdependence of the occupation zones for economic recovery.
While the Leipzig fair was immediately invested with political signi	cance 
during the occupation years, the fair in Cologne seemed to emerge in a less 
contentious context. When Cologne reopened its doors to visitors for the 	rst 
postwar fair in the fall of 1947, it not only competed with the Leipzig fair but 
also with other fairs in the western zones of occupation, such as Frankfurt or 
Hanover.19 In contrast to the Soviet funding for the Leipzig fair, Cologne re-
ceived no 	nancial support from the occupation authorities. The necessity to 
be self-sustaining and pro	table eventually led to the discovery that specialized 
fairs brought in more revenue for Cologne. Therefore, cities in the West German 
zones of occupation divided up these special-interest fair events among them in 
order to ensure sucient attendance by the general public as well as industry and 
retail experts.20 One such event was the International Furniture Fair (Internatio-
nale Möbelmesse, IMM), introduced in the spring of 1949.21 The early years of 
German division thus saw activities on both sides of the border that intended to 
maintain economic ties and to create spaces for East-West encounters.
Glossing over the emerging division ended with the institution of the Deut-
sche Mark. The West German currency reform in 1948 de facto foreclosed eco-
nomic unity and further politicized German-German trade. The Soviet Union 
reacted to what they understood as a separatist policy by American and British 
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occupation authorities with a blockade of western access to the eastern zone in-
cluding West Berlin, which brought intra-zonal trade to a complete halt in June 
1948.22 In response, the economic administration of the western occupation 
zones decided to withdraw its representatives from the Leipzig fair, although 
they feared that this might cause the fair to lose the status of an all-German 
trade institution.23 This was exactly what happened. By the time the Berlin 
blockade ended in 1949, eastern eorts at an all-German economic recovery had 
ceased. In successive years, the fair implemented barriers that limited participa-
tion of western companies. Subsequently, Leipzig developed an exposition-like 
character, providing the Eastern Bloc with a platform for self-representation. 
Contemporaries described Leipzig as a “GDR performance show.”
Once hopes for German unity were dashed by separate state foundations in 
1949, the GDR joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COM-
ECON, sometimes referred to as CMEA) in 1950 and built its own national 
economy independent of West Germany.24 East Germany 	nanced industrial 
development mostly through trade in the Eastern Bloc, a political process that 
oen denied economic rationality.25 The government held a monopoly over for-
eign trade, which meant that the VEBs, VVBs, and combines had little or no 
control over import and export decisions.26 Trade became closely connected to 
the GDR’s quest for international political recognition.27 Accordingly, fair or-
ganizers aggressively internationalized the event again in the mid-1950s.28 In the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, the GDR increasingly used it to display the reputed 
superiority of the socialist order, not least in contrast to the commodities of 
the West German economic miracle. This deliberate politicization of Leipzig 
raised questions about the political symbolism of West German fair participa-
tion in the context of its nonrecognition policy vis-à-vis the GDR. Trading with 
the GDR could be interpreted as West Germany’s unocial recognition of the 
other German state. Furthermore, trade relations could potentially stabilize 
the weaker East German economy. On the contrary, the Federal Republic sup-
ported these economic interactions precisely because they oered an opportu-
nity for East-West dialogue that did not necessitate ocial political recognition. 
Throughout the Cold War the Federal Republic considered intra-German trade 
relations as a political rather than an economic interest. In the early years of this 
trade, its volume and revenue remained relatively low. Yet intra-German trade 
grew over the course of the 1960s and 1970s as it became an increasingly import-
ant tool in the German Question.
The Federal Republic’s refusal to acknowledge the GDR remained the guid-
ing principle in its dealings with the eastern part of Germany. To reinforce its 
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position, the Ministry of Economic Aairs (BMWi) handled intra-German 
trade through an extra body, the Trust for Intra-Zonal Trade (Treuhandstelle 
für Interzonenhandel, TSI), rather than the foreign trade administration.29
Meanwhile, the GDR, denying the FRG’s claim to sole representation and as-
serting its own nationhood, handled intra-German trade through the Ministry 
for Domestic and Foreign Trade (Ministerium für Innen-und Außenhandel, 
MIA). These structural demonstrations of diametrically opposed politics in 
regard to German economic and political unity proved an ongoing bone of con-
tention but did not prevent the two German states from trading with each other. 
In the West German case, the disagreement even spurred Bonn’s commitment to 
this economic cooperation as Bonn hoped to use it to undermine East Germa-
ny’s demarcation policy. In fact, the negotiations between the TSI and the MIA
were the only nearly consistently intact channel for communication between the 
two German governments across forty years of division.30
The Berlin Agreement of 1951 established the basis for intra-German trade. 
The United States at 	rst rejected the idea, requesting guarantees for the free 
movement of goods between the Federal Republic and West Berlin and the end 
of Soviet interference with West Berlin trac. Ludwig Erhard, however, insisted 
that the negotiations should be conducted by German authorities and aimed 
for a quick resolution to reestablish economic ties that the Berlin blockade had 
severed.31 The 1951 agreement 	xed the exchange rate between the Ostmark and 
the D-Mark at equivalency, and so-called Swing credits served as a 	nancial in-
strument to overcome the economic oddities of German division.32 These cred-
its were interest-free, short-term intergovernmental loans intended to stabilize 
trade between the two German states that remained relatively insigni	cant until 
the 1970s. The Ostmark was only a domestic currency, purposely restricted by 
geography and backed by the Wall, and the GDR had a 	ctional currency for 
international trade, the Valutamark.33 Every year or two, the TSI and the MIA 
negotiated stock lists of goods and services that were traded according to their 
exchange value under three dierent accounts. To facilitate East German re-
quests for goods and services not listed on the stock lists, the additional account 
“Sonderkonto S” arranged cash payment in D-Mark.34 In theory, the principle 
of reciprocity regulated German-German economic aairs, such as fair-based 
trade. American concerns about East Germany and the Soviet Union taking 
advantage of West German desires to rekindle East-West trade were not un-
founded, however. Whenever possible, the GDR did not uphold reciprocity 
and used the economic agreement as a lever in negotiations with the West. In 
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addition, the Soviet Union only acknowledged the status of Berlin in the quad-
ripartite agreement of 3 September 1971.
In practice, East German protectionist behavior limited the stock lists and 
shaped strategic decisions about which West German industries received permis-
sion to participate in the Leipzig fair throughout the 1950s. The trade fairs served 
as the stage for a constant behind-the-scenes wrangling between the states over 
economic relations, and West German industry entered into an uneven relation-
ship. To protect the domestic furniture industry, at the time a vibrant cras in-
dustry on the verge of mechanization, from the dominant western competition, 
the SED denied western furniture producers access to the Leipzig fair. By 1960, 
only one West German furniture company had gained permission to exhibit 
its products in Leipzig, allegedly thanks to its low price range.35 Meanwhile, 
West German ocials did not take similar actions to protect domestic industrial 
interest against GDR competition at the Cologne fair. Constituents of the Na-
tional Lumber Industry Association (Hauptverband der Deutschen Holzindus-
trie und verwandter Industriezweige e.V.) complained about the large presence 
of East German furniture businesses at the 1960 IMM. In a letter posted to the 
BMWi aer the event, the association pointed out a lack of state-implemented 
regulations for East German exhibitors in Cologne, while the GDR government 
systematically excluded virtually all West German producers from the Leipzig 
fair.36 They urged the BMWi to intervene on their behalf by similarly restricting 
East German fair participation in Cologne. The ministry responded that the 
state chose to refrain from regulating the private enterprise that organized the 
fair, invoking the liberal principles of the social market economy. Up to that 
point, the ministry explained, it had only advised the organizers to admit exhi-
bitioners from the “Soviet zone” in the interest of expanding inter-zonal trade, 
provided that eastern traders did not abuse the event with provocative political 
demonstrations.37 It quickly became evident that these imbalances in trade and 
fair representation signaled as much Bonn’s economic decision-making as its 
political strategy in the context of the German Question. It also revealed a fun-
damental problem for West German companies: in trading with the East, they 
subjected themselves to dealing more or less directly with the middle and upper 
echelons of the GDR economic planning apparatus, not their 	rm counterparts, 
without having matching support from their own government.
Indeed, corporative attempts to balance out intra-German trade on a macro-
economic level had failed before. In February 1960, representatives of the furni-
ture industry and the BMWi had met at the Cologne furniture fair to discuss 
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intra-German trade. The furniture industry delegates blamed the mismatch 
between East and West German furniture exports on the fact that the minis-
try did not press the case of furniture in trade agreements with the GDR. The 
BMWi oered to solve the problem by listing furniture separately in the next 
trade agreement and by insisting on the principle of reciprocity at upcoming 
intra-German trade negotiations.38 This was a well-meaning attempt to appease 
national industry, but separate negotiations between the West German furni-
ture industry and the GDR foreign trade representatives revealed that solving 
the matter to the satisfaction of all parties involved would be dicult.39
In a meeting with the industry-speci	c Nationalized Organization for Ger-
man Domestic and Foreign Furniture Trade (Volkseigene Handelsunterneh-
men Deutscher Innen- und Außenhandel Möbel, VEH-DIA Möbel) the fol-
lowing day, West German furniture industry representatives learned that the 
GDR furniture industry was incapable of covering its own domestic demand. 
Theoretically, the VEH-DIA Möbel claimed, imports from the West should 
close the gap. Unfortunately for industry in the Federal Republic, the GDR 
chose to prioritize heavy industry. In fact, until 1971, the GDR avoided imports 
of 	nished and consumer products, such as furniture that could be produced by 
East German companies, to save scarce foreign currency for much-needed raw 
materials.40 Instead, the GDR pushed exports to the West to earn foreign cur-
rency. By 1958, East German furniture exports totaled 835,000 accounting units, 
which increased steadily over the 1960s.41 Such fast growth of GDR furniture ex-
port can be traced back to the industrial concentration and collectivization that 
started in 1958, which created enormous production capacities.42 Hiding behind 
the mechanisms of the planned economy and putting their national interest 	rst, 
the East German delegates exploited the dierences between the two economic 
systems to complicate the principle of reciprocity in intra-German trade. The 
VEH-DIA Möbel delegation ironically advised the West German furniture in-
dustry to participate more frequently at the Leipzig fair to resolve the imbalance. 
A collective display with West German products “of average pricing and aver-
age taste” would surely help create demand, and only such demand might make 
possible a budget allocation for furniture in the next economic plan. However, 
the VEH-DIA Möbel quali	ed, it would take at least a year of negotiations and 
planning to win this privilege at the Leipzig fair for the West German furniture 
industry.43 As puzzling as this contradictory behavior of fair ocials and the 
VEH-DIA Möbel may seem, the West German furniture industry eventually 
did gain greater access to the Leipzig fair via these intra-German trade negoti-
ations. Whereas the need to protect domestic industry remained a priority, the 
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GDR could not risk losing the economic exchange with the West and thereby 
access to western currency.
While East German companies were able to promote their products at the 
IMM in Cologne without limitation, they focused their promotional eorts 
domestically on the semiannual Leipzig fairs, which slowly grew in importance 
for East-West trade. In 1964, the GDR Council of Ministers decided to award 
gold medals to further “heighten the political prestige of the Leipzig Fair and 
to underpin its signi	cance as an international trading node.”44 The national 
industry could set higher prices for winning products for domestic retail as well 
as for exports.45 Nonetheless, the award system bene	tted most directly the state, 
by furthering its international reputation as a leading industrial nation. In fact, 
the SED instituted a ratio for medals awarded, distributing awards between the 
GDR, other socialist countries, and the nonsocialist countries, with the goal of 
presenting East German industry in a favorable light.46 At the 1970 Leipzig Fall 
Fair, the GDR awarded its own industry thirty-	ve gold medals for outstanding 
and technologically progressive products. The Soviet Union received the sec-
ond highest number with twelve gold medals.47 That year’s ocial (and hence 
con	dential) fair report on the state of research and innovation in East German 
domestic industries, however, contradicted outright this show of socialist eco-
nomic superiority: “The number of new and enhanced designs is completely 
insucient, and their quality is at best equivalent to world standard.”48 By over-
emphasizing its achievements, the GDR attempted to convince the international 
community that the East German planned economy could keep up with the 
innovations in design and technology displayed by Western competitors. To that 
extent, the Leipzig fair ful	lled its diplomatic function.49
Dealing with the Devil: German-German Trade
BMWi hesitance to become involved in enforcing the principle of reciprocity 
attests to the political nature of West Germany’s trade with the East. Western 
strategy for maintaining relations with the GDR was based on three ocial 
aims: helping the population in the East, maintaining a degree of German eco-
nomic unity, and safeguarding the uninterrupted trac between West Berlin 
and the Federal Republic.50 In reality, Bonn also used this strategy to regulate 
East German contacts to other Western nations and leveraged it when the GDR 
leadership behaved uncooperatively. At the height of the Berlin Crisis in 1960, 
for instance, the Federal Republic unilaterally terminated the Berlin Agreement 
aer the GDR restricted West Germans’ passage into East Berlin. However, 
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the dispute was resolved and the agreement reinstated subject to renegotiation 
before the new trade year began by 1 January 1961.51
The GDR meanwhile perceived West German economic policy as “economic 
warfare,” pointing to early trade embargos on raw materials for the military in-
dustrial sector in the 1950s and the discouragement of West German 	rms from 
fair participation in Leipzig during the Berlin Crisis in 1960 and aer the build-
ing of the Berlin Wall in 1961. In general, the East German Ministry for Foreign 
Aairs (Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, MfAA) complained, the 
West continued to dictate the terms of economic engagement and interfered 
in GDR trade relations with third states.52 These trends were only exacerbated 
with the renegotiation of the Berlin Agreement later in 1961, which abolished 
the limits on stock lists, simpli	ed the accounts structure, and increased the 
exibility of Swing credits.53 In the process, the GDR economy grew dependent 
on West German trade in order to support struggling consumption-oriented 
industries. Because it was the GDR’s second-largest trade partner aer the Soviet 
Union, goods and loans from the FRG became a crutch to a planned economy 
that failed to ful	ll the consumer promises of the Fih Party Congress and Ul-
bricht’s NES on its own. While the Federal Republic perhaps had not counted 
on this particular dependency of the GDR as the outcome, it was surely not an 
unwelcome one.
Intra-German trade then became an increasingly important tool in the Ger-
man Question over the course of the 1960s. Nonetheless, the way in which it 
helped stabilize the East German regime contradicted the CDU-led “policy of 
strength” position vis-à-vis the GDR throughout the conservatives’ rule in the 
Federal Republic. Foreign observers, such as US senator Hubert Humphrey, 
speculated about how Bonn reconciled eastern trade relations with its critique of 
the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, a Soviet-American agreement that limited 
nuclear tests to relax tensions caused by the arms race.54 To him the subsidized 
West German trade with East Germany showed similar political motivations 
for relaxation in the German Cold War, which rendered the critique of Ameri-
can global détente eorts hypocritical. The handling and implementation of the 
intra-German trade on either side of the border thus tells a story of a paradoxical 
western Deutschlandpolitik in the early 1960s and steady political antagonism 
that occurred alongside growing economic interdependence.55 Once the social 
democrats entered the government in 1966, some of these contradictions were 
resolved. Foreign minister Willy Brandt’s New Eastern Policy (Neue Ostpolitik) 
of the late 1960s eventually ushered in a period of détente and aligned economic 
exchanges across the inner-German border with national politics. Based on a 
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new foundational premise of “two states in one German nation,” it ended the 
isolationist policy of the Hallstein Doctrine. Thus changing course from the 
conservative Adenauer government’s isolation of the GDR to cooperation and 
accord, the Federal Republic instrumentalized German-German exchange in 
the realm of culture, economy, and humanitarian aid for rapprochement in the 
German Cold War.56
The Swing credits went from being almost insigni	cant to being an instru-
ment of political bartering once Honecker introduced his Unity of Economic 
and Social Policy at the Eighth Party Congress in 1971. The program attempted 
to increase the East German living standard by ameliorating decades of under-
development in consumer goods production through investments 	nanced with 
foreign credit. A couple of years into this new policy, economic planners realized 
that the early emphasis on heavy industry had compromised the light industry 
structures beyond recovery. Western goods and money started to seep into the 
East German economy to 	ll the gaps.57 West German furniture became a staple 
at the Leipzig Fall Fair, thanks to three specialized product shows—the Inter-
scola for school furniture, the Intacta for interior home design, and the Expovita 
for sports and leisure-time activities (Freizeitgestaltung)—that served as venues 
for western products.58 Already in the fall of 1971 the combined display area of 
all represented industries from the Federal Republic and West Berlin made the 
FRG the second-largest participating nation, second only to the GDR.59 Overall, 
the atmosphere at the fair that year was described as “thoroughly friendly.”60
For the 	rst time since 1946, politicians refrained from the traditional polemics 
against the Federal Republic in ocial speeches, and GDR minister of foreign 
trade Horst Sölle invited for the 	rst time the West German state secretary to 
his reception at the Leipzig city hall.61 This change in tone developed against 
the background of German-German talks over a new footing for their relation-
ship, which culminated in a “treaty concerning the basis of relations between 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic” (Basic 
Treaty) in 1972.
In preparation for the Basic Treaty negotiations, the Federal Republic re-
viewed the eectiveness of its trade policy toward the GDR. Trade by credit 
had become the law of the land, which created mostly one-sided dependencies: 
The GDR depended on West German money to 	nance its imports, and the 
Federal Republic required the GDR to use the credits to procure exclusively 
West German products. Accounting units usually documented the exchange, 
which eliminated most of the actual money ow. In this way, the GDR received 
DM 2.5 billion worth of raw materials, preproduction and subassembly parts, 
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and services from the FRG in 1970 alone.62 However, to maintain this level of 
trade the following year, the TSI estimated that the GDR had to raise its debts 
by another 500 million accounting units, because it had received 418 million 
units more than it delivered to the FRG in the previous year.63 East German 
short stockage, the incapability to deliver certain in-demand products due to 
ill-guided Five-Year Plans, partially caused the trade imbalance.
Moreover, the GDR followed a calculated import-export strategy. The GDR 
exported 	nished products to pro	t from high added value, while it mostly 
imported semi	nished products and raw materials such as steel (32.4 percent 
of the annual imports) and subassemblies (34.6 percent of the annual imports) 
from the FRG that contained less or no added value.64 Finished products only 
constituted 6.3 percent of the GDR’s annual imports in 1971.65 Had the West 
German business community at large known this statistic, the BMWi would 
likely have faced complaints from domestic industrial associations again. Bonn 
instead masked the imbalance by utilizing separate statistical methods for 
German-German trade and foreign trade. Trade statistics on the GDR oered 
information about the industrial origins of products, yet they did not specify 
the degree of 	nishing. Although the ministry claimed that this method was to 
politically contrast the two kinds of export on paper, the practice obscured the 
fact that the West German side delivered goods of lesser value, and thus more of 
them, to East Germany, while the GDR delivered mostly 	nished products of 
higher worth and fewer of them.66
Despite all of these favorable conditions for the East, by 1971 the GDR had 
accumulated a debt of 1565.9 million accounting units, or DM 1565.9 million. 
West German ocials privately welcomed these debts as a political guarantee for 
the persistence of German-German relations.67 This dire picture already existed 
before the industrial investment strategy of the Unity of Economic and Social 
Policy program faltered. Bonn knew that the GDR would not have the funds 
to buy the machines necessary to continue building up its capital equipment 
industry to further develop the consumer goods program. A FRG economist 
analyzing the situation looked skeptically at alternative solutions to East Berlin’s 
dilemma, pointing to the traditional interconnectedness of the two German 
economies and the GDR’s dependency on West German spare parts and 	t-
tings. Consumer goods production relied heavily on machinery originally built 
in the Federal Republic.68 Without natural resources to sell for foreign currency, 
the GDR faced the dilemma of 	nancing increased consumer goods production 
with the export of 	nished products, thus sending abroad the very items that its 
own population needed.69
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Yet in the end, the funds from consumer goods exports were needed to 	-
nance imports of steel and other construction materials for Honecker’s second 
ambitious project: the housing program.70 These simultaneous and contradic-
tory investment projects for 1972 precluded the option of a signi	cant reduction 
of iron and steel purchases in order to avoid further debts. From a West Ger-
man perspective this would have been prudent policy if GDR economic planners 
wanted to have the means to import western consumer products in quantities 
that would even come close to covering the demand for commodities among the 
East German population.71 And above all, buying on credit changed the focus of 
the GDR economic policy from long-term growth through investments to the 
short-term policy of borrowing and, subsequently, to the “immediate exigency 
of debt reduction” by the 1980s.72 As a consequence, the Federal Republic in 
fact partially 	nanced Honecker’s economic reform program.73 Western trading 
partners, 	rst and foremost West Germany, continued to grant the GDR loans 
and credits until the entire system came close to collapse under enormous debts 
in 1988–89.74
In reaction to the Basic Treaty signed in 1972, the GDR fell back into a pat-
tern of deep distrust and paranoia in its relationship to the Federal Republic 
and Western inuence at large. Representations of Western culture and au-
ence were again perceived as threatening by the mid-1970s, when it became clear 
that Honecker’s economic policy failed to produce the desired results. Fearing 
that displays of the West German lifestyle would threaten the GDR’s precar-
ious economic and political stability, the East German government explicitly 
prohibited fairgoers from exploring western stands in Leipzig in 1974.75 Only 
industry specialists, with the express permission of their companies or combine 
director, and accompanied by their colleagues, could visit exhibitions of western 
companies. In con	dential talks with the West German GDR Trade Board, the 
SED admitted to taking such measures, explaining that East Germany’s general 
foreign currency shortage warranted tight control over consumer demand.76 Ev-
idently, complex relationships between political aesthetics, economic policy, and 
everyday consumption had developed within the realm of intra-German trade.
The latter point was especially evident to the GDR’s industrial designers. 
Maintaining business on the export market required a certain degree of adapta-
tion to Western tastes. Coinciding with both Honecker’s plans to increase con-
sumer goods production and relaxed German-German relations in the context 
of Basic Treaty negotiations, the Federal Republic experienced a “furnishing 
wave,” caused by a general rise in wages during full employment in the 1960s 
and early 1970s.77 Large buyers, such as the Kauof department stores and 
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the Neckermann mail order business, increasingly relied on large production 
capacities in East German industries to meet the demand. Although the mail 
order businesses had direct connections to East German furniture combines, 
the BMWi oversaw these trade relations and monitored their progress closely.78
Noting that in the past the GDR had seldom ful	lled special orders, Kauof 
representatives remarked in a meeting with the ministry that this attitude was 
changing in the early 1970s, when the GDR became more receptive to western 
taste. East German bedroom furniture of the lower-to-middle price range that 
met the necessary quality standards especially attracted West German consum-
ers. Kauof would also have ordered sofas, armchairs, and desks, but the Plan 
proved inexible in responding to speci	c requests. In addition to East German 
industrial inexibility, the GDR transportation system proved unreliable. For 
example, Deutrans, the GDR’s state-owned cargo company, delayed deliveries to 
the FRG in 1971 because, allegedly, their trucks were needed during the fall har-
vest to transport potatoes from the 	elds to the towns.79 Under such unreliable 
circumstances, standardized, easily transportable storage furniture turned out 
to be the most consistent export product.
Notwithstanding logistic challenges, furniture exports to the West continued 
to increase, with the Federal Republic as the main receiving market. In the 	rst 
quarter of 1972 alone, trade with West Germany grew by 18 percent over the 
same time period in the previous year. But the domestic shortage of consumer 
products was not the only unwarranted eect of Honecker’s ambitions. The 
export-oriented nature of East Germany’s furniture production eventually came 
at the expense of national aesthetics. Increasingly, western preferences seeped 
into the guidelines for industrial designers as the GDR economy opened up to 
export markets in the West. As a result of the interplay between demand and 
subsequent reorientation of production design, what I call the dialectic aesthetic 
of intra-German trade, East German industrial designers found their vision of 
socialist product culture jeopardized by the aesthetic requirements of export. In 
a 1975 interview, designer Horst Michel pinned what he perceived as the demise 
of German socialist materiality on West Germany’s mail order giants, such as 
Neckermann or Quelle.80 Their buyers, he was convinced, undermined his and 
his disciples’ eorts to create a morally responsible product culture in the GDR. 
With this observation, he indirectly criticized the cultural and economic lead-
ership for turning the GDR production system into a magnet for western bulk 
buyers. Collectivization and regional concentration of industry had created large 
industrial clusters and combines whose raison d’être was large series mass pro-
duction. This production order, ironically, matched ideally the supply needs of 
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western retail chains. Michel complained that large businesses like Neckermann 
pushed prices down and thus forced East German industry to use low-quality 
materials, which also compromised the functionality of the products. Michel 
seems to have forgotten, however, that it was 	rst the lack of capital investments 
and subsequent backward production standards in the East German furniture 
industry that resulted in attracting these West German large retailers serving 
the low-income population. High-end furniture producers and retailers usually 
refrained from cooperation with East German combines because their cus-
tomers demanded expensive woods and state-of-the-art production methods, 
neither of which the GDR economy could oer. Even Deutsche Werkstätten 
Hellerau (DWH) could not keep up with western standards. In the 1980s, it 
mass-produced wooden chair designs for the West German luxury brand Inter-
lübke, but it could only produce one design, because it did not own the machin-
ery necessary for details on bent parts that the other designs required.81 While 
Michel astutely spoke to the creative potential of industrial designers and the 
skills of the furniture workers, the interplay between East German technological 
backwardness, scarce materials, and the resulting focus on low-end furniture 
ended in the mass production of low-quality goods.
The global economic downturn of 1973 further complicated German-German 
trade. The crisis hit the West German economy hard, particularly industries 
that relied on oil and the chemicals derived from it, such as cushion foam for 
upholstery furniture. In the autumn of 1974 the Bavarian Upholstery Associa-
tion complained to West German minister of economic aairs Hans Friderichs 
about a new set of imbalances in intra-German furniture trade.82 Speci	cally, the 
association demanded to be granted the same 6 percent tax reduction that the 
federal government gave to East German companies. In its response, the BMWi 
attributed this competitive advantage for East German products to the “special 
quality of the intra-German trade.”83 The turnover tax reduction served as a 
means to create incentives for western buyers to order eastern products and was 
intended by the ministry as a measure to level the playing 	eld for GDR export 
industries.84 Because of “budget concerns, the tax system, and European Com-
munity agreements,” Friderichs explained, such a turnover tax reduction could 
not be applied to domestic industries, even if they were in 	nancial distress.85 He 
furthermore pointed out that the East German exports of upholstery products 
corresponded to only 1.8 percent of domestic production, which, he assumed, 
would not aect the market noticeably.
Nevertheless, West German industry, especially in federal states neighboring 
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figure 3.1. By the 1960s large furniture industry clusters developed in the GDR  
and the FRG. The competition from Thuringian and Saxon furniture clusters  
close to the inner-German border with Bavaria caused particular concern for  
the local furniture industry.
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trade between the GDR and the FRG by the early 1980s shows how Friderichs’s 
generalizations about upholstery import amounted to misinformation or only 
momentary truths. In any case, the furniture sector was in the fastest-growing 
position in the lumber product trade between East and West Germany.86
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 oer a glimpse into the exibility required on the part of 
West German buyers in dealing with the uctuating GDR planned economy. 
Bulk production and diering Plan priorities could result in the overproduction 
of certain furniture in any given year. In 1981, this happened to be sofas, which 
resulted in a 97.3 percent growth of sofa exports to the Federal Republic. The 
following year the pattern changed to armchairs, with an increase of 154 per-
cent, while sofa export returned to the 1980 level. Giant furniture retailers such 
as Ikea and RKL Möbel found themselves confronted with these wild uctu-
ations in their East German product supply.87 The West German competition, 
small-and medium-sized furniture producers such as the members of the Bavar-
ian Upholstery Association, suered when GDR furniture erratically ooded 
the West German market. The fact that Bonn did not take action on behalf of 
this industry and tolerated the GDR inconsistencies further con	rmed West 
Germany’s political interest in the intra-German trade.
To justify its actions, the GDR turned the western trade partners’ concern 
about eastern reliability on its head. At a conference on the “situation of the 
global economy” in the fall of 1981 in Hamburg, Jürgen Nitz, a representative of 
Table 3.1. West German imports of East German furniture, 1980–1981
January–June
1980 in  
m AU
1981 in  
m AU




Sofas and divan beds 14.7 29.0 +14.3 97.3
Wardrobes 0.3 4.4 +4.1 –
Chests of drawers 1.9 4.6 +2.7 142.1
Living room furni-
ture systems
5.3 6.4 +1.1 20.8
Kitchen chairs 5.4 6.0 +0.6 11.1
Armchairs 20.8 12.4 -8.4 40.0
Source: Schaefer, Ergebnisse des IdH im 1. Halbjahr 1981, 24 August 1981.  
Note: m=millions; AU=accounting units.
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the East Berlin Research Institute for Politics and Economy (Institut für Poli-
tik und Wirtscha), explained to a bemused western audience how the capital-
ist path in the global economy continued to disappoint the socialist nations.88
The disconcerting results, he explained, threatened GDR trading interests: the 
slowing-down of industrial growth; the relatively slow accumulation of capital 
aer the oil crises; chronic ination in capitalist countries that was detrimental 
to socialist economies; stagnant wages that throttled demand for import prod-
ucts from socialist countries; and the increasing instability of capitalist currency, 
which made credit negotiations dicult for the GDR.89 These crises, Nitz 
contended, negatively aected global trade between East and West; and East 
Germany, as well as other socialist countries, would not accept the blame for 
the consequences. While pointing to the shortcomings of capitalism, the GDR 
displayed little concern about the structural quirks in the planned economy and 
its focus on political goals, rather than mutually bene	cial trade, that negatively 
aected the Western European countries.
Moreover, to gain political advantage in trade negotiations, the GDR did 
not shy away from manipulating Plan statistics to conceal the real state of its 
economy from Western countries. The BMWi and the Federal Ministry for 
Intra-German Relations (Bundesministerium für Innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 
BMB) usually looked to the Plan, in combination with GDR foreign and in-
tra-German trade statistics, to leverage West German trade policy diplomat-
ically. However, the Plan oen reected political aims rather than economic 
probabilities, leaving the ministries to rely on GDR trade policy patterns to 
Table 3.2. West German imports of East German furniture, 1981–1982
January –June
1981 in  
m AU
1982 in  
m AU




Armchairs 12.4 31.5 +19.1 +154
Add-on furniture – 23.8 +23.8 –
Kitchen tables – 11.9 +11.9 –
Wooden bed rests 8.1 11.5 +3.4 +42
Sofas and divan beds 29.0 14.9 -14.1 -49
Source: Schaefer, Ergebnisse des IdH im 1. Halbjahr 1982, 23 August 1982.  
Note: m=millions; AU=accounting units.
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estimate real outcomes. For example, in the 1981 Plan directive, the Planning 
Commission estimated impossible growth in the production sector, which, 
western economists realized, was a statistical trick on paper to balance and con-
ceal the import purchases necessary to uphold the current standard of living in 
the GDR.90
By the 1970s, West German money and consumer products increasingly 
seeped into a socialist Germany that desperately tried to gain popular support 
by raising the standard of living. While this created deepening dependencies, 
the GDR won a reliable source of credit, which funded the economic policies of 
the SED leadership and created the illusion of a ourishing socialist consumer 
society. In addition to the political signi	cance of the 	nancial and economic 
cooperation between the two German states, their collaboration clearly under-
mined the division of Europe between the Eastern Bloc and the partners of the 
transatlantic alliance.
Creating the Common Market
The speci	c characteristics of intra-German trade, such as the high degree of 
interdependence in production industries and special tax cuts, diered greatly 
from international norms of foreign trade. When the Federal Republic joined 
the EEC, intra-German trade carried high potential for problems in the Com-
mon Market. A triangular relationship joining East and West Germany and 
the EEC member states spun a complex web of economic and political inter-
ests dominated by the German Question. The 1957 Protocol on Intra-German 
Trade formed the basis on which the two German states engaged in the most 
pro	t-oriented manner with other European nations and shaped a Europe that 
from the very beginning accommodated German special interests. Therefore, 
examining political goals in conjunction with the economic interests that were 
carried out over the German division also helps in understanding the economic 
culture of this export-import triangle and the aesthetic market incentives which 
resulted from it.
The European market has been critical to West Germany’s economic foreign 
relations. France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg took about 
35 percent of Germany’s exports in the 1950s, but the vibrant economies of these 
nations also presented competition.91 In 1955, the Federal Republic identi	ed 
Italy, Belgium, Norway, and Sweden as its main competitors in the furniture 
export market. A BMWi market analysis found that the rate of export orders 
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for furniture slowly accelerated, mainly from Western Europe, but from overseas 
as well, where the demand for seating furniture was particularly high. Rising 
packaging and shipping costs made trading goods overseas less lucrative, which 
kept the number of successful competitive contracts low. In Western Europe, 
however, the postwar demand for all kinds of furniture was high.92 Neverthe-
less, economic analysts worried about the German furniture industry’s inabil-
ity to “jump over the tari wall” within Europe.93 The fact that the German 
industry had cut itself o from the international market from 1933 to 1945 had 
encouraged other nations to build their own industries. As a byproduct of this 
process, the report stated, these countries had developed strong national tastes 
that rendered any mention of “a global furniture market situation” that corre-
sponded to distinctive aesthetics pointless. Italy and Belgium emerged as the 
main competitors; while their technical production costs were not lower, they 
had lower labor costs. Analysts saw the only chance to overcome these hurdles in 
“exporting especially high-quality products that neither the national industry of 
the target markets could produce nor Italy, Belgium, Norway or Sweden could 
export there at the same qualitative level and with the same design aesthetic.”94
This export strategy developed alongside the FRG’s early attempts to create a 
national aesthetic in industrial design.
The early 1950s also oered an opportunity to employ economic relations in 
the service of reconciliation in Western Europe. France’s fear of West Germa-
ny’s reemergence as a dominant power was replaced by trust in the stabilizing 
eects of cooperation and multilateralism. Paris hoped to steer West German 
foreign policy away from national interest toward European integration.95 The 
Franco-German rapprochement implemented in the realm of coal and steel 
eventually included Italy and the Benelux.96 These 	rst steps toward a shared 
European economic sphere enabled West Germany’s success as an export na-
tion that excelled with the establishment of the EEC on 1 January 1958. The 
integration into the Common Market solved most of West Germany’s furni-
ture export problems by abolishing taris between EEC members, leveling the 
playing 	eld among German, Italian, and Belgian furniture producers in the 
European market, and rendering the Scandinavian countries less competitive. 
The open Common Market accelerated industrial modernization with the sup-
port of American investments and technology, which was one reason for the 
Federal Republic’s later superiority in the EEC. Social stability under the con-
servative, welfare-oriented Adenauer governments promised foreign investors 
safe pro	ts and oered them a gateway into the Common Market.97 The West 
German infrastructure oered a dense network of railways and highways, an 
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outstanding communication system, and the most ecient inland waterway in 
Europe.98 These favorable conditions turned the Federal Republic into a true 
competitor in the EEC, compelling German industry to acquire more capital 
and to accelerate its peaceful expansion.
From the very inception of the EEC, the German Question stood at the cen-
ter of Bonn’s relations to other member states. The FRG demanded special stip-
ulations for intra-German trade, which other members feared could adversely 
aect the community. Accordingly, the 1957 Treaty of Rome contained a “Proto-
col on intra-German trade and related issues” stipulating that German-German 
trade remained unaltered by the EEC agreements.99 However, paragraph 2 of 
the protocol required all EEC states to relate any trade with “German territories 
outside of the territory of the Basic Law,” that is to say the GDR, to the other 
members, and to take precautions that any agreements with the GDR would not 
contradict the principles of the Common Market.100 Furthermore, paragraph 
3 of the agreement stated that each member state was allowed to take action 
against injurious interaction between another member state and East Berlin.101
While trade with the GDR theoretically counted as foreign trade, the country 
could not be treated like any other third party. Its special status due to the open 
German Question and West German nonrecognition required bilateral agree-
ments signed at the level of nonstate actors, such as foreign trade associations. 
Its special status foreclosed a common EEC trade policy toward East Germany 
by de	nition. In theory, the principles of protocol paragraphs 2 and 3 applied to 
the Federal Republic as well, but Bonn exempted itself, claiming as its guiding 
foreign policy the notion that “in all of its actions, the government of the Federal 
Republic assumes the political and economic unity of Germany, whose realization 
is only obstructed by factual, but not legal reasons.”102 For the Federal Republic, 
the protocol regulated all trade between East Germany and the European part-
ners, interpreting it to mean equal treatment for all German territories.103 From 
this point of view, trade between the GDR and any of the EEC members did 
not constitute foreign trade. When in 1961 the European Council of Ministers 
attempted to include EEC-GDR trade relations under Article 111 of the Rome 
Treaty, which regulated foreign trade, Bonn demanded a clause exempting the 
Federal Republic from all of the council’s decisions vis-à-vis the GDR.104
Not surprisingly then, one of the 	rst foreign trade disagreements in the EEC 
came about in relation to the Eastern Bloc and European trade credits. The 
Berne Union had implemented the limit of state-backed credit to 	ve years with 
a gentleman’s agreement between Western countries to create fair trading con-
ditions across the Iron Curtain.105 In accordance with Western containment 
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policy, this agreement strove to prevent the Soviet-led bloc from playing Western 
trade partners against each other for political or 	nancial gain. Together with 
the United States, the Federal Republic had been timid about overstepping the 
Berne Union rules. Admittedly because of its geographic situation, among West-
ern countries West Germany already consistently ranked 	rst in trade statistics 
with the Eastern Bloc generally and the GDR speci	cally as table 3.3 shows.106
Bonn looked con	dently toward the future, reassuring itself that the kinds of 
goods the GDR required and the kinds of goods it produced made West Ger-
many a unique and essential trading partner for years to come.107 By 1964, how-
ever, a number of Western countries, among them Japan, the UK, Italy, and 
France, broke the Berne agreement and granted the East European socialist 
countries credits ranging from seven to 	een years. Worried about keeping 
its prominent status in trade with the East and its leverage over East Berlin, the 
Federal Republic started an initiative to streamline EEC foreign trade policy to-
ward the Eastern Bloc. At the same time, the BMWi defended its own generous 
credits for the GDR, stating explicitly that “intra-zonal trade is an instrument 
of reuni	cation policy,” reemphasizing the political nature of German-German 
trade.108 While Bonn felt no need to further justify its special interest in these 
trade relations, the government feared that the GDR could 	nd 	nancial sup-
port elsewhere, thus jeopardizing the carefully craed interconnections between 
the two German economies. At a conference with other EEC members, West 
Germany proposed two options that would apply to all members: extending the 
limit to state-backed credits by two years or upholding the original Berne Union 
agreement. Bonn’s attempts to shape Europe’s global trade policies to protect its 
own special relationship to East Berlin were stopped by Italy, which preferred 
to debate these matters at the Berne Union or the OECD in order to come to a 
binding agreement for all Western nations.109
While Bonn protected its political goals regarding intra-German trade 
against rival European interests, the East German economy greatly bene	ted 
from its de facto integration into the European market. By trading with West-
ern Europe through West German middlemen, the GDR bene	tted, like EEC 
members, from the removal of internal taris on certain products in 1968. A 
German-German exchange of blows in 1970 brought to light how much the 
GDR pro	ted from West Germany’s EEC membership. The minister for in-
tra-German relations Egon Franke estimated publicly that the GDR earned 
DM 400 to 500 million per year because of its economic relationship to West 
Germany.110 With Franke’s statement, the Federal Republic reminded the GDR 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































that it would be prudent for East Germany to stop pushing for recognition as a 
separate state under international law, a goal that the GDR fervidly pursued in 
the 1960s and early 1970s.
Not surprisingly, the depiction of East German economic growth as an out-
come of West German European integration politics oended the GDR gov-
ernment. In a public message, the Council of Ministers defended the socialist 
economy against the “capitalist imperialism” of the Federal Republic by pointing 
to its trade relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.111 In-
deed, the Soviet Union was East Germany’s biggest trade partner. Member coun-
tries of the Eastern Bloc’s COMECON usually traded roughly three-fourths 
of their exports within the COMECON area.112 In 1962, for instance, only 11 
percent of GDR exports went to the Federal Republic, and 14 percent to other 
Western nations.113 The lagging domestic potential of smaller members such as 
the GDR or the Čzechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR) made them heavily 
dependent on Eastern Bloc trade. Yet the principle of sovereign planning meant 
that national Five-Year Plans remained uncoordinated among member states, 
which oen caused supply shortages. This in turn necessitated short-term cov-
ering of purchases from the more exible nonsocialist economies. Furthermore, 
commodities within the COMECON were exchanged for kind, not money.114
Accordingly, no hard currency found its way into the GDR via this trade. For 
foreign currency, East Germany depended on credits and trade with the West.
The GDR was not the only Eastern Bloc country that had realized this. In 
the early 1970s, the Soviet satellites pressured the Soviet Union into establishing 
ocial contacts between the COMECON and the EEC. The Soviet Union 
gave in to these demands spearheaded by Hungary and Poland in 1973 to main-
tain cohesion and “reduc[e] some centrifugal tendencies” in the COMECON.115
Just like the GDR, these countries already entertained trade relations with the 
EEC and had a vested interest in deepening these contacts. This policy change 
aligned with contemporary Soviet détente eorts and ensured a level of coor-
dination that le the Soviet Union in control of Eastern Bloc trade with the 
West. On the other hand, EEC-COMECON contacts played also into Western 
détente eorts, showing that European integration was compatible with other 
institutional solutions in the 1970s, such as the Conference for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE), for overcoming the Cold War divide in Europe.116
Just as Minister for Intra-German Relations Franke had foreseen, the Eastern 
Treaties (Ostverträge) the Federal Republic signed with the Soviet Union, Po-
land, and later the ČSSR, and the Basic Treaty with the GDR threatened East 
Germany’s special status in the European statutes. The question of a uni	ed 
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EEC eastern trade policy resurfaced immediately in 1970 with the signing of the 
Moscow and Warsaw treaties. The EEC thought that if the Soviet bloc recog-
nized European cooperation not only de facto but also de jure, a more cohesive 
and eective European economic policy would be viable, which could possibly 
contribute to the extension of the EEC to other Western European countries. 
With East-West détente and the GDR’s international recognition on the hori-
zon, West Germany’s European partners wanted to renegotiate the status of in-
tra-German trade. Once the Basic Treaty was signed in 1972, the other member 
states grew increasingly impatient with the Federal Republic.117 Pushing for the 
complete abolition of the 1957 Protocol on Intra-German Trade, the European 
Commission acknowledged the new political reality of two German states and 
insisted that the GDR was a third country.118 West Germany meanwhile main-
tained that the Basic Treaty had not further deepened the German-German 
division. The question of German uni	cation remained open, Bonn argued, 
because the two German states still did not consider each other foreign terri-
tory and thus intra-German trade would remain an important bond between 
them.119 In order to ease European concerns, however, Bonn pointed to trade 
statistics. The percentage of intra-German trade in contrast to West German 
EEC trade was small, while the trade between the EEC partners and the GDR 
had decisively increased in recent years. Intra-German trade, as it had developed 
over the 1960s, was unlikely to grow given the GDR’s diculties in recipro-
cating, and the danger of GDR price-dumping practices was negligible for the 
Common Market, since East Berlin at this point kept prices high to reap larger 
pro	ts.120 Accordingly, from the West German point of view, there was no rea-
son to nullify the protocol.
The situation changed considerably, however, aer Honecker’s consumer turn 
of 1971 gained momentum, normalizing the use of Swing credits in intra-Ger-
man trade, which radically transformed the size of German-German trade.121 At 
the same time, EEC skepticism about West Germany’s claim to a special rela-
tionship between Bonn and East Berlin grew. In 1974, Belgium demanded that 
the community should implement measures to monitor intra-German trade.122
The same year, the Netherlands complained that the Federal Republic inter-
rupted the free-trade zone, stopping imports of GDR products sent through 
other EEC countries into West Germany.123 Bonn reacted strongly, insisting on 
upholding the regulations of paragraph 1 of the protocol on intra-German trade. 
The federal government justi	ed this stance with the continued political interest 
in keeping German-German economic exchanges as direct and as frequent as 
possible in order to thicken contacts between East and West Germany.124 When 
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bilateral negotiations failed to produce agreement, the Benelux countries began 
a grievance procedure.
While the Benelux countries rightfully questioned Bonn’s loyalties, the real 
bone of contention was the tari exemption for East German products. The 
European Court of Justice had declared these to be products “not of German 
origin” for the purpose of EEC trade policies aer the GDR’s formal recognition 
by EEC members had made it a third country in 1974.125 Yet, due to the special 
nature of intra-German trade, the GDR paid no taris for products crossing 
the border into the Federal Republic.126 Once inside the EEC zone, East Ger-
man goods could continue to move around the EEC without further taxation, 
skewing the principles of the Common Market and hurting national industries 
as well as wholesale networks. Consequently, the West German position that 
connected the German Question to intra-German trade came under close scru-
tiny by the EEC. The Benelux countries furthermore hinted at West German 
economic pro	teering from intra-German trade as a transit hub for distribution 
of eastern products. Because of the customs and other tax exemptions as well as 
established dealership networks, West Germany could sell East German goods 
to other member states with higher margins. Moreover, the system of intra-Ger-
man trade through product bartering tied to exclusive credit agreements neces-
sarily conicted with the free trade principles of the Common Market.127 Had 
the products entered under the usual tari laws through other EEC member 
states, they would not have enjoyed this competitive advantage. In order to avoid 
legal action while guaranteeing the uninterrupted political priority of intra-Ger-
man trade, the Federal Republic proposed a compromise: a license agreement 
that allowed for DM 10 million worth of GDR products to be brought into 
West Germany through other EEC countries. This proposal represented a max-
imum amount that, so Bonn hoped, would neither enable East Berlin to supply 
West German demand exclusively through third countries nor possibly create a 
political lever for the GDR.128 In the end, the 1951 Berlin Agreement principles 
of intra-German trade, revised for greater exibility in 1961, remained in place 
until German-German economic and monetary unity on 1 July 1990.
Despite the risk of disagreement in the EEC, time and again Bonn prioritized 
the well-being of German-German relations over European agreements. Yet this 
rapprochement policy triggered widespread domestic critique from liberals and 
conservatives. In a public hearing before the parliament in 1977, sociologist Ralf 
Dahrendorf described the lack of clarity in Bonn’s Deutschlandpolitik in combi-
nation with European integration as “explosive.”129 Active pursuit of European 
political unity would necessarily preclude German uni	cation, Dahrendorf 
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maintained, because none of West Germany’s neighbors had a strong political 
or economic interest in seeing Germany reunite. Similarly, political scientist 
Hans-Peter Schwarz criticized the policy of rapprochement, noting that the 
Basic Treaty had taken the German Question out of the East-West conict and 
German policies had fallen by the wayside.130 On the contrary, this analysis of 
intra-German trade in relation to the EEC integration explicitly reveals the po-
litical power and economic signi	cance of the unresolved German Question for 
West Germany’s European politics, and how it reinvigorated German-German 
economic and cultural ties well beyond 1972.
Aesthetic Convergence in the Common Market
The integration of the EEC increased the interaction of East and West German 
import and export economies through the loophole of intra-German trade, per-
meating the Iron Curtain with capitalist market principles and Western aes-
thetic styles. West German stubbornness thus not only worked to uphold bonds 
between Germans, but also contributed to a convergence of aesthetics between 
East Germany, the Federal Republic, and EEC countries. Although both Ger-
man states had striven for their own national identity in design aesthetics during 
the reconstruction years, other countries’ styles and tastes aected German ma-
terial culture alongside growing trade.
German furniture, with its legacy grounded in interwar modernism, re-
mained a contender on the global market and, aer initial struggles, continued 
to be an important export good for both the GDR and the FRG aer the Second 
World War. It is thus not surprising that the annual IMM fair in Cologne be-
came the most important furniture marketplace in the world. Within intra-Ger-
man trade, the furniture traveled mostly from East to West, but on the global 
market, both countries gained important positions as furniture export nations. 
Already in the early 1960s, the GDR proclaimed itself the world’s largest fur-
niture export nation, if only in percentage of total annual production rather 
than real pro	ts. It exported 40 percent of its furniture production to twenty 
countries, at a time when the standardization and mechanization of the GDR 
furniture industry had only begun to gain momentum.131 If nothing else, this 
high percentage of export furniture underscores East Germany’s chronic domes-
tic underprovisioning in the realm of household goods and domestic culture. In 
comparison, West Germany reached the status of the world’s largest furniture 
exporter in absolute numbers alongside Italy by the early 1980s, with DM 3 bil-
lion in sales, which was about 17 percent of its annual furniture production.132
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As the Federal Republic imported the same amount of furniture from other 
countries, its market was saturated.
In the GDR, the aesthetic incentives of the Common Market worked mostly 
through export goods production, slowly undermining socialist material ideals. 
To the East German oce for quality control, the DAMW, the fact that exports 
to the West increasingly determined the appearance of commodities in East 
Germany was even more disturbing than the obvious gap between the claims 
and the realities of its production. East Germany’s inexible planning mecha-
nisms made the production of export furniture and domestic design inseparable. 
Once set on a furniture model, the regional industry structured the distribution 
of raw materials and ordered the machines needed to realize only these designs. 
Changing the design meant a halt in production until necessary material and 
technological changes were made. These impediments crippled innovation to 
the degree that industry reports aer 1970 regularly included remarks on the 
old-fashioned look of GDR furniture.133 While these products should not have 
been awarded the ocial seal of quality “Good Design,” exceptions were made 
for poorly designed furniture in the export business. The DAMW’s realistic 
assessment that earning foreign currency was more important “because we can-
not force our design principles on the foreign buyer” exempli	es how economic 
necessities suppressed socialist fervor, designers’ creativity, and innovation.134
The furniture at the 1970 Leipzig Fall Fair, in particular, failed to live up to 
the DAMW’s expectations. “The requirements of a socialist living culture can-
not be met with these [export] models,” the fair’s report declared.135 While the 
East German upholstery section at the fair did display “joy of experimentation,” 
it was oen a result of West European customers’ requests.136 Indeed, archival 
evidence suggests that the GDR actively pursued West European customers. 
For example, by the 1960s the ZfF had sent its sta to trade fairs in the West to 
report on the technological quality and design of the capitalist competition.137
The new travel agreements of the Basic Treaty facilitated this. Short trips to 
West Berlin to visit exhibitions at the newly opened International Design Cen-
ter (IDZ) or to view the range of products at West German furniture stores 
increased exponentially aer 1972. Most of the documented visits to the IMM
in Cologne fall into this time period as well and include representatives from 
the furniture industry. Such observational activity entailed a certain degree of 
adaptation to Western aesthetics. Indeed, West German producers feared the 
eastern economic competition on the European market. In 1974, the Bavarian 
Upholstery Association accused East German combines of “slavishly” imitating 
West German designs and selling their furniture on Western markets at cut-rate 
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prices.138 The federal government, however, saw this transfer of cultural ideas as 
a way to impress western aesthetics upon the East German population and to 
increase the GDR’s western economic dependency, thereby taking another step 
toward a shared economic culture.
The ZfF’s successor institution, the Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung 
(AiF), institutionalized the practice with a product card index in 1974. e 
index cataloged furniture systems predominately from Scandinavia, the Federal 
Republic, Switzerland, and Italy, with an occasional Russian model thrown in 
to inspire the export models that headed east.139 The 	rms in the card index 
were producers of extreme examples of classy, high-priced designer furniture 
like Interlübke, nothing one would expect in a “workers’ and peasants’ state.” 
In the process of cataloging the Western furniture, GDR industrial designers 
compared their products with those of the West, which, ultimately, hindered 
the development of a distinct East German aesthetic. The tendency toward 
comparison sharply contrasted with the GDR’s goal of convincing the West of 
the East’s superior quality and comfort of life. The GDR intelligentsia incor-
porated this Westernization of style into the socialist framework of the state 
without hesitation. Cultural critic Karin Hirdina hurried to make the form 	t 
the ideology, claiming in 1975 that “functionalism represents a Utopian vision 
of a non-capitalist order of relationships between Man and his environment.”140
Results remained substandard nonetheless. All too oen GDR production 
mashed together the natural look of Sweden, the functionalist purism of West 
Germany and Switzerland, and the playful avant-gardism of Italy in the cheap 
export furniture oered in West German mail order catalogs like Neckermann.
The most important lesson learned from trips to the West pertained to ma-
terials rather than design. Upon his return from the 1979 IMM in Cologne, 
Gert Großpietzsch, the head of the Dresden-Hellerau combine’s product devel-
opment department, recommended that the combine should refocus on produc-
ing expensive furniture to maximize its revenues and to target these unexplored 
parts of the western market.141 In terms of materials, he reported, the trend was 
toward natural looks with a high demand for solid woods and wooden veneers, 
which were the exact materials that the Chemical Program had abolished in 
the GDR. Instead, the synthetic alternative to veneers, so-called decorative foil, 
which went through multiple varnishing and polishing processes aer its appli-
cation on chipboard, compromised the overall aesthetic of the East German fur-
niture production.142 With the shortfall of Honecker’s Unity of Economic and 
Social Policy, the material dreams of Großpietzsch and his designer colleagues 
remained out of reach, leaving East Germany to continue its low-end quality 
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production strategy. By 1985, only about 8 percent of the Federal Republic’s fur-
niture imports came from the GDR.143
In the case of the Federal Republic, trade and a nascent collective vision of 
Europe as a cultural space brought European trends into West German designs. 
The Federal Republic’s accession to the status of the world’s largest furniture 
exporter, grossing DM 3 billion in 1981, developed in parallel to its place as an 
equally high importer of foreign-made furniture.144 Consequently, domestic 
producers followed the lead of the European market demand in order to maxi-
mize sales. Foreign inuences thus found their way into the department stores 
and homes of the FRG, slowly aecting the overall national aesthetic. While 
consumption shaped and reproduced dominant ideas about the appearance of 
material culture, artistic inuences brought new ideas into the Common Mar-
ket. West German domination of the international furniture market coincided 
with the “designer decade” of the 1980s, which brought the aesthetic qualities 
of material culture, alongside a renewed appreciation for ornamentation, back 
to the forefront.145 Cultural events, such as the Venice Biennale of 1980, greatly 
impacted industrial furniture design once more to a degree that had last been 
seen in 1958 at the Brussels world exposition. The Venice Biennale marked the 
arrival of postmodernism in Europe. Although postmodernism mostly devel-
oped in architecture, many of its participants were engaged in interior design as 
well. As lifestyle design stores mushroomed, design reentered public discourse 
on consumption. Moreover, design in	ltrated all areas of public and private life 
via collaborations between traditional brands, such as Alessi or WMF, and the 
most creative minds in the applied arts, turning everyday utility objects into 
design objects.
A radical design movement from Italy illustrates the playfulness of this post-
modern decade and its implications for West German furniture design.146 In-
spired by art deco and pop art, the virtuoso movement Memphis (1981) entered 
the design scene under the leadership of Ettore Sottsass. While the extreme 
shapes were not enthusiastically received by the population due to their lim-
ited functionality, their inuence can be seen in German museums. Wolfgang 
Flatz’ lightning chair and table (1982), displayed at Hamburg’s Arts and Cras 
Museum, drew inspiration from the movement. Furniture mass production 
referenced these exaggerated shapes, for example emulating urban skylines in 
top pieces of wardrobes and shelves. Especially in West Germany, this playful 
movement broke down into geometric forms exempli	ed by Peter Maly’s Zyklus 
furniture (1984), pieces that have become German classics. In the GDR, simi-
lar shapes emerged with Herbert Pohl’s Metropol furniture for the East Berlin 
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furniture combine, which the AiF approved and recognized with the “Good 
Design” prize at the Leipzig fair in 1988. The Metropol program never entered 
mass production, because the GDR collapsed before the model could be inte-
grated into the next Plan.147 Nevertheless, opening up to European inuences 
further increased aesthetic similarities between the two German states as well 
as between them and the rest of Western Europe.
Germany’s own original take on postmodernism drew markedly on histor-
ical elements.148 In contrast to the architectural deconstruction movements 
elsewhere in Europe, East and West Germans rehabilitated urban apartment 
buildings dating back to the nineteenth century. The rediscovery of the classic 
architecture of an aesthetically untainted German past came alongside a post-
modernist critique that aimed at the core of postwar German national design. In 
this rejection of modern aesthetics, which encompassed the Werkbund, the Bau-
haus, the HfG Ulm, and the late functionalism of large-scale housing programs 
figure 3.2. West German interpretation of postmodern:  
“Zyklus” furniture designs by Peter Maly, 1984.  
Photograph: Foto COR.
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and city transportation systems, the strong sense of aesthetic continuity since the 
1920s that they represented came under attack again.149 Such critique of func-
tionalist modernism aected German furniture designers as well. In 1982, an 
East German report from the Cologne fair explained that the Spartan aesthetics 
and rigid lines of West German functionalism had gone out of fashion in the 
West. Instead, “lines of emphasized elegance with a tendency to individualism” 
attracted the consumer.150 Successful West German furniture producers such 
as Interlübke and Hülsta recovered elements that evoked the mass appeal of art 
nouveau. Within Europe, this furniture style was historically one of the most 
successful aesthetic concepts that straddled the divide between cras and mass 
production. Its many international names alone indicate the vibrancy of style 
in the 	elds of architecture, art, and decorative arts as well as the scope of its 
circulation: Jugendstil, Stile Liberty, le style moderne, arte nova, arte joven, and 
figure 3.3. East German interpretation of postmodern with Asian inuences.  
“Metropol” furniture designs by Herbert Pohl for VEB Möbelkombinat Berlin, 1986. 
Photograph: Bernd Neumeier.
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Nieuwe Kunst, to name but a few. The return to historical styles did not consti-
tute a novelty but rather brought the postmodernist and the style enthusiast in 
Germany closer together, while simultaneously creating bridges to more opu-
lent French and Italian styles. In the process of European economic integration, 
then, awareness of a European culture and identity began to emerge.
It is important to note that design as an economic factor also received at-
tention at the European level. For the 	rst time in its comparatively short his-
tory, the EEC awarded an industrial design prize in 1988. The award recognized 
small-and medium-sized companies that excelled in the categories of quality de-
sign and corporate identity. This prize illustrated, 	rst, that design had become 
by the late 1980s a critical factor in the success of European products of Mittel-
stand businesses that still constitute the backbone of European national econo-
mies. The design prize marked, second, the culmination of cultural-economic 
competition for markets within the European Community that encouraged the 
acceptance of other national aesthetic concepts. In the call for submissions to 
figure 3.4. Hülsta furniture with art nouveau inuences at the IMM  
in Cologne, 1982. Bundesarchiv DF7/1072. Photograph: Gerhard Wetzig.
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the 1988 EEC design prize, organizers underscored the pan-European nature 
of this event. In particular, the competition’s three objectives emphasized the 
concept of a shared European design culture: (1) to stimulate interest in design 
in European/EEC industries; (2) to illustrate the nature of the design process 
and how it can be used as a tool for industrial innovation; and (3) to promote 
European/EEC design outside of Europe.151
The 1980s thus were a turning point in the eort to forge a European cultural 
space. As plans for a cultural television event demonstrate, industrial design 
served as a building block for European identity. The pan-European project La 
Casa Europea—European Design Day on European TV aired on the same day 
in all EC member countries. It consisted of discussions, lectures about objects, 
interviews, and design presentations. Organizers pushed for a cohesive Euro-
pean aesthetic that communicated the “growing together” of the Western Eu-
ropean countries. Among other things, they used the event “to oer design as 
a European identity.”152 Aiming to prove to a European audience that Europe 
had grown into a tight-knit network of dierent locations and activities, the 
television program proposed Europe as an open space. Industrial design helped 
to create this European public sphere, serving as a framework for European in-
novation to explain “Europe as a real and arti	cial world.”153 This conception of 
Europe as a cultural space and its integrative force even brought about delibera-
tions for a communal EC cultural policy vis-à-vis the GDR.154
Not everybody shared in the excitement about the concept of a European de-
sign. In 1989, the West German design council RfF restructured itself under new 
leadership. Dieter Rams, known as the mind behind the rebranding of Braun 
and its evolution into one of the leading technological design companies world-
wide, volunteered to serve as president of the disorganized design council. In 
an eort to bring the RfF back to its rightful place at the core of West German 
industrial design policy, he started a fundraising campaign among industrial-
ists and entrepreneurs. In a letter asking for 	nancial support, Rams pointed 
to other countries’ design activities and the integration of the European mar-
ket as motivation for rejuvenating the West German brand. The goal was to 
heighten awareness of German design by expanding its presence abroad, thus 
giving German design its rightful recognition as an important export.155 Rams 
intended to continue the RfF’s quest for a national identity predicated on its 
industrial design.
The preoccupation with a national brand, informed by the tense German- 
German relationship even in the context of European economic integration, 
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suggests that the Federal Republic could only commit fully to Europe aer the 
resolution of the German Question in 1989. This point is further supported by 
the sequence of subsequent events leading up to reuni	cation and the manner 
in which this process was negotiated with Germany’s European neighbors in 
1990.156 Yet this is not to say that the EEC was of no signi	cance to the Ger-
man-German rapprochement process. To the contrary, European economic in-
tegration and European cultural trends paved the way for convergence between 
East and West Germany. Dahrendorf ’s description of Bonn’s pursuit of Euro-
pean integration as “explosive” for its Deutschlandpolitik reverberates in histor-
ical accounts that present Adenauer’s policy decisions about German unity and 
Western integration in the 1950s and 1960s as highly contradictory, if not mutu-
ally exclusive. However, with the long-term perspective of the economic culture 
approach it seems that EEC trade agreements reinforced the special nature of in-
tra-German trade, and in a roundabout way helped to deepen German-German 
economic interaction and interdependencies. The initial moments of German 
aesthetic development toward a shared design aesthetic can similarly be found 
in the integration of the Common Market and the incentives it gave to pursue 
“modern” tastes and styles, no matter how diverse.
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Ch a pter 4
From Competition to Cooperation
Cold War Diplomacy of German Design
W hen the West German embassies reopened in the early 1950s, countless perplexed letters from around the world arrived in Bonn. Sta requested guidance about what to do with emblems of the 
Third Reich. The embassy in Rio de Janeiro faced a peculiar conundrum in 
1952, as it inherited a set of eagle-and-swastika-adorned silverware. Estimated at 
a value of DM 115,000, a lively letter exchange between the Rio embassy and the 
Federal Ministry for Foreign Aairs (Auswärtiges Amt, AA) developed about 
the NSDAP party symbol.1 Eventually it was decided that a local Brazilian jew-
eler should remove both eagle and swastika.
In varying geographical and geostrategic contexts, West German ambassadors 
learned quickly how central material representation of the new postfascist nar-
rative of transparency and simplicity was to the country’s success abroad. This 
was particularly true when it came to the task of opening up export markets for 
engineering and consumer products with high added value, the core of the West 
German export industries. In countries where the Federal Republic’s trade con-
sisted of mostly cheap products, tremendous eorts were made to improve the 
reputation of the German national brand. Ambassador Dr. von Hentig reported 
from Djakarta in 1953 that the embassy’s Mercedes 300 had been the single best 
investment for economic promotion activities, together with a modern sterling 
cutlery set made by the company C. Hugo Pott: “The cutlery has found highest 
admiration and acknowledgement among international and Indonesian-Dutch 
circles. It may be described without hesitation as the most beautiful, even far 
superior to President Sukarno’s state silver. . . . In this artistic accomplishment 
lies proof that we are not only technologically but also artistically superior.”2
His exchanges with the AA illustrate a high awareness of industrial design’s 
importance for economic relations among the diplomatic corps in the early years 
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of the Federal Republic. For instance, von Hentig politely declined German tex-
tiles oered to him through AA contractors, as these could “not even compete 
with the quality of the most aordable of mass-produced hand-knotted Indian 
carpets and fabrics.”3 Instead, he preferred to furnish the representational spaces 
in the embassy with interior design solutions from the Vereinigte Werkstätten 
in Munich, the pre-1945 sister company of the Deutsche Werkstätten Helle-
rau (DWH) in Dresden, known for its modern and functional aesthetic. The 
embassy in Paris chose furniture designs from the Werkstätten as well, as they 
expressed a “dignied modesty.”4 The potentially positive eect of displayed 
humility and artistic excellence underpinned the diplomatic work that the AA 
began in an eort to reintegrate the Federal Republic into the world economy 
and, eventually, re-establish the country’s importance in international politics.
From the early days of the Federal Republic the symbolic signicance of 
German materiality for foreign relations and trade was thus well understood. 
What is more, it became a medium through which diplomats communicated 
their anxieties about Germany’s past and their hopes for a better future based 
on mutually benecial interests, such as trade and cultural exchange. Material 
cultural foreign policy became intrinsically linked to the economic culture 
of the home country, the structures, values, customs, skills, technologies, and 
materials visible in the products of German industry. In fact, the BDI and the 
German Industry and Commerce Board (Deutscher Industrie und Handelstag, 
DIHT) spearheaded West German foreign trade policy. In some cases they even 
preempted the reopening of ocial diplomatic relations with other countries 
to recommence foreign trade speedily. The two economic organizations coor-
dinated their eorts to show a united front and aligned their ambitions with 
Adenauer’s foreign policy. They supported western integration and a confron-
tational Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik even if trade with the Eastern Bloc would 
have been lucrative.5
These fundamentals complicated German-German relations during the Cold 
War, a piecemeal eort to “coexist” in a geopolitical situation marked by rising 
superpower tensions. Faced with deadlocked ideological positions, Germans 
eventually realized that they needed new ways to interact in order to salvage 
what was le of the cultural and economic bonds between them. Like economic 
reconstruction and intra-German trade, alternatives to eastern and western 
alignment were also explored in diplomatic usages of German material culture 
as both Germanys ercely competed for legitimacy and recognition in the in-
ternational arena.6 In the beginning, the Federal Republic shared its modern 
style in interior design with other members of the Atlantic community. Its fresh 
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and functional aesthetics placed West Germany among the advanced and pro-
gressive nations in the innovative elds of engineering, technology, and design. 
Meanwhile, cultural Stalinism of the 1940s and early 1950s, economic planning, 
and the politicization of product development delayed East Germany’s cultural 
aspirations until the mid-1960s. Impelled by the economic logic of export mar-
kets, the GDR eventually made progress in the production of modern furniture 
that was able to nd customers in East and West. Thus, the research suggests 
that East and West German attempts at expressing ideological and systemic dif-
ference ironically created a shared code inscribed in material culture that would 
eventually further German-German rapprochement.
Within the bipolarity of the Cold War, the political signicance of aesthet-
ics in everyday objects has been well established.7 Taking the focus o the su-
perpowers to interrogate the specically German cultural politics behind the 
aestheticization of separate identities—proletarian in the East and cosmopoli-
tan in the West—highlights German interests in the global Cold War. It is in 
the operationalization of industrial design for diplomatic purposes, in which 
economic culture and foreign policy directly connect. In order to show how 
material culture emerged as a recognizable language in the intra-German rela-
tionship and what functions it served, this chapter integrates the material with 
the diplomatic ambitions of the two German states. In this way, East and West 
German cultural-political strategies that sought to negotiate a German-German 
modus vivendi through the medium of domestic culture can be connected to the 
complex history of Cold War German diplomacy within the framework of inter-
national industrial design exhibitions, international design organizations, and 
direct German-German cultural exchanges. At the center stands the question of 
how both Germanys turned a competitive situation, the aestheticization of their 
respective political orders, into a diplomatic tool for rapprochement.
Part of what allowed material culture to mediate German-German relations 
was the deeply ingrained self-understanding of Germany as a “nation of cul-
ture” (Kulturnation) that survived the 1949 division. The term originated with 
early German conservatives who substituted the lack of a nation-state in the 
nineteenth century with the term Kulturnation to describe “one people united 
by custom, language, poetry and music, and a common tradition in which all 
these factors dened a unique German history.”8 Both sides utilized German 
aesthetic traditions to overcome or suppress the horrors of the Third Reich and 
employed them to display moral improvement. This operational understanding 
of aesthetics was the lowest common denominator upon which communica-
tion between the FRG and the GDR functioned. While both Germanys shared 
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one cultural heritage of Goethe, Beethoven, and Dürer, the ideological Cold 
War shied focus from high culture to lifestyle and Wohnkultur. Industrial 
and product design, a material expression of progress and membership among 
modern nations, thus became an integral part of their competitive foreign re-
lations eorts.
International Exhibitions and the Diplomatic 
Signicance of Material Culture
Early in the 1950s, both Germanys established a tradition of competitive inter-
national industrial exhibitions.9 The aesthetic and artistic elements were under-
pinned by economic strategies and the search for international partners. In the 
1960s, East and West German design councils began working toward establish-
ing more formal relations with European nations on the other side of the Iron 
Curtain. Both German states aimed to demonstrate material progressivism and 
economic prowess to the opposing bloc. The lingering German Question and 
East Berlin’s legitimization eorts pitted East and West German material cul-
ture against each other.
Prior personal and professional friendships facilitated the Federal Republic’s 
entry into this new stage of Cold War design diplomacy. The general secretary of 
the RfF, Mia Seeger, together with her Polish counterpart, Zophia Szydlowska, 
the head of the design council Instytut Wzornictwa Przemyslowego, proposed 
the rst exclusively West German industrial design exhibition in the Eastern 
Bloc.10 The two women had met at the 1960 Milan Triennial, where the German 
and Polish displays were adjacent. When Seeger saw the nal blueprints for the 
exhibition space, she noticed a wall that separated the Polish exhibition from the 
German one. She immediately wrote to Szydlowska and put her disappointment 
about the Polish demarcation in the most diplomatic terms: “If I read your layout 
correctly, then you have erected a wall against the German section, your section 
against ours. This would greatly hinder the ow of visitors. In no way do we 
need a wall.”11 The wall was never again mentioned and a lifelong friendship 
between the two women ensued. In the following years, they made an invaluable 
contribution toward constructive East-West exchanges in industrial design. For 
instance, in 1965 Szydlowska informed Martin Kelm, the head of the East Ger-
man ZfF, about the industrial design work done in West Germany.12 The friend-
ship of Seeger and Szydlowska demonstrates how interpersonal relations eected 
links across the Iron Curtain many years before Chancellor Willy Brandt’s New 
Eastern Policy initiated ocial reconciliation with Poland.13
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In 1967, the RfF organised “Industrial Design from the FRG,” the rst West 
German industrial exhibition to travel the Eastern Bloc since 1949. It stopped 
in the Polish cities of Warsaw and Krakow rst, and then moved on to Soa 
in Bulgaria, and Zagreb in Yugoslavia. The RfF promoted this event as part 
of a series of Western European and Scandinavian exhibitions that visited the 
Eastern Bloc. Yet considering Germany’s special position in Cold War Europe, 
it took particular “cautious and balanced good will” on all sides to make this 
project happen.14 Once the exhibition opened its doors to Polish visitors, as-
pects specic to the Federal Republic’s relations with the East surfaced. The 
underlying message of the show was that of Western abundance and technical 
superiority, consistent with western Cold War cultural diplomacy. In a design 
journal review, Peter Frank, an exhibition supervisor and sta member close to 
Mia Seeger, reported his uneasiness regarding the excitement that Polish visitors 
expressed when seeing the exhibition objects: “As exhibition custodian, I receive 
the admiration of visitors with somewhat ambivalent feelings. The exhibition 
is more than simply a specic design show.” And he elaborated: “It is, like every 
other documentation of a country’s national design standards, understood as 
a representation in its broadest sense. Perhaps design exhibitions are especially 
tting for this purpose, particularly if they make evident that industrial design 
expresses more than just the immediate technological and economic level.”15
Frank only realized the show’s combined eect of abundance and technologi-
cal advancement once it was on display.16 He also noted that the West German 
products either were complete novelties in Poland or representative of a dierent 
economic and social context. For example, a bachelor kitchenette embodied a 
particular Western lifestyle, whereas from a communist viewpoint, it must have 
seemed like a waste of resources for a social oddity.17
Two incidents heightened the diplomatic payo West Germany derived from 
this event. First, GDR industrial designers scheduled a visit to Poland for one 
of their regular bilateral exchanges during the two-week period of the FRG ex-
hibition in Warsaw. This aorded East German designers the opportunity to 
acquaint themselves with West German products that they had before only seen 
in print.18 West Germany, meanwhile, could once again show o its superiority 
in product design. While the unexpected visit from the GDR delegation surely 
gave great satisfaction to the RfF, the friendship between Seeger and Szydlowska 
yielded an even bigger success for West German diplomacy. Aer the show’s 
opening in 1967, Szydlowska organized a dinner party to honor her dear German 
friend, to which the Federal Republic’s chargé d’aairs in Poland was invited—
his rst ocial invitation to a Polish event.19 With this exhibition the Federal 
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Republic not only showcased its material culture but also made an important 
step toward rebuilding diplomatic relations in the Eastern Bloc.20
West Germany’s activities in the Eastern Bloc triggered East German anxi-
eties about its own reputation as the most technologically advanced industrial 
country in the Soviet sphere of inuence. To be trumped by Bonn in the realm of 
product design and consumer culture in front of its socialist friends, as East Ger-
man politicians feared, could potentially lead to a loss of prestige in the COME-
CON. Within months of the West German traveling exhibition, the ZfF hastily 
put together its own exhibition to feature GDR state-of-the-art interior design. 
The show Function—Shape—Quality traveled through the Eastern Bloc for two 
years, imitating the route of the West German exhibition by starting in Warsaw 
and then progressing to Krakow. The ZfF modeled the size and concept of the 
exhibition aer what the Federal Republic had presented just months earlier.21
Instead of stressing dierence and superiority, as the Federal Republic’s exhi-
bition had done, the GDR attempted to win over their Polish audiences with 
a message of solidarity.22 Positioning industrial design as a common challenge 
for all socialist nations, the GDR sought to appeal to mutual interests in the 
ideological and practical problem-solving process within the COMECON. 
The exhibition’s intended audience, however, included professionals beyond 
the Eastern Bloc, as invitations were sent to numerous Western design councils 
and design schools.23 Consequently, this exhibition aimed to declare the state of 
industrial design in the GDR—in practice and theory—to both friend and foe, 
as well as signal the GDR’s commonalities with other socialist nations, where it 
subsequently toured.
As the title Function—Shape—Quality suggests, the show’s focus linked aes-
thetics to functionality. It was the rst GDR display to feature design as an 
important quality of industrial production. It thus expressed the consumer turn 
in East German economic policy, which led planners and designers to pay more 
attention to the relationship between humans and their material environment. 
More than 150 objects and group exhibits, thirty photographic displays, and 
eight models provided a comprehensive overview of contemporary East German 
industrial design.24 Visitors were greeted by an introductory display that covered 
German design history between 1900 and 1933. The timeline omitted the Nazi 
period in accordance with the foundational myth of the GDR, which empha-
sized a clear break with the Third Reich.25 The next part of the exhibition intro-
duced the German arts and cras tradition and provided an overview of current 
design education in the GDR. The rest of the exhibition addressed signicant 
aesthetic challenges in socialist societies: design solutions that “integrated the 
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cultural and the utility value of the product” for work environments, domestic 
spaces, and leisure, reecting the state-dominated life of the socialist citizen.26
The show’s ideological component was especially apparent in the accompa-
nying catalog. It explained the role design ought to play in socialist societies: 
“The world that humans shape has a shaping inuence on them in return. The 
properties, benets, and shapes of man-made objects stimulate people’s behavior 
and relationship to the world.” This stimulation would result from “usage, that is 
the experience of the objects’ material, construction, and function, which come 
together in the design, leads in the end to the unlocking [of] new human senses 
and to the activation of satisfaction, pleasure, and joy of living.”27 Although the 
explanation may sound like a denition of hedonistic consumption, the rela-
tionship between humans and their material environment was central to the 
mid-1960s understanding of production and consumption in the GDR. The 
idea of “humanistic socialism” put humans at the center of design, with the goal 
of creating an environment that served the needs of the population. The degree 
to which a product fullled these needs determined its ideological value.
Generally speaking, the catalog revised many of the more extreme ideological 
stances that the GDR had taken in the 1950s and early 1960s. The historical 
section even exonerated the Bauhaus, which had been erased from East Germany 
cultural memory during the Formalism Debate between 1950 and 1953. Instead 
of the previous ocial critique labeling Weimar modernism as cosmopolitan 
and formalist, by 1967 the ZfF had crowned the Bauhaus the highest develop-
mental stage among a series of design initiatives coming from the East German 
territory. The catalog text for the Function—Shape—Quality exhibition in Mos-
cow two years later even integrated the Bauhaus into leist, that is, socialist, 
opposition to the Hitler regime, pointing out that the Nazis closed down the 
design school as a “hotbed of cultural Bolshevism.”28 One of the pieces displayed, 
Horn’s modular furniture program MDW, epitomized the newfound sense of 
modernist tradition and a humanistic outlook on production, as it allowed con-
sumers to accommodate individual needs of their changing personal as well as 
spatial living situations by adding on.
Polish media extensively advertised the show during its run from 11 December 
1967 until 20 January 1968, and numerous Polish politicians and designers vis-
ited the displays. Newspaper reviews reveal that the exhibition’s novelty, unlike 
its West German counterpart, was not the display of unfamiliar products, since 
East German products were mostly available on the Polish market. Rather, the 
fascination lay with the display’s explanation of the development of a design 
culture and its subsequent appropriation by industry.29 The integration of design 
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into the economic planning process, epitomized by the ZfF’s 1965 relocation 
from the Ministry of Culture to the DAMW, was especially admired by the 
Polish press. At the specialist symposia framing the exhibition, GDR representa-
tives emphasized the economic benets of functionalist industrial design, while 
the catalogs stressed its cultural value. The crucial takeaway from the industrial 
exhibition was the GDR’s move toward resolving the evident contradiction be-
tween the ideological superstructure and its practical application inherent in the 
economic culture of the 1950s and early 1960s.
The mid-1960s then were a moment in which the GDR revised its ideological 
position vis-à-vis functionalism in its cultural diplomacy. Aer a decade of aes-
thetic divergence from the West and internal political contradiction, ideology 
and social considerations surrounding industrial design merged in humanistic 
socialism. The new interest in individual needs increasingly paved the way for 
consumer-oriented design and the rediscovery of Weimar modernism as a leist 
aesthetic. This rehabilitation of the Bauhaus tradition in East Germany signaled 
once more the GDR’s commitment to artistic and economic competition with 
the Federal Republic. The demise of socialist realism in the East occurred along-
side the crisis of functionalism in the West. At the same time, individual solu-
tions, such as the MDW furniture program, enabled increasing standardization 
of production, which in turn helped preserve resources. Yet, the mismanagement 
of the planned economy would eventually ruin this moment of convergence. As a 
result, the GDR remained an “economy of scarcity,” in which consumers waited 
for years to attain coveted furniture, cars, and other technical equipment.30
To claim a place among modern industrialized nations, the next logical step 
for the GDR was to show its design expertise in Western countries, facilitated 
by membership in the International Council of Societies of Industrial Design 
(ICSID). Aer earlier positive experiences with the UK, East Germany strove to 
formalize sporadic and unocial bilateral cultural and economic relations with 
Great Britain on the way toward full diplomatic recognition.31 British companies 
had regularly participated in the Leipzig Fair in the 1960s and, pursued by GDR 
diplomats of the MfAA, representatives of British industry, the media, and the 
two major political parties had visited East Berlin.32 A parliamentary friendship 
group with Labour MPs had existed since 1962, yet its members mostly hailed 
from the le wing of the party.33 In the international spirit of détente in 1969 
the British industry organization CBI and the GDR chamber of foreign com-
merce signed an initial trade agreement for the years 1970 to 1973. Diplomats 
worked with the British public relations company Lex Hornsby to promote rec-
ognition of the GDR and convey information to support this eort to British 
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newspapers.34 In addition, a number of cultural exchange events were scheduled, 
among them UK tours for some of the GDR’s nest artistic institutions, such 
as the Leipzig Gewandhaus Orchestra and the East Berlin’s Komische Oper.35 It 
became evident that industrial circles were more receptive to establishing con-
tacts with the GDR than their political counterparts.36
In an eort to merge political and economic aims, the MfAA commissioned 
the ZfF in 1970 to put on an industrial design exhibition in London. By display-
ing products that fullled the highest international standards of quality and de-
sign with clear usage of GDR insignia, the exhibition planners aimed to impress 
characteristics of their socialist economy on the British public.37 What seemed 
like a straightforward event, however, demanded much diplomatic skill. At rst, 
the general idea of a GDR design exhibition found fertile ground in England. 
Sir Paul Reilly, the head of the British Council of Industrial Design (CoID) and 
an active member of ICSID, supported the ZfF and even visited East Berlin in 
April 1970.38 The diculties arose over an exhibition venue. The location had 
to be humble enough to avoid the impression that the British government enter-
tained quasi-ocial relations with the socialist GDR, but also a suciently rep-
resentative space not to oend the East German guests. In the end, the Ceylon 
Tea Center, a Sri Lankan trade forum, served as the exhibition space.
The diplomatic intricacies did not end there. Upon receiving the texts for the 
placards and the catalog, both loaded with socialist ideologisms, Sir Paul Reilly 
retracted his agreement to personally open the exhibition. From the outset, he 
had made it clear that he “was happy to open an exhibition which was entirely 
on the subject of Design and did not contain any political or ideological allu-
sions, however slight.”39 As head of a government-supported organization, he 
did not want to be involved with an ideologically inscribed event, he insisted. 
If the GDR wanted him back on board, Sir Paul Reilly demanded that the ZfF 
revise the texts.
From this point, opinions within East German ocial circles sharply di-
verged. Designers feared that “the revisions would mean abandonment of our 
socialist point of view.”40 The DAMW, the ZfF’s superior governmental insti-
tution, pointed to the possibility that others, especially West German ocials, 
could use such altered texts politically against the GDR. The diplomats of the 
MfAA, on the other hand, preferred changing the texts to losing Sir Paul Reilly’s 
endorsement, which “would hence represent an important precedent for future 
activities toward the GDR’s diplomatic recognition by Great Britain.”41 This 
stance was in line with GDR foreign policy in the nal months of the Ulbricht 
era, which introduced a cautious opening up to the West from 1970 onward.42
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Although coordinated with the Soviet Union, Ulbricht’s foreign policy maxim 
of the GDR as the model socialist state, had, with its ambition of an indepen-
dent Deutschlandpolitik, contradicted Soviet western strategy. It was abandoned 
in recognition of the GDR’s geostrategic position and the responsibility this 
entailed for the country’s leadership in East-West rapprochement.43 In the end, 
potential diplomatic gains won out over ideological concerns. The ZfF entirely 
revised the texts and thus gave the presentation of socialist material culture new 
meaning, one that catered to Western European sensibilities about individuality 
and that erased any trace of open state socialism from the displays. Original text 
was phrased as such:
New standards for the quality of industrial products are derived from the 
development of the socialist order in the GDR. Manufactures are an essen-
tial part of our environment. They inuence people’s way of living within 
every area. The quality of material and ideological needs also depend on 
product design.44
The revised, English translation purged the Marxist language from the texts:
New standards of quality have been set for industrial products. It is rec-
ognized that as an essential part of our environment these inuence man 
in all spheres of his life. Ideally, every product should be an expression of 
certain requirements, both physical and aesthetic.45
When the exhibition opened, it underscored the humanistic aspects of GDR 
design culture. This new stance was further underlined by Martin Kelm’s re-
marks at the show’s opening: “It is the goal in our society to positively inu-
ence all of the factors aecting human beings and to create an environment in 
which one can experience the challenging notion of humanism.”46 Yet Kelm used 
his speech also to reinsert ideological messages with a socialist interpretation 
of humanism:
As you know, we abolished the hurdles of private ownership of property 
as well as means of production in order to undertake planning that serves 
across societal interests. The people own everything. The people can de-
termine their own fortunes. Hence, we have the potential to design an en-
vironment that serves the people’s interests. We work on utilizing these 
opportunities and on putting industrial design to work in creating a com-
plexly designed humanistic environment.47
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The re-inscription of GDR material culture as an expression of humanistic ide-
als within socialism was a watershed moment in East Germany’s cultural and 
trade diplomacy: For the rst time, political goals became more important than 
ideological consistency. With this newfound pragmatism with regard to the neo-
liberal free trade doctrine, the SED sought to combat the stigma of isolation 
and provincialism that had attached to the country aer the construction of 
the Wall.48
Having appeared in the catalog for the 1967 Warsaw exhibition, the concept 
of humanism in communism was not entirely new. As a shared concern, it fa-
cilitated communication between Eastern Bloc countries at dierent stages of 
socialist and industrial development; though in London the ZfF employed it 
to sway Western audiences. Indeed, in the mid-1960s, “socialist humanism” be-
came a key term in the rapprochement of eastern and western Marxists.49 This 
school of Marxist thought opposed the structural mechanisms of state socialism 
and instead emphasized subjectivity and human agency in socialist theory, and 
aimed at creating social alliances to win support for reform. Yet using humane 
socialism to mitigate the ideological opposition between Western democracies 
and socialist groups, parties, and even states, announced a new stage in diplo-
matic cultural exchange. It also contributed to a period of Western Eurocommu-
nism in the 1960s and 1970s by enabling the cooperation of bourgeois and leist 
parties in Western democratic governments, such as the Labour governments in 
Britain and the Grand Coalition in West Germany.50
At the London exhibition, the GDR thus strategically employed the con-
cept of humane socialism to overcome the ideological barrier. To convey this 
approach materially, the exhibition consciously minimized the better-developed 
heavy industrial sector and instead displayed consumer products that related to 
the everyday.51 It especially featured objects for leisure activities, such as patio 
furniture and toys. An East German review mentioned that the toys are “not 
only very well designed, but also pedagogically valuable and fulll therapeutic 
requirements. The colorful, imaginatively arranged, and multiform toys bestow 
the entire exhibition with a friendly and casual atmosphere.”52 East German 
products ranging from pictures of heavy work equipment to displays of prized 
china and glassware created the impression of a progressive material culture. 
Yet visitors saw more than industrial design. GDR literature and picture al-
bums strategically placed throughout the exhibit for perusal conveyed a better 
understanding of the socialist country.53 A color slide presentation about Karl-
Marx-Stadt’s postwar reconstruction (today Chemnitz) brought all these ele-
ments together and transported visitors to an ideal socialist setting where public 
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buildings, public art, the health establishment, and urban infrastructure neatly 
coalesced. Apparently, the message resonated positively with British audiences. 
On 9 September 1970, even the conservative Daily Telegraph titled its story on 
the GDR design exhibition “Humane East Germans.”54
In the end, the response to the London exhibition far exceeded the hopes 
and expectations of diplomats in the GDR. Representatives from several eastern 
European countries, as well as the cultural attaché of the American embassy in 
London and a few members of British parliament, among other London no-
tables, attended the opening reception. In his speech, Sir Paul Reilly armed 
the bilateral interest in fostering trade relations between Great Britain and the 
GDR “whether ocially or unocially.”55 Not to take advantage of this sizable 
market, he maintained, “would be ludicrous for a trading people like the Brit-
ish.” Yet he acknowledged the unusual diplomatic situation, hoping that “no-one 
here feels any compunction about being present to wish this exhibition well. It 
is indeed innocent self-interest that brings us all together here, since trade is 
properly a two-way trac and cannot be conducted without reasonable personal 
contacts.”56 Once ideology was set aside, economic interests prevailed. With this 
event, the GDR moved one step closer to losing pariah status and becoming a 
desired trade partner.
figure 4.1. Children’s toy hippo, designed by Renate Müller (1960s)  
for VEB Therapeutisches Spielzeug Sonneberg, and exhibited in London 
in 1970. Photograph: Klaus Dietrich Zeutschel.
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The exhibition lasted from 7 to 19 September 1970, and was a great success 
for GDR foreign policy.57 There were 1067 visitors who signed a guest book, 
but a CoID report suspected that more people actually saw the show.58 Visitors 
nominated the tea china, glassware, and toys as their favorite objects on display. 
ey also commented on the high quality of GDR design and the sophistica-
tion of the exhibition system. Many agreed that there was much more to learn 
about the GDR and wanted to deepen relations with the country. Major design 
organizations in England proved receptive and invited the GDR delegation to 
talks.59 The nal ZfF report showed great satisfaction with the way the exhibi-
tion demonstrated East German capabilities in the eld of industrial design and 
concluded that this contributed tremendously to GDR diplomacy.60
Encounters of Foreign Design:  
The Tug-of-War over ICSID Membership
The adversarial nature of East and West German cultural diplomacy over in-
dustrial design also preoccupied the ICSID. Founded in 1957 out of several in-
dustrial design congresses, the ICSID was an organization dedicated to globally 
advancing and organizing the new professional eld of industrial design.61 Initial 
members included Denmark, the FRG, France, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, Swe-
den, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The ICSID quickly became 
the dominant body dening the profession, nding solutions to contemporary 
design problems, and setting standards for industrial design education. Its rst 
president, Peter Muller-Munk from the United States, called it “a ne display of 
transatlantic community and un-selsh professional co-operation.”62 According 
to his successor Sir Misha Black, oceholders were highly aware that as a nonpo-
litical professional organization it could play a part in bridging the bipolarity of 
the Cold War: “Those who will not associate politically are able to meet and talk 
at the ICSID Assemblies and Conferences.”63 This awareness translated into an 
inclusive member acquisition policy across the Iron Curtain.
ICSID’s eastward expansion emulated a pattern seen in several nongovern-
mental cultural organizations vying for the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tic, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) status in the 1960s. Nonaligned 
Yugoslavia became the rst socialist member of the ICSID in 1961, followed by 
the Soviet Union’s All-Union Scientic Research Institute of Industrial Design 
(VNIITE) as the rst Eastern Bloc country in 1965. The novelty of eastward 
expansion both encouraged Western members to protest on political and tech-
nical grounds while the Eastern Bloc members prepared for possible diplomatic 
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fallout and sabotage attempts. A particular concern for ICSID was that Eastern 
Bloc design councils were oen state institutions and not professional associa-
tions. Yuri Soloviev, the head of VNIITE, sent the ICSID executive board a 
long appraisal of the role of industrial design in socialist societies, explaining 
how the state centrally organized the profession.64 Despite some initial hesita-
tion on part of the ICSID board, the desire to grow from a transatlantic into a 
global organization won out over concerns about the nature of the new member 
societies. To enable national members in addition to professional associations to 
join the organization, the ICSID constitution was changed, eventually allowing 
most eastern European industrial design institutions to be admitted.65 The same 
applied to the ZfF when it requested membership at the Vienna Congress in 
1965.66 However, the existence of two Germanys complicated this request.
On 9 January 1965, Mia Seeger received a “strictly condential” letter from 
her Belgian colleague Josine des Cressonnières. The ICSID secretary general 
inquired whether Seeger had heard of the ZfF in Berlin, which had approached 
her about ICSID membership. Des Cressonnières did not know whether the 
ZfF was located in East or West Berlin and relied on her German friend for 
information.67 This rather innocuous letter initiated a two-and-a-half-year-long 
West German campaign to prevent the GDR from joining the ICSID.
A founding member, the West German RfF had acted as the sole representa-
tive of German interests in ICSID since 1957. With ICSID’s pending extension 
into the Eastern Bloc, the worlds of Cold War diplomacy and cultural politics 
collided.68 The campaign to isolate the GDR aligned with the Federal Republic’s 
Deutschlandpolitik and Cold War foreign policy of nonrecognition regarding 
the eastern part of Germany. The Hallstein Doctrine prescribed the severing of 
diplomatic relations with countries that extended diplomatic recognition to the 
GDR and armed the West German claim to sole representation (Alleinvertre-
tungsanspruch) for all of Germany in international organizations. The concern 
was that German-German interaction would become ocial if the ZfF were to 
gain ICSID membership. It would take place within an international organi-
zation that accepted representatives from diplomatically recognized countries, 
which would force West Germany to share German representation with East 
Germans. It was feared that this would open doors to increasing international 
integration in other contexts and eventually pave the way to recognition of the 
GDR as a sovereign state.69 It was thus important, western ocials argued, to 
shut this down. West German professional and academic organizations received 
recommendations of how to perpetuate the GDR’s international nonrecognition 
at international congresses from the West German Foreign Ministry (AA). For 
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instance, before any congress or meeting, professional organizations should en-
sure that the term “GDR” did not nd its way into the event program. Both East 
and West German participants should be listed simply with “Germany” as their 
country of origin.70 International organizations, the advice circular maintained, 
needed to be informed that the separate recognition of the GDR by name or, even 
worse, through independent membership would profoundly undermine desired 
intra-German cooperation on both the professional and the interpersonal level.
Mia Seeger’s successor as general secretary of the RfF, Fritz Gotthelf, inten-
sied the campaign to reject the East Germans aer the ICSID executive com-
mittee had passed the GDR’s application in February 1967 for conrmation by 
the General Assembly in Canada.71 He turned to the Executive Committee, 
explaining once more the delicate German political situation and the diplomatic 
importance of West Germany’s Alleinvertretungsanspruch, but to no avail. While 
the ICSID executives acknowledged the tenuous relations, they had neither the 
interest nor the power to challenge the Cold War status quo of German division. 
In July 1967, a few weeks before the Ottawa Congress, Gotthelf received a con-
dential letter from Des Cressonnières, stating that, aer careful consideration, 
the board had decided to grant East Germany full membership. Almost humor-
ously, she reported that “the Executive Committee has concluded that it was not 
possible to come to a decision, against all existing facts, about the re-unication 
of Germany!”72 Des Cressonnières ended by pointing to a precedent in which 
ICSID had already granted provisional membership to a design society from the 
People’s Republic of China and advised that it ought to extend the same to the 
East German ZfF. In face of this, Gotthelf could do little but accept the ICSID’s 
decision. Aer more than two years of string-pulling and backdoor diplomacy, 
he downplayed the importance of the matter in his response: “One Germany 
or two; we aren’t politicians.” Nevertheless, Gotthelf announced that West 
Germany would abstain from the vote on East Germany’s membership “in an 
elegant manner” by being absent from the Canada congress.73 This last-minute 
eort to save face could not conceal that the Federal Republic and its ICSID 
representatives had suered a signicant blow in the struggle for sole German 
representation in international bodies.
As the West Germans pushed forward their last intervention against GDR 
membership in the summer of 1967, tensions between the ZfF and the ICSID 
executive committee rose as well. From the very beginning, the GDR had taken 
a “no nonsense” approach to West German attempts to exclude them from this 
organization. Having encountered the Federal Republic’s Alleinvertretungs-
anspruch in other international bodies, the SED leadership suspected western 
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conspiracy behind the smallest diplomatic slip-up, and East Berlin became 
adamant about the correct representation of its country in name, ag, and na-
tional anthem.74 When the program for the ICSID Congress in Ottawa failed 
to identify the ZfF as an East German institution, Martin Kelm threatened to 
boycott the congress altogether.75 Des Cressonnières tried to calm the situation 
by assuring him that the membership nomination of the ZfF would be listed 
with the addendum “German Democratic Republic (GDR).”76
What might seem like an unnecessary escalation actually represented a fun-
damental building block of GDR foreign policy to gain formal recognition as a 
legitimate state from the West. Membership in nongovernmental international 
organizations moved the country closer to attaining a seat at the United Na-
tions. Moreover, as the tug-of-war over ICSID membership shows, both Germa-
nys knew that each of these incidents raised the stakes in the German-German 
Cold War over ideology, division, and international recognition. Eventually 
the ZfF gained membership at the Ottawa Congress, along with the institutes 
of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, leveling the diplomatic playing eld 
between eastern and western Europe for the industrial design profession.77 In 
fact, a decade later during the Soviet ICSID presidency under Soloviev, it would 
be the West Germans who complained that their country had been labeled in-
correctly as “German Federal Republic” and who would request a correction to 
the ocial and UN-recognized “Federal Republic of Germany” in all ICSID 
documents and papers.78 This may well have been a squabble over alphabetical 
order, since the German Democratic Republic would of course appear before the 
“German Federal Republic” in any listing of members.
That East German cultural diplomacy actually worked was proven by a sud-
den spike of western interest in GDR design aer its acceptance into the ICSID. 
West German diplomatic circles were not at all pleased with this outcome, but 
the industrial design community embraced it. Form, a leading design publica-
tion with signicant inuence on aesthetic discourse in the Federal Republic, 
welcomed this as a blessing in disguise as “the membership of the GDR in the 
ICSID might perhaps oer more opportunities for knowledge exchange.”79 An-
other article in Form recognized the leading East German design publication 
Form und Zweck “as an auxiliary bridge to compensate for the lack of personal 
exchange of experiences between East and West.”80 While other national design 
traditions were covered, the journal had largely ignored GDR design for the 
better part of a decade. This international validation redeemed GDR design 
in the eyes of West German designers. However, the East German turn toward 
modern idioms in the mid-1960s no doubt propelled this new interest as well.
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Nonetheless, the ICSID mediated exchange did not mean that German- 
German interaction became less confrontational aer 1967. In 1968, for instance, 
the BMWi supported the then-ailing RfF in building a design center in West 
Berlin, which remained politically contested territory. The GDR protested the 
center, which it understood to be a government institution, but of course had no 
power to block it. When in 1969 the RfF suggested an ICSID expert meeting at 
the new International Design Centre (IDZ) in West Berlin, Kelm declined the 
invitation from Des Cressonières.81 He reasoned that “the fact that recent o-
cial eorts on part of the West German Federal Republic to support industrial 
design are to be implemented of all places in West Berlin, that is outside the bor-
ders of the West German state, can only be interpreted as a political act against 
the GDR.”82 Des Cressonnières, in turn, told the RfF that she had foreseen such 
complications: “I must admit there is some truth in it. . . . I told Philip Rosenthal 
when I saw him: ‘Why choose Berlin? It will create diculties.’”83 The ICSID
executive board quickly found a diplomatic solution and asked Kelm to arrange a 
visit to the AiF in East Berlin for one of the days of the expert meeting, a request 
with which he happily complied.
Diplomacy of German Design:  
The German-German Basic Treaty
These events demonstrate that industrial designers from both Germanys could 
not interact easily as long as confrontation dominated Cold War foreign policy. 
In the absence of ocial political relations, professional exchanges were seen 
as part of the struggle for hearts and minds and therefore intrinsically tied to 
cultural diplomacy.84 As the general Cold War climate moved from deterrence 
to dialogue in the late 1960s, the situation slowly changed. Intertwined with 
détente processes in superpower relations was the ongoing issue of the national 
status of a divided country and its diplomatic recognition.
In a rst step, Chancellor Willy Brandt who had opened up West German 
diplomacy to negotiations with the Eastern Bloc in his prior position as minister 
of foreign aairs, intensied these eorts aer his election in 1969.85 Brandt’s 
Neue Ostpolitik revised the previous “policy of strength” that the conservative 
Adenauer and Erhard governments had followed.86 Adenauer especially had 
been convinced that West Germany’s rearmament, NATO membership, and 
economic cooperation in western Europe would inevitably lead the Federal 
Republic from strength to strength and, more importantly, safeguard it from 
communist political inuence and Soviet expansionism or military aggression. 
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Western integration, however, only deepened German division, and Adenauer 
knew this.87 By 1969, the formula “reunication through Western integration,” 
the idea that a politically and economically strong Federal Republic would “at-
tract” East Germany into reunication, had not worked. The Wall stood as a 
reminder of the limits of Adenauer’s strategy.
The construction of the Berlin Wall had taught Brandt, at the time the mayor 
of West Berlin, important lessons, among them the realization that “the West 
alone would not solve the problems of German division.”88 Negotiations over 
minor agreements, such as the 1963 special pass agreement for West Berliners to 
see East Berlin family for holidays impressed on him and his advisor Egon Bahr 
the importance of dialogue and exchange with the GDR. Improving relations 
with the Soviet Union was an important step toward German-German political 
rapprochement. In the absence of a peace treaty following the Second World War, 
postwar Germany’s former eastern territories had remained a point of contention 
in Soviet–West German relations. Under the auspices of Brandt’s policy of rap-
prochement, Bonn armed the eastern German border, the Oder-Neisse-Line, in 
1970 in the Moscow Treaty with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty with 
Poland, and renounced any claim to former German territories. The two treaties 
enabled the Federal Republic to continue to pursue an eastern foreign policy sep-
arately from their transatlantic partners, especially the United States. Egon Bahr 
summarized Bonn’s new strategy in the German Question: “Responsibility for 
Germany had to be borne by Germans themselves.”89
The ultimate goal of Brandt’s Ostpolitik was indeed to re-establish some kind 
of national context for the two German states.90 It was therefore crucial “to 
restore at least some aspects of the pre–World War II links between the two 
halves of Germany.”91 In this way, his policy diverged from superpower détente, 
because it sought to change the Cold War status quo. To realize the eastern pol-
icy regarding East Germany, Brandt needed greater independence from external 
powers “to create living conditions far better than those enforced by Cold War 
rivalries.”92 Aer twenty years, the Federal Republic thus gave up its foreign pol-
icy maxim of Alleinvertretungsanspruch, abolished the Hallstein Doctrine, and 
entered into ocial negotiations with the other part of Germany.93
The superpowers on both sides had mixed feelings about this German-German 
rapprochement. On the one hand, the Germans had to nd a way to coexist, but 
on the other hand, the possibility of German unication under the umbrella 
of the opposing system, or even a neutral Germany released from any binding 
partnerships, presented a scenario that neither side wanted. Washington was 
especially nervous about the degree of independence displayed by West German 
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diplomats and their willingness to cooperate with Soviet diplomats in order 
to achieve their political goals. Moscow was less nervous about the GDR lead-
ership, especially aer the transition from the obstinate Ulbricht to the more 
pliant Honecker, whom it kept on a short leash throughout the negotiation 
process.94 The Soviet Union supported the normalization of German-German 
relations as far as it t with the overall détente and economic policy interests of 
the Bloc leader.95 While the superpowers saw German division as a means for 
maintaining peace in Europe, Germans argued with increasing intensity that the 
division was a major cause of tension.96
As the Moscow and Warsaw treaties awaited ratication in the West German 
parliament, and the Four Power Agreement on Berlin had just been signed, di-
rect talks between East and West Germany commenced.97 Aer nalizing the 
Transit Accord and the Trac Treaty, which established regulations for the pas-
sage of West German citizens and goods through the GDR, negotiations about 
more substantial issues began in the summer of 1972: the national question, the 
absence of a peace treaty and the presence of the Four Powers, and the question 
of citizenship. Both sides signed the Basic Treaty that December aer curtailed 
negotiations le some of the issues unresolved. Over the next two decades, the 
Federal Republic would spend millions for the Transit Accord annually, which 
included visa charges and taris. Bonn would also pay more than DM 3.5 billion 
to free roughly 34,000 political prisoners and reunite approximately 250,000 
families divided by the Wall.98
West German willingness to pay enormous sums for the transit regulations 
highlights Bonn’s eorts to ameliorate interpersonal relations between the East 
and West German populations. It also demonstrated a new attitude toward the 
German Question by accepting the realities of the division.99 At the core of this 
policy lay the hope that increased interaction between East and West would 
reignite feelings of national unity, lead to the demise of the GDR, and end Ger-
man division.100 However, the SED completely controlled contacts between 
their population and the West: Visas required a complicated application process, 
packages and mail from the West were searched, and, as Stasi les later revealed, 
western visitors were monitored for the majority of their stay in the East. The 
Brandt government, on the one hand, attempted to reach an agreement that 
deregulated human interaction and limited institutional or ocial interference 
in order to break down the literal and gurative walls that the SED had erected 
between people who shared cultural and political roots. The Honecker govern-
ment, on the other hand, continued its approach to the German division via 
demarcation policies.101
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The specics of German-German cultural exchanges agreed upon in the 
Basic Treaty, namely the Cultural Accord (Kulturabkommen), provide an ex-
cellent window into the diplomatic eorts to “normalize” East-West relations 
on both sides. They also reveal West Germany’s long-term goal for Ostpolitik 
deregulating cultural exchange by allowing nonstate actors to initiate and con-
duct cultural events on the other side of the border.102 Beginning in 1974, the 
West German Permanent Representative Mission (StäV) in East Berlin, which 
the Federal Republic had set up instead of an embassy in the aermath of the 
Basic Treaty, functioned as a mediator for political issues, economic cooperation, 
and cultural contacts concerning both parts of Germany. Yet negotiations over 
the Kulturabkommen remained unresolved for twelve years.103 The initial ve 
rounds of talks between 1973 and 1975 brought no results because the GDR 
claimed ownership of cultural artifacts that the Federal Republic had included 
in a new cultural foundation.104 East Germany also contested the inclusion of 
West Berlin in the Kulturabkommen. Together, these issues brought delibera-
tions to a halt until 1982.105 As an interim solution, both Germanys agreed on the 
state-mediated cultural exchange to enable mutual visits of theater companies, 
choirs, and museum exhibitions.
The disagreements not only stemmed from the hasty and incomplete nego-
tiations over the Basic Treaty but also from the souring German-German re-
lations in the aermath of the 1975 Helsinki Accords. Suddenly, the GDR re-
versed its strategy from dialogue to delineation, as “internal problems increased 
under the inuence of détente” and GDR citizens, encouraged by the Helsinki 
human rights stipulations, began to reject the socialist system openly.106 Frus-
trated by the East German change of course, Bonn insisted on continuing the 
“policy of normalization.”107 Meanwhile, the interim solution of state-regulated 
cultural exchanges suited the GDR well. With the cultural accords in limbo, 
the SED maintained control over contacts between East and West and did not 
shy away from leveraging this power to complicate cultural exchange whenever 
Cold War tensions ared. The Federal Republic, alternately, participated in the 
state-mediated cultural exchanges because it saw them as an opportunity to re-
connect with the other Germany and to shape East German perceptions of the 
Federal Republic. Eventually, Honecker dropped East Berlin’s unresolved claims 
to artifacts to the bottom of the negotiation list in order to recommence talks 
in 1983. Aer twelve more rounds, negotiations successfully concluded with the 
signing of the Kulturabkommen on 6 May 1986.
West German public discontent with the Kulturabkommen certainly grew 
over the negotiation period. The most prominent critic of the treaty was Nobel 
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Prize–winning author and artist Günter Grass. In a newspaper interview with 
the Rheinischer Merkur, Grass criticized the diplomatic aspect of the agreement 
because it was negotiated as if the two Germanys were foreign territory to each 
other, like a treaty with France or Finland. He warned that the Federal Republic 
gave up the last piece of commonality between East and West and insisted that 
“the agreement should have been made on the basis of a shared culture and his-
tory.”108 The political and economic division had long been established, but the 
realm of culture had proven resistant to division, he maintained. The agreement, 
in Grass’s opinion, put survival of a shared German culture into question. Grass 
had previously approached the federal government with his concerns about the 
Kulturabkommen’s potentially damaging eects. As an alternative, he suggested 
a German-German national foundation to ensure the continuation of the Ger-
man Kulturnation.109
Such a solution .  .  . could contribute to the development of a new un-
derstanding of ‘nation,’ which would exclude reunication, but, on the 
other hand, could assist Germans in two states to nd a new, relaxed 
self-understanding. This would also preclude a renewed political power 
build-up in the center of Europe. Our neighbors in East and West needn’t 
fear such a development any more.110
Apart from his preference for this universalist, postfascist, and pacist vision 
for a German culture, Grass was concerned that the Kulturabkommen could 
negatively aect the arts and cultural economies: It would promote only what 
was ocially acceptable art in both German states, thus implicitly censoring 
artistic expression. Grass exclaimed that “everywhere where art, where literature, 
where painting is created, it is necessarily subversive, and it will thus be, perhaps 
even from both sides, be held back.”111 The Kulturabkommen, notwithstand-
ing its original intentions of deregulating German-German cultural exchange, 
could possibly become a tool for state censorship of the arts.
Despite Grass’s warnings, the Federal Republic pursued the Kulturabkom-
men to continue the normalization of German-German relations. Rather than 
heeding Grass’s concerns about the treaty’s meaning for the German national 
idea and cultural diversity, politicians in the Federal Republic valued its practical 
merits: They could hold the GDR leadership accountable to a signed treaty, but 
not to the loy idea of a unied Kulturnation.
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German-German State-Mediated Cultural 
Exchange and the Kulturabkommen
To a certain extent, Grass was right. The events that came out of the Kultur-
abkommen indeed centered on promoting cultural products that armed of-
cial policy and national narratives. Subversive modern art, such as the 1983 
postmodern artwork “Consumer’s Rest,” a re-appropriated and manipulated 
shopping cart with which West Berlin designer Frank Schreiner playfully cri-
tiqued consumer society, did not rank high on the West German priority list for 
German-German cultural exchange. Too much was at stake as well in the realm 
of economic culture and industrial design to employ humor, which is evident 
in the events surrounding the planning and execution of two industrial design 
exhibitions before and aer the signing of the Kulturabkommen: the FRG ex-
hibition Design—Thinking Ahead for Humanity in East Berlin (1984) and the 
Design in the GDR show in Stuttgart (1988). These exhibitions showcase the 
political strategies behind intra-German cultural exchanges, while illustrating 
the signicance of the Kulturabkommen as a cornerstone for a more self-deter-
mined Deutschlandpolitik.
The idea for the West German exhibition originated in 1983 against the back-
drop of deteriorating East-West relations during the Soviet-American Geneva 
talks about the American Pershing missiles in the Federal Republic.112 In this 
tense atmosphere, Bonn commissioned the RfF to assemble a West German in-
dustrial exhibition. The Federal Ministry for Intra-German Relations (BMB)113
and the BMWi jointly coordinated the planning eort so that the FRG gov-
ernment could pitch the project as part of the interim state-mediated cultural 
exchange.114 Emphasizing that it would contribute to peace in Europe, the west-
ern side made clear that holding the design exhibition within the same calendar 
year was of “political signicance.”115 Using every available channel, the Federal 
Republic impressed the event’s importance for German-German relations on 
the SED leadership. Minister for Economic Aairs Otto Graf Lambsdor even 
brought the exhibition pitch on a trip to the Leipzig trade fair in the spring of 
1984.116 Nine months aer Hans Otto Bräutigam, the head of the Permanent 
Representative Mission in East Berlin, had rst proposed the design exhibition 
to the GDR deputy foreign minister Kurt Nier, the project came to fruition. 
The exhibition ran for two weeks in December 1984 as the fourth project the 
Federal Republic sent as part of the state-mediated cultural exchange since 
1975.117 None of Bonn’s initiative had been coordinated with transatlantic part-
ners, signaling to the international community the German determination to 
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“insulate inter-German relations from the vicissitudes of relations between the 
superpowers.”118
Initially, the GDR hesitated to support the West German project. Yet aer 
a few weeks of deliberations, it swallowed the bait that the RfF had put in the 
exhibition proposal: a symposium that would convey “specialized technical and 
professional details and suggestions.”119 With the exhibition would come an op-
portunity to inspect West German industrial products and to learn about their 
aesthetic, structural, and technological qualities, without the risks and costs as-
sociated with industrial espionage. It was a welcome chance for East German 
figure 4.2. West Berlin artist Frank Schreiner 
designed “Consumer’s Rest” as a playful critique  
of consumerism in 1983. © DACS 2019.
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research and development to catch up to world standards, a preoccupation 
for the GDR.
With the exception of the venue, the preparations for Design—Thinking 
Ahead for Humanity went smoothly, and the exhibition opened on 3 December 
1984, in the International Trade Center in the heart of East Berlin. High-ranking 
East and West German politicians, representatives of GDR cultural organi-
zations, and the industrial designers from the RfF and the AiF attended the 
opening event.120 Even Wolfgang Schäuble, the chancellery chief of sta in the 
rst Helmut Kohl government, visited during his rst ocial trip to the GDR. 
During the opening speech, Martin Kelm highlighted the political signicance 
of German-German rapprochement at this moment: “We regard the fact that 
this exhibition takes place as a positive sign, particularly at a time when the inter-
national situation gives reason for serious concerns. . . . Even the best intentions 
and the best design achievements would make no sense for humanity if a nuclear 
inferno cannot be prevented.”121 Hans Otto Bräutigam of the Permanent Mis-
sion also commented on the international situation when he greeted the guests:
The Federal Government is determined to continue the path paved by the 
Basic Treaty and the Helsinki Accords. We want to extend cooperation 
and take advantage of every chance to improve relations. We do this con-
scious of our shared responsibility for peace and stability in Europe and 
in the interest of the people on both sides. Cultural activities such as this 
exhibition are the building blocks for good neighborly relations between 
the two German states.122 
Such expressions of “mini-détente” in German-German relations solidied the 
idea of their special role in maintaining East-West dialogue.123 Sharing concerns 
about becoming hostages of the superpower arms race with other non-nuclear 
nations in Europe oered a new vision for pan-German foreign policy: a Ger-
many unied for the universal values of peace and accord.
West Germany’s emphasis on interpersonal relations in the German-German 
rapprochement was expressed by the exhibition’s content. From its conception, 
it was intended to show design’s contribution to everyday life by means of se-
lected, progressive solutions.124 Humans and the social fabric, not the products 
themselves, stood at the center and provided the premise for “deepening mutual 
knowledge about cultural and social existence” in the two German states.125
High-prole guests, diplomatic speeches, and the awareness that this German- 
German display of harmony stood in stark contrast to the tense Second Cold 
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War beneted both sides in the diplomatic arena. The exhibition consciously 
continued the Federal Republic’s eorts with Neue Ostpolitik, to change the 
Cold War status quo and the push for direct interaction between the German 
populations.
Materially, the West German show was impressive. Nearly two hundred prod-
ucts, systems, and projects from more than a hundred businesses conveyed the 
evolution of industrial design in the Federal Republic. A historical section con-
textualized West German design in the Werkbund and the Bauhaus traditions 
of modern, functionalist aesthetics.126 Visitors quickly realized that the exhibi-
tion was not a sales show when they saw the lavish products displayed for home 
interiors. The luxury furniture company Interlübke sent its high-priced Duo-
Bed, while the furniture cooperative Wohnkultur displayed the top-selling, 
yet expensive, WK 470 furniture system, and Vitsoe showed an upholstery 
suite.127 None of the East German visitors could aord such pricey furniture 
nor could most West Germans. Rather, the exhibition clearly showcased the 
perks of the Western lifestyle with the amenities of high-end designer interiors 
and high-technology standards for appliances and tools. In addition to displays 
figure 4.3. A friendly encounter between RfF president Philip Rosenthal (le) 
and AiF director Martin Kelm (second from le) at the second opening of the West 
German industrial exhibition Design—Thinking Ahead for Humanity in Leipzig, 1985. 
Photograph: Waltraud Grubitzsch.
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of auence, the descriptions accompanying the interior designs provoked East 
German political cadres with a critique of the GDR surveillance society. One 
read, for example, “In a mass society and an increasingly depersonalized environ-
ment, the personal apartment remains one of the few areas where one can realize 
individual ideas.”128 The home, the text suggested to GDR audiences, oered a 
space for personal freedom and self-expression, an escape from the state’s control 
over its citizens. Such provocations aected cultural exchanges during the show’s 
two-week run.
The initial impression of a close-knit inter-German relationship created by 
the exhibition documents’ emphasis on “peace in Europe” and “German-Ger-
man understanding” is quickly nuanced by materials from the East German 
archives. Unbeknownst to the guests from the Federal Republic, the SED closely 
monitored and manipulated the exhibition. Event advertisement posters pro-
vided by the RfF were only put up in obscure places, if at all.129 The GDR lead-
ership hoped to keep the number of visitors to a minimum, yet thanks to word 
of mouth, their numbers rose by the day.130 In a press release, the Permanent 
Mission celebrated the fact that 22,000 people had seen the show during its rst 
week. The crowd’s youth was noticed; it revealed that the SED populated the 
West German product show with chosen party-loyal groups, trusted young pro-
fessionals, and design students.131 Only about two hundred visitors were “aver-
age” GDR citizens on the rst day of Design—Thinking Ahead for Humanity.132
In addition to the at best insucient exhibition promotion, the AiF purposely 
slowed down the admission into the venue. Each day during opening hours, 
a queue of 150–200 curious East Germans stood in front of the International 
Trade Center. Ocials from the FRG’s Permanent Mission stopped by several 
times and asked the AiF sta to open more registers to decrease the waiting 
time. The eastern side withstood the pressure, claimed to have been bullied, 
and complained that Bonn connected political protability to attendance.133
The West Germans decided to ignore this provocation. Overall, 66,000 people 
visited the exhibition in eighteen days, and the RfF sold every one of the 40,000 
available catalogs.
Meanwhile, the AiF feared that the displays of Western auence might po-
tentially lead to open critique of socialism and its economic shortcomings. Two 
days before the industrial exhibition opened, it outright conscated a number of 
West German design books that the RfF provided in the exhibition.134 However, 
aer the books were removed, visitors simply turned to the information and 
technical descriptions provided in the exhibition texts.135 Moreover, the East 
German exhibition personnel prevented contact between East German visitors 
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and the RfF sta on hand to answer visitors’ questions.136 As a countermeasure, 
the AiF outtted its own sta with a twenty-page disinformation script to en-
able them to discredit western achievements in conversation with exhibition 
visitors. Emphasizing the potential negative eects of market capitalism and 
protmaking on the social fabric of a country, the text characterized industrial 
design and its institutions in the Federal Republic as “ineective.”137
However, the feared consumer protest failed to materialize. The internal AiF 
event report described visitors’ reactions as “condent and competent-critical 
with specialized design interest.”138 It is possible that the sta did not record 
visitors’ disgruntlement accurately so as to give the impression that they had the 
situation under control. Certainly, earlier design shows had attracted critical, 
if knowledgeable, audiences in the GDR that usually did not hold back with 
critique. With a public relations asco successfully averted, the SED leadership 
condently completed the negotiations over the German-German Kulturab-
kommen in 1986 without further complications. Once the West German event 
had ended, the GDR design institution looked forward to sending an exhibition 
to the West in accordance with the principle of reciprocity.
Yet it would take more than three years for the GDR industrial design show 
to nally be sent to West Germany in May 1988. The fact that the AiF, the For-
eign Ministry, the DIA, the collectivized industry, and design schools all collab-
orated on the Design in the GDR exhibition illustrates the complex interweaving 
of industry, industrial design, trade, and cultural foreign policy. However, the 
extent of the eort did not match the prestige of the resulting industrial exhibi-
tion. One of the regional design institutions in the West, the Design Center in 
Stuttgart, hosted the exhibition in its representative nineteenth-century build-
ing, far from Bonn. To ensure the political and economic success of the event, 
the SED leadership demanded elaborate advertising strategies.139 But the West 
German government quickly thwarted these eorts. When the time came to 
print the catalog, the GDR Permanent Mission in Bonn asked for a short greet-
ing from the chief of sta of the Federal Chancellery to parallel high-ranking 
GDR politicians’ participation in the 1984 exhibition.140 To their great astonish-
ment, Bonn denied the request, claiming that: “These kinds of forewords were 
common during the period of rare, individual state-mediated cultural projects in 
prior years. In the light of the extensive project list agreed upon aer the signing 
of the Kulturabkommen, this kind of high-level preface should not generally 
be planned on; they should be reserved for especially high-ranking projects.”141
Diplomatic gestures such as an ocial greeting would only further legitimize 
the GDR, which Bonn wanted to prevent. With the signing of the cultural 
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agreement in 1986, the Federal Republic had reached its goal of securing Ger-
man-German exchanges on a nongovernmental level, and this exhibition pre-
sented the perfect opportunity to put this achievement into practice. If the East 
had not noticed the political eects of the Kulturabkommen at the time, they 
surely realized them in 1988.
A loss of diplomatic signicance in conjunction with the provincial exhibi-
tion location demoted the GDR design show from a national event of political 
importance to a regional event of purely economic interest. Only one West Ger-
man regional politician attended the opening event, the RfF did not even pay 
an ocial visit. The FRG design journal Form covered the exhibition only in 
an eight-line news item that stated matter-of-factly that 170 products from the 
GDR were on display in Stuttgart’s design center between 26 May and 31 July 
1988, providing broader historical as well as recent insights into GDR design 
development.142
Meanwhile, the AiF tried to make the best of the situation. The East Ger-
man design journal Form und Zweck dedicated an entire page to the exhibition. 
Exaggerating the importance of the Stuttgart Design Center, it described the 
challenges of putting together the exposition in such a “lavish” environment. 
“We could not simply present products with ‘Design in der DDR’ because it was 
important to depict the way of living and culture, to convey knowledge about 
the country, its economic potential, and its people,” the author explained.143 In 
this regard, the GDR project emulated the West German show of 1984—the 
event aimed at creating a dialogue and deepening mutual understanding, while 
not shying away from “critical comparison.”144 But the result was quite dierent. 
Over the exhibit’s long run, it had just 18,000 visitors. According to the Form 
und Zweck article, West German visitors perceived GDR design as high quality 
in its usefulness and as “aesthetically respectable without attempting to circum-
vent social responsibility with spectacular pieces.”145 Although not exactly a rave 
review, the design council sta seemed satised with having proven the GDR’s 
prowess as an export nation.
Martin Kelm and Michael Blank, since 1987 the director of the newly es-
tablished GDR Design Center in East Berlin, visited the RfF that summer. At 
this occasion, Blank talked about industrial design development in German 
socialism, mentioning the showcase specically, with the editor of the RfF jour-
nal Design Report. In this conversation, he reached far back to Horst Michel’s 
humble beginnings in Weimar during the occupation years to claim a long tra-
dition and continuity in functionalist East German design aesthetics. To the 
learned observer, the claim just did not match the reality of the hard-fought 
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battles against functionally unnecessary embellishments that socialist realism 
had bred throughout the 1950s. This was clearly an exercise in emphasizing com-
mon ground with the West German host for economic reasons. Blank admitted 
that some prototypes had been placed in the exhibition to provide stimulation 
for trade but simultaneously dismissed the notion that the showcase had been 
conceptualized as a trade fair with a marketing strategy.146 “We deliberately 
changed the title [from Design om the GDR to Design in the GDR] to show 
how it works here, what we do and how,” he assured the Design Report editor. 
When the conversation turned to future exchange projects with the mention 
of cooperation opportunities in Berlin, Blank quickly reined in the interviewer 
by invoking Berlin’s contested status and reminded him that—from East Ger-
many’s perspective—the RfF represented West Germany, but not West Berlin. 
Cold War politics clearly remained a limiting element in exchanges between the 
RfF and the AiF until the last days of German division.
Later in 1988, the West German liaison to the GDR Permanent Mission in 
Bonn summarized the lessons learned from the German-German cultural ex-
change. Her memo stated that there had been many possibilities for cultural 
contacts and exchanges with persons and institutions in the GDR, especially 
since there was no language barrier and plenty of shared traditions. However, 
“Cooperation in the classical sense was very rare, because the GDR avoids ‘the 
all-German’ (Gesamtdeutsches).”147 It was dicult for the GDR to uphold its 
policy of delineation aer the agreed-upon cooperation in the Basic Treaty and 
the Kulturabkommen. From the western perspective relations with the East im-
proved over time, whereas the GDR preferred cultural cooperation with coun-
tries of the Eastern Bloc precisely for reasons of demarcation. Nevertheless, the 
piecemeal eort to improve German-German relations via cultural cooperation 
paid o for both sides.
While Bonn aborted the Hallstein Doctrine as the international climate 
shied from confrontation to détente, it capitalized on this moment to free itself 
from superpower politics by creating a sustainable German-German dialogue. 
Of course, the four-power agreements still decided the fate of Germany on a 
diplomatic level, but the German-German policy of rapprochement clearly im-
proved and facilitated contacts between the East and West on an individual and 
organizational level. By pushing for nongovernmental relations between East 
and West Germans, especially in the realm of everyday culture, Bonn achieved 
its long-term goal of loosening the SED’s grip on every aspect of East German 
social and cultural life. The shared cultural heritage, especially in the case of 
industrial design, brought each Germany closer to the quotidian reality on the 
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other side of the border. What is more, the FRG thus gave the GDR the chance 
to “function as an actor on the world stage,” despite its lack of autonomy from 
the Soviet Union.148 The Bonn–East Berlin negotiations were part and parcel of 
the GDR’s transition from pariah to internationally recognized state. In the pro-
cess, the GDR successfully broke the West German Alleinvertretungsanspruch. 
Its claim to membership among modern nations, expressed in and communi-
cated through its economic culture, received political legitimization at last.
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Conservative Modernity
The Reception of Functionalism in German Living Rooms
H abitation (Wohnen) is a part of culture,” Hans Paul Barhdt expounded in his sociological analysis of the processes at work in the German postwar home. His 1961 book became a seminal sociologi-
cal text on German urbanization and the tensions between public and private 
spaces.1 “A space, an apartment, is comfortable if it provides a cozy-familiar 
frame to everyday functions, including work—yet not all kinds of work—in a 
way that these functions not only don’t interfere with each other, but rather har-
monize with each other. This harmony is a part of culture.”2 With his work Bar-
hdt expanded the West German functionalist debate about domestic culture, 
aesthetics, and taste. Industrial designers and architects had previously limited 
functionalism to a specic aesthetic of “good design,” which, religiously imple-
mented, expressed support for politically legitimizing national brand narratives. 
Barhdt reinterpreted functionalism as practicality, the way in which the home 
and the things in it aligned with the needs of its inhabitants and their everyday 
routines. His denition included the actual practices involved in the consump-
tion of space, both in terms of the acquisition of objects and their usage. This 
perspective subordinates material culture to human needs, a position similar to 
Adorno’s call for an extended functionalism.3
The sociological approach to material possessions diverges from postwar 
German design discourse that had put form and political meaning above the 
necessities of everyday life. As such this point of view oers a dierent per-
spective on the complex history of functionalism in Germany and provides an 
opportunity to look at its implementation in German homes. It adds the social 
element that was lacking in West German design debates, an aspect that dif-
fered between the Federal Republic and the GDR, where it had remained part 
of the East German industrial design discourse from the states’ foundation. 
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What remained unclear, however, was how, or whether at all, socialist and capi-
talist modes of habitation diered practically. This chapter seeks to understand 
how pervasive the German postwar discourse on functionalism was in German 
everyday life and what elements of the good design education successfully en-
tered consumer practices.
By the 1970s both German states had arrived at functionalist aesthetics as 
a marker of modern living standards. This raises the question of whether the 
two German states also shared one vision of modernity. Heretofore, historians 
of the GDR and other Eastern Bloc countries have put forward the notion of 
“socialist modernity,”4 arguing that the Eastern Bloc shared with capitalist mo-
dernity progressive forces such as secularization and industrialization, yet that 
socialism had “a special dynamism” in its scientic approach used to legitimize 
political action and a “cult of technology and a mania for remaking the world” 
in its vision for a socialist way of life.5 This emphasis implies that GDR designers 
and politicians, producers, and consumers had inherently dierent ideas about 
industrial modernity than their western cousins.
While the notion of a socialist path to modernity is certainly useful, it has 
its limitations when discussing the two postwar German states. In fact, strong 
similarities existed between the economic cultures in East and West in the later 
decades of the Cold War, which leads to the conclusion that the earlier diverging 
concepts of modernity were fueled by the ideological fervor of the GDR’s early 
days under Stalinist inuence, traces of which persisted into the 1960s. In the long 
run, however, the German-German bond that endured despite and because of the 
eastern demarcation eorts, the reexes that the ever-present alternative on the 
other side of the border triggered, led to reective policymaking and institution 
building.6 Approaching this topic from the vantage point of the welfare state, 
specically housing policy, oers an exciting opportunity to move beyond dis-
course on postwar German design that had put form and political meaning above 
the necessities of everyday life. The existence of a German socialist state helped 
raise the prole of social policy during the Adenauer years and made progress in 
housing provision and economic security a foundational issue in debates about 
human dignity and citizenship in the early Federal Republic. Similarly, West 
Germany’s social market economy and its conservative welfare state, centered 
on middle-class dreams of homeownership and the male bread-winner model, 
challenged the GDR leadership to move away from radical socialist ideas and to 
inch toward a model that Konrad Jarausch has labelled a “welfare dictatorship.”7
As we have seen, East and West German economic cultures were not dramat-
ically dierent in terms of expectations for living standards, both expressed in 
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political debate and production culture. However, at the level of execution, the 
availability and the material quality of furniture and housing remained a chal-
lenge for the GDR’s economic system throughout the Cold War, as thousands 
of complaint letters and comments in exhibition guestbooks show. The East 
German population expected more, especially aer the Fih Party Congress 
in 1958, when the GDR leadership pitted East German economic performance 
against the West German benchmark. At the same time, social stratication in 
West German capitalist society limited the opportunities for participation in 
progressive lifestyles for those in the low-income brackets.
These limitations, in turn, raise questions about the extent to which the of-
cially promoted political, social, and cultural norms and values embodied in 
material culture and interior design were able to transcend the divide between 
public and private in the two German states. This chapter examines these ques-
tions through consumer education and consumption practices. The narrativity 
of material culture can explain consumer choices based on fashions, personal 
tastes, and projections of self-image. No matter if it is furnished sparsely modern, 
retro nostalgic, cozy romantic, or expensive luxurious, a home becomes part of a 
life story. Accordingly, consumers purchase the material representation of values 
with which they identify.8 The act of consumption, then, symbolizes the popu-
lation’s acceptance or rejection of foundational values inscribed in the national 
brand and the economic culture. In this way, consumers became an integral part 
to the success or failure of ocial aesthetics in interior design in East and West 
Germany. But it is important to go beyond consumption statistics to evaluate 
the relative success of functionalist rhetoric. What did prescriptive visions of 
domestic modernity mean for the populations’ everyday life? How successful 
were these interjections of public policy into private homes, and how did the 
individual mitigate them?
Despite the emphasis on modernization and progress on both sides of the bor-
der, what emerged in the practices of domestication and privatization, curiously, 
is a pan-German conservative modernity, a muted rationalism that intertwined 
progressive cultural policy with conservative social policy. The term conservative 
modernity warrants further explanation. It links to political conservatism, which 
revolves around ideas of nationhood that put family at the center of political life. 
These concerns form the basis for a commitment to safeguarding the limits of 
acceptable expression of national belonging.9 Conservatives themselves have ex-
plained that their philosophy is not opposed to change, but is a cautious “break” 
to slow down change, to reform gradually and not to revolutionize.10 Conserva-
tive modernism shares certain concerns and values with political conservatism 
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and has been discussed as a phenomenon that emerged rst in the early 20th 
century as a political reaction to cultural liberalization.11 The term was also used 
in architecture discourse in the interwar years and resurfaced during the post-
war reconstruction period. Recovering polemics from the 1930s, church architect 
and moderate modernist Rudolf Schwarz employed the term during the 1953 
Bauhaus Debate in West Germany to express “his rejection of any kind of avant-
garde.”12 Aer losing the argument to functionalists Hans Schwippert and Egon 
Eiermann, he repeatedly took a stance against “monocultures” of glass facades 
and cubic architecture. A similar conservative resistance to design monocultures 
was reected in the consumer behavior of most East and West Germans. Partial 
integration and “incorrect” appropriation of those modern idioms that the two 
German states promoted at dierent points over forty years—be it functionalist 
modernism, socialist synthetic modernism based on functional product designs, 
or Adorno’s extended functionalism—resulted in a conservative modernism. 
The intertwining of cultural and economic modernization with, in essence, 
conservative social policy was another aspect that contributed to an economic 
culture shared by populations on both sides of the border.
Leading by Example: The Visual Experience of Wohnkultur
Implementation of modernization in everyday life happened only gradually for 
a host of reasons. Social patterns of tradition, the inability of the state—de-
spite growing welfare states—to enable everybody to participate in a modernity 
that sought a complete break with the past, the authoritative notion that there 
was only one right way to get to this modernity, and the connection of its ful-
llment to competing ideas about national identity or brand narratives all pre-
sented hurdles. These parallel challenges came clearly to the fore in state-guided 
consumer education, political attempts at integrating the population into the 
nation’s cultural-economic aspirations via moderate, rational, and “correct” 
consumption.13
Home ownership quickly became an important issue in bombed-out and 
refugee-crowded urban areas in the West and was encouraged by local admin-
istrations. Under the Adenauer governments, a conservative consensus viewed 
private property and state welfare as the basis of social security.14 The exhibition 
catalog for one of the rst postwar interior design exhibitions How to Dwell? 
in Stuttgart in 1949 acknowledged popular ambitions of home ownership: “A 
house for the family is the dream of many. Rightfully so! A people that culti-
vates domestic culture does not give up on itself.”15 However, for the time being, 
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the catalog posited that Germans had to content themselves with smaller apart-
ments and simpler, tting furniture. “The occurring changes require completely 
dierent things. . . . The small apartment is not transitional, it is constant.”16 In-
deed, the First Housing Law of 1950, describes West German humble beginnings 
with the so-called small apartment model of 32 to 65 square meters.17 Between 
1950 and 1952, 70 percent of all new-built housing was public housing funded by 
the state with subsidies or interest-free loans to alleviate the shortage of capital. 
Private investors received tax cuts and credits in exchange for accepting rent re-
strictions and an income-dened tenant community. This housing policy aimed 
at the social integration of a starkly stratied postwar West German society by 
providing aordable apartments for all, including millions of refugees and ex-
pellees.18 While rental property development had clear priority during the early 
years with an estimated housing decit of 4.5 million apartments, private home 
ownership received equal state support.19 Meanwhile, the right to housing was 
not inscribed in the West German constitution, and home ownership remained 
a distant dream for many.
The GDR faced similarly challenging circumstances. Initial experiments 
in communal housing and shared spaces faltered in the face of what East Ger-
man authors also depicted as a “natural” longing for a private apartment and 
family life without subletters and an army of children.20 In 1952, the prestige 
construction project Stalinallee in Berlin promised East Germans family ats 
with lush amenities, including elevators, modern built-in cupboards, and sepa-
rate bathrooms. Although about 70 percent of the materials for the rst stage 
of the project had been salvaged from the debris of bombed houses, the lavish 
architectural style proved too expensive to become the standard blueprint for 
GDR public housing.
The hardships of the postwar housing situation engendered popular nostalgia 
for a comfortable past. In an eort to make their new apartments feel like home, 
many West Germans acquired furnishings that reminded them of better times, 
much to the disdain of the network of industrial designers, producers, and pol-
iticians who had invested in the national aesthetic. Consumer choices, guided 
by sentimentality rather than the actual limitations of the postwar situation, 
only conrmed the Werkbund’s conviction that public consumption ought to 
be guided. The liberalization of choice in the climate of incipient economic re-
covery only exacerbated the problem, which the Federal Republic shared with 
its European neighbors.21 The RfF design council promptly nominated itself to 
supervise this liberalization of choice. During the parliamentary hearings about 
the council’s rationale in 1952, the Werkbund laid out the elitist philosophy for 
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the RfF: “The audience has neither good nor bad taste. Its taste always refers to 
that of the powerful, who shape the Zeitgeist, the meaning of life, and mankind’s 
ambitions and illusions.”22 Such a top-down approach not only ran contrary to 
West Germany’s sociopolitical goals of democratization and liberalization in all 
areas of cultural, economic, and public life, but it also intentionally capitalized 
on the principle of pecuniary emulation, canons of taste in modern stratied 
society, and status consumption.23
Similarly, but with a dierent ideological impetus, Horst Michel and the 
Weimar Institute organized several kitsch exhibitions to educate the broader 
public through comparison with well and badly designed products.24 Michel’s 
understanding of good design was expressed in the same design maxims as the 
Werkbund: durable and honest materials, the avoidance of modishness, and pre-
tension of value appreciation via “unauthentic” or embellished surfaces. When 
the regime eventually made a step toward a comprehensive housing policy in 
the 1960s, people brought their old furniture into new modern housing, which 
frustrated reformers.
In the 1960s, the Soviet Union had solved a comparable situation with the 
so-called everyday (byt) campaigns. The eradication of petit-bourgeois furni-
ture as “vestiges of the capitalist past hindering the development of late social-
ism” became one of the central aims of Khrushchev’s rationalizing reforms. Byt 
reformers distributed household advice manuals which encouraged behaviors 
that would conform with socialist ontology through taste education. Stalin-
ist excess could be adequately contained through this disciplining regime of 
taste. Manuals provided do-it-yourself advice about how to alter the vestiges of 
petit-bourgeois living to conform to the reformist principles of the leveled do-
mestic landscape. Chopping o the backs of divans and lowering bed frames or 
disposing completely of such bourgeois furniture were among the recommended 
measures to guarantee the “horizontality” of the home.25
There is no evidence of such campaign measures in the interior design advice 
literature of the GDR. A possible reason might have been the extreme pressure 
on the SED to uphold the image of a ourishing economy that could provide for 
its population, so it instead addressed the problem of outdated interior design 
choices with the 1964 reform of the furniture industry. But producing modern 
furniture did not mean that consumers would buy it. Actively shaping consumer 
taste and inuencing decision-making remained the only means to improve fu-
ture consumption.
It is noteworthy that both Germanys denied that the general public had good 
taste and therefore elevated design professionals to arbiters of beauty. This elitist 
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worldview and the activities that derived from it expressed what can be called 
“taste paternalism,” a term that encapsulates the missionary zeal with which 
reformers took up their self-assigned task of enlightening the population about 
aesthetic principles. “Show and tell” became a popular method to generate 
public understanding of their respective modern domestic cultures in the two 
German states. The Werkbund and the ZfF, each in cooperation with regional 
administration and industry, put together a range of activities that brought their 
message to the people. They targeted all age groups to ensure the education of 
present and future consumers to buy the “right” products that supported the 
construction of socialist and capitalist society. Hands-on taste education, a form 
of consumer education that relies on clear distinctions between good and bad 
design, became the logical next step in both Germanys.
In 1954, the Werkbund initiated a program of material culture education in 
West Berlin’s secondary schools that eventually spread to other federal states.26
To provide teachers with materials for demonstration, the Berliners invented 
so-called Werkbund boxes (Werkbundkisten), which they lled with exemplary 
objects for the students to see, touch, and utilize. The objects were arranged in 
the boxes according to their material, function, utility, technology, shape, and 
color. Each box had a dierent thematic focus—“the work space,” “kitchen ap-
pliances,” and “the set table.” Oen, they contained designs of Werkbund mem-
bers Heinrich Löelhardt and Wilhelm Wagenfeld, and those of rms close to 
the association, such as Zwiesel glass, Arzberg china, and Carl Pott cutlery.27
Some of the boxes, like the ones that focused on table settings, encouraged stu-
dents to utilize them in simulations of family meals, reproducing conservative 
social norms of family and domesticity.28 Growing incomes and more leisure 
time, the result of the economic miracle, made youth vulnerable to the seduc-
tion of the developing consumer society, the Werkbund feared. The objective of 
this program was to sensitize teenagers to the design of everyday objects and to 
enhance their critical abilities vis-à-vis the world of consumer products.29
Aer the social critique of functionalism by the 1968 movements, the Werk-
bundkisten initiative began to lose momentum in the early 1970s. One federal 
state aer another ended the program amid the general climate of antiauthori-
tarianism and youth protest. A nal report of the Werkbund in Lower Saxony 
stated in 1970 that the program had become counterproductive: “The youth’s 
skepticism toward things that they perceive as representations of the establish-
ment lead to a loss of their binding character or even to an urge to ght them.”30
In the GDR students’ education about the material environment had a com-
pletely dierent point of departure. Aer the secondary school reforms of 1958, 
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the curriculum required polytechnical education and industrial apprentice-
ships.31 The underlying objectives of this program were similar to the Bitterfelder 
Weg in acquainting school students with the means of production in connection 
with the cultural value of objects.32 A byproduct of polytechnical training in 
schools was a preparation for adult life in the GDR economy of scarcity, where 
do-it-yourself became an important and clandestinely state-supported strategy to 
ll the gaps of supply shortages.33 It also aimed at introducing university-bound 
students to the everyday experiences of workers, familiarizing them with the 
social foundations of the German socialist state. In the West, professional in-
ternships became increasingly common in later decades, but here the goal lay in 
helping young people choose their future vocations.
To educate the adult population that possessed actual buying power, both 
Germanys developed an interior design counseling system.34 In West Germany, 
the elevation of living standards developed alongside public housing policy. 
So-called Wohnberatungen sprang up around the Federal Republic. The rst 
Wohnberatung set to work Mannheim in 1953.35 The “Second Housing and 
Family Home Law,” which abolished some of the conditions for generous 
state-supported mortgage systems and tax cuts in 1956, shied focus from rent-
ing to private home ownership.36 The eect of this housing policy liberalization 
was further social stratication that disadvantaged lower income groups; in fact, 
by 1960 working-class families were disproportionally represented in emergency 
accommodations.37 The newly introduced term “family home” encapsulates the 
conservative foundation on which West German society and its growing welfare 
state would continue to evolve, an anti-collectivism centered on private property. 
Home ownership never reached the same level as in other European countries: 
by the 1990s West Germany’s 43.1 percent looked unimpressive when compared 
to 81 percent in Ireland, 78 percent in Spain, and 68 percent in Great Britain. 
Nevertheless, with 2.3 millions new-built homes and 600,000 rental properties 
converted to private ownership by 1994, the Federal Republic’s policy has been 
noted as a success because it expanded the circle of home owners to lower in-
come groups.38
By 1972, sixteen Wohnberatungsstellen, a number of them Werkbund-aliated, 
received subsidies from the Ministry for Housing and municipalities across the 
republic.39 The federal government expected interior design counseling that 
connected furnishing to the conservative consensus around private homeown-
ership and technocratic ideas about social progress. The West German Wohn-
beratungen tied this message to restrictive taste regimes in domestic culture 
by impressing the functional aesthetic of “good design” on the population.40
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Clients received advice from interior decorators who used samples ranging from 
wallpaper over furniture to tea sets to help them nd space-saving solutions for 
their home. Some of the Wohnberatungen even presented life-sized idealized 
apartment settings. This involvement in all areas of the material environment 
epitomizes the Werkbund’s paternalistic claim that through taste and consumer 
education they could regulate the way in which the population furnished its 
homes.41 In the end, the interior design counseling did not remain untouched 
by the changes brought about by the protest movements of the late 1960s. It 
gradually had to move away from “the taste of an elite of sensitive esthetes” but 
nonetheless remained linked to their political and economic interests.42
Wohnberatung was also a byproduct of socialist economic reforms, standard-
ization, and concentration in the GDR. It was a way to achieve greater transpar-
ency in the retail sector and thus facilitate better planning. With a change of 
economic orientation from heavy industry toward consumer good production 
under Ulbricht’s NES, furniture retail morphed from barely meeting the most 
basic needs of the population to a more service-oriented industry. For example, 
the Wohnberatung in Karl-Marx-Stadt, Ulbricht’s model socialist industrial city, 
joined the regional retail organization in 1964.43 Just like their western counter-
parts, interior decorators advised customers with the help of samples, product 
catalogs, and mini-exhibitions that promoted ideologically correct furniture 
and advertised new synthetic ersatz materials, such as Melafol. Within the con-
straints of the planned economy, the mission of the Wohnberatung was to create 
domestic environments that enabled and supported new experiences as well as 
ignited the population’s joie de vivre.44 Nevertheless, the personal comfort of 
the home came second to overall economic goals. Wohnberatung belonged to 
an entire institutionalized system that “‘trained’ consumers to ‘want’ what the 
government decided that they ‘needed.’”45
Despite, or even because of, the failure of design councils and intellectuals to 
develop a terminology that could give East and West German domestic culture 
a profound sociocultural meaning, the market for interior design publications 
boomed by the mid-1960s. This medium communicated trends, new ideas, and 
tastes through images, allowing citizens to see how one should live in modern 
postwar Germany. In a survey conducted in 1962 and 1963 in Cologne and its 
suburbs, sociologist Alphons Silbermann found that among the design interested 
Cologne inhabitants with basic schooling, 39 percent read articles on furnish-
ings and living spaces. Among those with a secondary education (Gymnasium), 
this number increased to 69 percent.46 Readers usually referred to special inte-
rior design magazines, the daily press, or lifestyle magazines for information on 
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interior design.47 Consequently, the media catered to a broad audience ranging 
from experts to the general interest readers. The West German design magazine 
Form moved gradually toward a specialized and professional audience. Along 
with this specialized audience came increasingly specialized debates, such as the 
critique of functionalism in the late 1960s. Earlier, such debates had taken place 
exclusively in the Werkbund newspaper Werk und Zeit (Work and Time), mostly 
read by its own membership. Form, however, was available at newsstands across 
the country and even in the GDR, where design professionals used it to stay 
informed about the developments in the West.48 In contrast, the East German 
design council’s specialized industrial design journal Form und Zweck became a 
forum for institute employees and design professionals to show the connection 
between politics, ideology, and industrial design but did not provide advice on 
how Germans should furnish their homes.49 The debates remained largely scien-
tic and ideological, without any real application to everyday living conditions 
and practices.
Interior design magazines, alternately, developed a broad popular appeal. 
Since 1957, the East German magazine Kultur im Heim reported on the domes-
tication of socialism and its eect on the New Man. It has been described as part 
of the eort to implement “a rational ‘sensible’ modernity in domestic culture.”50 
The editors put great emphasis on images for presenting new designs, and the 
photographs usually showed arranged room settings, though most of them taken 
from company or fair displays. The logic behind orchestrated displays, rather 
than depicting single pieces of furniture, was to elicit emotional reactions from 
readers.51 Such settings demonstrated a cohesive socialist domestic culture in 
contexts that the population could easily transfer to their homes.52
The practice of arranging settings also profoundly shaped an entire genera-
tion of interior designers in the Federal Republic who knew how to nd the best 
light, fashionable color combinations, and cutting-edge designs. One of them, 
Rolf Heide, oversaw an advice section that responded to reader questions in Bri-
gitte, Germany’s most successful women’s magazine. His designs oered solu-
tions to real world problems, such as how to combine antique with new furni-
ture or cheap furniture with collector’s items. This column’s success inspired the 
Hamburg publishing house Gruner and Jahr to publish Schöner Wohnen (Better 
Dwelling) in 1960, the rst and most successful magazine to exclusively focus on 
the domestic environment.53 Like Kultur im Heim, Schöner Wohnen used ideal-
ized settings to inuence German tastes. Aer its successful rst issue in 1960, 
its readership quickly grew to two million.54 With pictures of the newest trends 
in furniture design, color palettes, and room arrangements, Schöner Wohnen 
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brought interior design to the masses in an eort to promote aesthetically cohe-
sive living environments. Studio photographs lled the pages of the magazine, 
an art form in and of itself, as the founding editor-in-chief Josef Kremerkothen 
noted: “Small rooms needn’t look cramped, improvisation needn’t seem primi-
tive—they had to appear lively . . . , light had to create atmosphere . . . , colors had 
to be nely matched with materials.”55 Heide eventually joined Schöner Wohnen 
where he created idealized room arrangements and continued to exert tremen-
dous inuence over shaping the population’s interior design taste.
figure 5.1. Cover of the East German interior design 
journal Kultur im Heim 3/1966 showing the furniture 
suite “Leipzig 3” produced by VEB Möbelindustrie 
Gera. Image courtesy of Stiung Haus der Geschichte der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Photographer unknown.
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By the late 1970s, Kultur im Heim had abandoned studio pictures of ideal 
room arrangements in favor of actual apartments. This development has been 
associated with the loosening of the party’s hold on every facet of public and pri-
vate life.56 Closer examination of the magazine reveals, however, that this change 
in imagery also occurred alongside the stagnation of GDR furniture innovation 
during this decade. Showing the same furniture in the domestic context of dif-
ferent subcultures and lifestyles glossed over the unavailability of new designs 
and created an illusion of consumer choices. By shiing focus to the makeshi 
solutions of their readers’ neighbors, editors avoided showy, yet unavailable, 
prototypes under Honecker’s failing consumer socialism. In this way, Kultur 
im Heim circumvented the kind of public disgruntlement that earlier interior 
design showcases had caused.
figure 5.2. Cover of the West German interior 
design journal Schöner Wohnen 4/1968.  
Image courtesy of Stiung Haus der Geschichte 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  
Photograph: Richard Stradtmann.
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Designers, politicians, and retailers hoped that consumers would internal-
ize these images and make consumer choices in support of the aspired national 
modern brand. By visualizing the spatial context of furniture in arranged dis-
plays and on blueprints of family homes at Wohnberatungen, the Werkbund 
and the ZfF brought their vision to the people. This paternalistic attitude to-
ward consumer taste continued interwar-era concerns about German material 
and economic culture: aesthetic education and the struggle against kitsch in 
everyday life.
The Multifunctional Living Room
Despite the emphasis on rational technological progress that accompanied eco-
nomic and social modernization, privacy and emotions had replaced the public 
“aesthetics of power” of the Nazi period in postwar Germany.57 Yet the curious 
combination of the success of modern Bauhaus rationalism with the conser-
vative social climate of the reconstruction decade in the West and the artistic 
dictat of socialist realism in the East had sidelined emotional needs.58 Change 
eventually occurred when the 1970s saw a general shi toward individualization 
based on postmaterial values in the West and an ocial acknowledgment of the 
right to privacy in the East.59 These developments inserted powerful notions for 
more freedom of individual expression and emotionality into the discussion. 
To understand the forces at play requires exploring how Germans navigated the 
struggle between rigid public taste regimes and desired private coziness, a ten-
sion that was nowhere more at play than in the living room.
The extent of urban destruction that wartime bombings had caused made 
the representational function of the living room in bourgeois homes—a Gesamt-
kunstwerk of strategically placed representative furniture and decorations—
seem like a relic of a bygone era. Nevertheless, as a symbolic system of interior 
design the living room continued to gure largely in debates on lifestyles as 
codications of class distinctions, habitus, and socioeconomic aspirations.60
However, the sociological model of distinctive consumption driven by social as-
piration, observable in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, lost its 
explanatory power as the three-class system was replaced by a growing number 
of postmodern lifestyle milieus.61 Moreover, during the housing scarcity of the 
immediate postwar years, Germans in East and West and from all social back-
grounds lived in crowded conditions. As a result, the little space available had to 
serve multiple functions: as space for receiving guests, eating, sleeping, storing 
belongings, and working. The postwar German living room therefore became a 
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less formal space. Furniture designers responded, and the two decades immedi-
ately following the Second World War saw the most interesting developments 
in modular system furniture not only in Central Europe but also in the United 
States and among neutral European powers such as Switzerland and Sweden.62
With the economic boom of the 1950s and early 1960s, the West German 
population experienced a collective increase in living standards, which enabled 
workers to aord household goods and technical equipment previously only af-
fordable for the educated and upper-middle class.63 In the GDR, the population 
worked hard during reconstruction with a view to reaping the promised fruits 
of their labor in the planned economy, even though this consumer good abun-
dance failed to materialize. Still, they benetted from the increasing political 
attention to the pressing needs for more modern housing over the course of the 
1960s and 1970s.
One commonality that survived the forty years of partition on either side 
of the border was the multifunctionality of rooms, originating from necessity 
during the immediate postwar period and continuing into the years of greater 
prosperity. This was not an entirely new concept though. Urban working-class 
housing prior to this period had seldom oered the space for a room that was 
purely representational. Family life of urban workers had long taken place in 
the enlarged kitchen. It combined the sociability of a living room or parlor with 
workroom features, kitchen functions, and sleeping amenities. Typically, fur-
niture was light and easily moveable, as industry workers were “nomads,” al-
ways on the move to the next place of employment, unlike bourgeois families. 
Over the course of a century, however, the reality of the working population 
had changed, especially under the welfare regimes in the GDR, with the inher-
ent right to work and the constitutional right to housing.64 Social distinctions, 
naturally more nely nuanced than in the three-class system, were lived out in 
the private sphere of the home, even under the utopian auspices of a classless 
socialist society.65
Nevertheless, GDR citizens’ exploration of the functionality of their living 
rooms was spatially conned by the highly standardized architecture in the East-
ern Bloc. The country used specic crane models and prefabricated construction 
techniques that both originated in the Soviet Union. The Russian apartment 
model of the 1950s oered families with two children on average 35–40 square 
meters with an economical oor plan that predetermined the function of each 
room.66 In 1962, the GDR presented its own concept for modern socialist living 
in the “P2,” which became the most common apartment, built until 1990. It con-
sisted of a small, open kitchen that connected to the living room and dining area, 
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thus including the housewife in family activities. This layout departed from tra-
ditional worker housing by making the living room the center of family life, 
reecting “the idea of the home as primarily a respite of leisure and relaxation.”67
The important point here is not only that with P2 workers’ housing had a room 
for leisure and sociability but that it emphasized family as the central unit in so-
cialism. In this, the architectural design anticipated a profound change in GDR 
social policy. Three years later in 1965, the SED passed a new Family Law that 
pronounced the family the “basic cell of society,” an eort to combat one of the 
highest divorce rates worldwide.68
By the mid-1960s, planners prioritized the construction of prefabricated build-
ings with standardized apartments, while inner-city areas with older building 
structures, for instance in Dresden, Leipzig, and Berlin, fell into disrepair. As such, 
the historic worker apartments lost appeal due to their outdated sanitary facilities 
and utilities, such as communal toilets on the landing and coal ovens. When of-
fered an apartment in one of the new, if less aesthetically pleasing, buildings, most 
families opted for the modern amenities of P2 and, later, the WBS 70 apartments. 
Housing remained a problematic policy area until Honecker introduced his Unity 
of Economic and Social Policy program at the Eighth Party Congress in 1971, fol-
lowed by a promise to solve the housing question in the GDR once and for all. The 
following year he announced the Housing Construction Program, the largest cap-
ital investment program in the country’s history: building increased by 78 percent 
over the course of the decade. By the end of the 1970s, more than one million of 
these one- to three-bedroom apartments were built, and over all 2.1 million dwell-
ings had been either newly constructed or renovated by 1990.69
Such highly standardized architecture reignited concerns about the danger 
of potential moral degeneration through uniformity in the socialist material 
environment. Similar to the debates economic planners and industrial designers 
had in the 1950s and 1960s over the streamlining of furniture production, the 
concern was that uniformity in construction contributed to a loss in cultural 
value of GDR living standards. In 1969, attempts to create diversity within the 
connes of standardized construction techniques through long-term planning, 
such as the GDR Bauakademie building project “Mutable Living” (Variables 
Wohnen), ended in failure. It became a sobering litmus test for the degree of 
individuality and exibility that socialist architecture and the interior design 
industries could tolerate.70 The architectural idea was simple: the outer walls 
would dene the apartment while the open interior oor plan could be cus-
tom-designed by the tenant. A utilities pipe constituted the only xture and 
suggested a logical placement of the bathroom and the kitchen in its vicinity. 
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Otherwise, the apartment concept remained open and could be designed ac-
cording to the number and the needs of the inhabitants. This approach diered 
from previous apartment designs, as built-in furniture in the P2 apartments, 
such as heating convectors hidden in partitions that did double-duty as desks, 
presented limitations and prescribed usage.
In Variables Wohnen, storage furniture elements, instead of traditional walls, 
divided the space into rooms, oering a high degree of individuality in ascribing 
the function of the rooms. The Bauakademie tested this concept in Berlin and 
Rostock with twenty-four and eighty apartment units respectively. Furniture 
combines were involved in interior design counseling as well as the delivery and 
installation of furniture. To gain a better understanding of the array of demands 
and needs across the population, the Bauakademie chose tenants from all walks 
of life, from cleaning lady to medical doctor and from metalworker to studied 
figure 5.3. A design collective at the Institute for Industrial Design Halle—Burg 
Giebichenstein designed a furniture system that replaced brick-and-mortar walls  
in the East German architectural experiment “Variables Wohnen.”  
SLUB/Deutsche Fotothek, Friedrich Weimer, 1973.
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engineer.71 Its overarching goal was to nd patterns for ideal solutions that 
would serve dierent age groups, professions, and family structures. However, 
aer ve years the organizers realized that, when tenants were given the freedom 
to fulll their every housing wish, no apartment would look like the next one. 
The Bauakademie concluded that “the multitude of functional design solutions 
stood in stark contrast to the quest for an ideal solution.”72 No such thing as 
one “socialist way of living” existed; a long-term planning concept, a one-ts-
all solution, could not derive from this individual-functional approach to mod-
ern housing. The open oor plan posed an insurmountable challenge for East 
German industry and its ve-year planning intervals.73 What the experiment 
proved in the end was the point that East German citizens had their own ideas 
about functionality, which did not necessarily overlap with those of designers, 
urban planners, and politicians. Variables Wohnen was just one of many ideas 
that the Bauakademie, the ZfF, and furniture companies across the GDR put 
forward in nding sensible solutions to individualize standardized housing. As 
the 1970s progressed, the ailing economy allowed for very few of these ideas to 
be realized.74
In the early 1980s, ocial design discourse in the GDR eventually embraced 
the idea of the working-class living room, at a time when it had already com-
monly become the largest room in modern apartments. Kultur im Heim posed 
the ideologically loaded question: “Living or representation room?”75 The arti-
cle carefully pointed out that in a nonbourgeois context the living room served 
multiple functions, such as socializing, eating, playing, and napping, which had 
once been limited to other rooms. The author saw this socialist development as 
inherently dierent from the fragmentation that sociologists had found in West-
ern capitalist societies. There, the article claimed, individualization had led to 
the compartmentalization of the oor plan, each room serving the desires of one 
family member. This allegedly eradicated the larger room for communal activ-
ities and family time. As a result, conspicuous consumption habits had evolved 
and nonfunctional furniture, such as the lowered coee table impractical for 
family meals, had increasingly entered Western apartments. Accordingly, the 
article concluded, the “capitalist living room” had exclusively representational 
properties—nobody lived in it anymore. However, the article completely dis-
regarded the fact that the multifunctional living room was a modern twenti-
eth-century development and that, historically speaking, nobody had “lived” 
in it much before the war either. Meanwhile, the author saw the socialist living 
room as a true living room (lit.: Lebensraum). In this room, communal activities 
trumped materialism and therefore, almost by denition, the furniture had to 
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be functional. Not in a stylistic sense, but in a pragmatic way: furniture needed 
to provide storage, work space for adults and children, play areas, and a table for 
family meals as well as for entertaining guests.76
The claim that the eastern living room served no representational function 
seems to have enjoyed broad acceptance. A multiple response survey conducted 
in prefab building areas in East German middle-sized and large towns found 
that none of the study’s respondents used the living room for representational 
purposes. Asked about their regular activities in the living room, 94 percent re-
sponded that they used it for reading and writing, 62 percent for cras and sew-
ing, 53 percent for keeping and nurturing plants and pets, 42 percent for playing 
instruments and games, and 23 percent for activities connected to collections, 
such as stamps or glasses.77 It is noteworthy that entertaining is not listed among 
the activities, and contemporaries attested that “the GDR is not a leisure-time 
society and never will be.”78 In recent years, research on state-controlled cultural 
events and television viewing habits has shown that, on the contrary, East Ger-
mans enjoyed both leisure and company in the home, away from forced partici-
pation in cultural consumption, campaigns, and mass-organization activities.79
Evidence of a thriving private party culture supports the conclusion that East 
Germans hosted guests in their living room as well.80
Because of these largely standardized living room functions, a standard in fur-
nishings emerged: a large closet, a couch and easy chairs, and a dinner table plus 
chairs could be found in the majority of the living rooms.81 Serially produced 
storage furniture with functional elements, such as the glass cabinets, mini bars, 
and desks included in the popular MDW program from Dresden-Hellerau, 
featured prominently in magazine photographs.82 By 1981, the study “Wohnen 
’81” found, 90 percent of living rooms in all prefab buildings contained such 
a multifunctional Schrankwand.83 This postwar invention epitomized the so-
ciological phenomenon of desired or forced mobility in the age of technology 
and combined it with the protability of large-series production in the increas-
ingly mechanized furniture industry.84 Ninety-six percent of respondents to the 
“Wohnen ’81” study in new workers housing described their dream living room 
as comfortable and cozy, that is, emotionally fullling.85 Yet when asked to de-
scribe the actual living room furniture they owned, respondents listed “practical 
and purposeful” (39 percent), “factual and neutral” (30 percent), and “timelessly 
dignied” (12 percent)—a clear break with their declared preferences and emo-
tional needs.86
This discrepancy between desire and reality warrants explanation, as it could 
not solely have been the result of the limited furniture availability. Although 
168 chapter 5
purchases of specic styles could be dicult or take several years due to poor 
planning and the organization of consumer good production by district, the 
GDR furniture industry produced a range of styles in the 1980s. This ranged 
from Biedermeier and Chippendale-inspired furniture at the Zeulenroda 
combine, to the postmodern pieces of the Berlin furniture combine. Evolving 
pro-family policy in the GDR had made the money available for the consumer 
desires that the “Wohnen ’81” study implies. Following the 1965 Family Law, 
which had aimed at containing the eects of the comparatively liberal divorce 
laws, the SED encouraged the founding of new families with so-called marriage 
loans (Ehekredite). From 1972 onward, interest-free loans of 5,000 Ostmark sup-
ported young couples under the age of twenty-seven (increased to 7,000 Ost-
mark for couples under thirty-one in 1986) in their start to married life. These 
loans could be partially “paid back” by having children.87 Moreover, young mar-
ried couples and families were statistically over-represented in the new housing 
development of Marzahn in East Berlin, for instance, showing that the author-
ities treated these groups preferentially when allocating the new, modern apart-
ments. 88 With such measures, the state aligned conservative family policy and 
progressive housing policy and put young families in a position to participate in 
East German consumer culture. Therefore, in combination with a well-devel-
oped do-it-yourself culture, a large part of the population would have had the 
means to realize their design preferences to a certain extent.
One possible explanation for the aforementioned discrepancy could be that 
the discourse on socialist functionalism had been eective among the GDR pop-
ulation. East German neofunctionalist designers and planners understood func-
tional to mean practical furniture that served the needs of the population. They 
considered decorative elements as unnecessary for the function of the piece, as 
expensive to produce, and as obstructive to their goal of standardized, more e-
cient production. They thus dedicated the majority of the furniture production 
capacities to serial shelf systems and multifunctional pieces, such as the MuFuTi, 
a multifunctional table that could be used as a desk or a family dinner table; 
it could be extended when hosting guests or lowered to serve the function of 
a coee table. Taken at face value, the broad acceptance of the Schrankwand 
in 90 percent of prefabricated building households seems to demonstrate the 
pervasiveness of the functionality discourse in the context of standardized 
apartments.
A second possible explanation could be that, in the process of self-evalua-
tion, respondents simply reinterpreted their impractical furniture solutions as 
practical and, thus, functional. Germans always liked to experience their home 
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emotionally, not functionally, as renowned architecture critic and journalist 
Manfred Sack asserts: “Dwelling incites feelings. If an apartment is impractical, 
one will notice, but get used to it and begin to think that it is practical.”89 Such a 
cognitive shi can be illustrated with further examination of the Schrankwand 
and its contents. Its material structure, underpinned by systemic thinking, leads 
consumers to three main behavioral patterns: orderliness, presentation, and rep-
resentation.90 The dierentiation between presentation and representation is sig-
nicant here, as the former is about self-recognition and the latter about impress-
ing visitors. The dierence reveals thus how East German consumers thought 
about personalizing and appropriating the dominant piece of furniture in the 
living room—or more precisely the ways they had learned how to talk about it.
Displayed objects, collections, or little knick-knacks without immediate 
everyday function are usually assumed to have a representational purpose as 
means to impress. In a research study, 100 percent of Schrankwand owners in 
the GDR reported that they indeed used theirs for storage of porcelain and cut 
glass. Usually, these collections were put on display in the glass cabinets, like 
museum objects in vitrines. However, interviewees claimed that such items were 
put there because the owners liked them, not because they were believed to re-
ect favorably on the owner’s taste or to impress visitors.91 This response shows 
a degree of success for the East German ocial discourse on the working-class 
living room, in so far as the population accepted that it was by denition not a 
representational space. Further items, such as photos and personal documents 
(98 percent), books (91 percent), TV sets and radios (80 percent), hobby mate-
rials and collections (65 percent), records and record players (55 percent), and 
alcoholic beverages (49 percent) also underscore the role of the Schrankwand 
in leisure time activities and as a personal archive. The storage of tablecloths 
(72 percent) as well as sheets and towels (43 percent) obviously fall under or-
derliness.92 The Schrankwand in its storage capacity thus embodied rst and 
foremost pragmatism, yet it was lled with hobby materials that contributed 
to personal well-being and expressed the personality of the owner, and nally 
kept safe personal items such as collections or photographs. This appropriation 
strategy combined the useful with the emotional.
Taste Appropriation and Obstinacy in the 1980s Living Room
Further insights into the motivations behind furniture consumption are oered 
by three empirical studies conducted in East and West Germany in the 1980s. 
All of them share an interest in the object-person relationship but relate their 
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ndings to the broader economic culture by investigating the values and norms 
that informed these relationships. They were conducted in the nal decade of 
Germany’s division, thus documenting developments in housing and interior de-
sign aer thirty years under the socialist and capitalist economic systems and be-
fore reunication changed the societal context in the East. Thirty years, or one 
generation, not only reveals long-term change but also the success of the national 
brand narrative and the prescriptive design discourse in real German homes.
In the mid-1980s, an East German study supported by the AiF looked behind 
apartment doors in the GDR. Two cultural studies researchers, Herbert Letsch 
and Karla Scharf, used autobiographical interviews, photographic documenta-
tion, and theoretical analysis of the collected materials to trace the participants’ 
demands on their home environments. The study aimed to contribute to eco-
nomic planning with a production-oriented aesthetic strategy for domestic ev-
eryday design.93 The project naturally had an ideological angle, operating with a 
theoretical concept that assumed that aesthetics embody the sensual experience 
of socialism. It concluded that the way in which the population conceived of 
domestic aesthetics was always a combination of everyday practical demands and 
an aesthetic appreciation of cultural and artistic objects. On top of that was the 
“desire for self-recognition” in the things and spaces in the home.94
For the study, Letsch and Scharf interviewed six couples between twenty-ve 
and forty years of age from working-class family backgrounds. Most of them had 
been trained in industrial jobs, though some of them had gone on to secondary 
education. Their ages indicate that all of the couples had spent their entire lives 
in the Soviet occupation zone and the GDR and had been socialized in socialism 
through membership in political mass organizations and educated in the East 
German school system. The interview questions included some that addressed 
furnishing choices and the stories behind individual furniture pieces as well as 
the respondents’ ideas about “the aesthetic” and “the beautiful.”95
Take, for example, Frank and Marina R., born in 1957 and 1959, respectively. 
They were employed in working-class professions—he trained as a road con-
struction worker and she worked as a cook. When Letsch and Scharf interviewed 
them for the rst time in 1985, they lived with their two daughters in turn-of-
the-century workers’ housing near the city center of Dresden. A year later, the 
family moved to a modern housing development at the outskirts of town, tak-
ing the living room furniture with them. The light brown Schrankwand with 
teak wood nishing, the rst major furniture acquisition the couple had made 
together, they explained, had been chosen not because of any aesthetic objec-
tive, but because of the storage space it oered. It was too modern looking for 
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the couple, who preferred ornamentation and dark wood, and underlay purely 
practical considerations.96 In the absence of a bedroom closet, Family R. kept 
bedding, their own clothes, and their children’s clothes in it. It also oered a 
display cabinet for knickknacks and their glass collection, including heavy beer 
glasses. Mrs. R. explained that these objects add “warmth” to the room. Aer 
the move into the modern apartment, they switched the display to their newer 
collection of cut crystal glasses, because they had changed their taste to more ele-
gant objects.97 They also moved over their upholstery furniture ensemble, which 
provided ample seating for guests and neighbors stopping by.
Frank R. was a do-it-yourself home improver, who produced intricate works, 
such as lanterns and small furniture, for the living room and other rooms. As 
these items had no commercial value, they were not representational pieces per 
se, but they illustrate the personality and technical skill of the owner. In the 
context of an economy where not everything one wanted or needed was avail-
able, these were invaluable skills. Materials, equally scarce, could be procured 
through ocial and unocial channels. In 1984 alone, 778,000 Ostmark worth 
of construction materials, it has been estimated, had been pilfered from indus-
trial workshops and construction sites.98
Handmade items were visible in the other respondents’ apartments as well. 
Günter Z. shared Frank R.’s love for wood, and he even lined his entire apart-
ment with wooden panels.99 This idea came about when he wanted to reintro-
duce his conservative taste into the prefab apartment. In their previous home 
in an old building, Günter Z., a car-body constructor turned acrobat, had in-
vested in Chippendale furniture. Although he still liked the furniture, he could 
not arrange these pieces in a pleasing way in the new space. Even a handmade, 
complementary room divider could not t aesthetically, “and so we decided to 
buy a Schrankwand.”100 His story allows insights into how dominant modern 
housing architecture was in interior design decisions and goes some way to ex-
plaining why the great majority of people living in the new prefab construc-
tion apartments eventually turned to functionalist storage furniture to solve 
their decorating problems. Despite their dierences in education, status, taste, 
and exposure to culture, all of the respondents owned a Schrankwand, and dis-
cussed in the interviews the purchasing decision and the functionality of this 
piece.101 The conservative wood paneling, on the other hand, illustrates how 
do-it-yourself not only presented a means to make things that were otherwise 
unavailable but was also a strategy to undermine the overwhelming modern 
logic of the prefab architecture. Above Günter Z.’s couch hung samurai swords, 
a nunchaku, and a samurai symbol, which, he explained, showed his interest in 
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Asian culture and admiration for Far Eastern martial arts. He watched samurai 
lms and read books and also practiced karate himself. The earnestness with 
which he described this fascination with Japan stands in complete contrast to 
the backdrop of the traditional dark wood paneling and the oral fabric of the 
couch. Collecting and displaying objects without use value allowed residents to 
recognize themselves in the space and made it feel homey.102
The preference for traditional idioms, such as dark woods and handcraed 
furniture, was apparent in most of the apartments in this study. In his leisure 
time, lathe operator Achim Sch. customized such objects as picture frames and 
semi-antiques, and treated them to look old.103 He and his wife described these 
accessories as “romantic,” indicating that some of the do-it-yourself projects ca-
tered to the emotional needs of the inhabitants to create coziness and “atmo-
sphere” in their modern housing. Other smaller objects on display, such as a 
Chinese tea set, heavy wine glasses, and a silver-plated candelabra, completed 
the interior design. About the latter Renate Sch. remarked: “We like old things, 
because they have a visual eect and represent a value.”104 Inherited and barely 
figure 5.4. The Schrankwand with collectables in Frank R.’s living room in a prefab 
building in Dresden Gorbitz. Photograph: Christine Starke DGPH, 1989.
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used objects such as the china tea set and the candelabra represented both status 
and family history, indicating that despite the utopia of a classless society, social 
dierentiation still existed in the GDR.
In contrast, the more educated respondents in the study liked light colors and 
preferred simpler lines. Engineer Hubertus R. and his wife Martina, who had le 
her university course aer the couple had welcomed their rst child, fully com-
mitted to functional furniture in their apartment. They spent their interest-free 
marriage loan on a Schrankwand and later added additional storage pieces in 
the hallway and the children’s room.105 Their furnishing strategy rendered the 
home signicantly less cluttered than those of the other families. Similarly, the 
divorced Günter N., who worked in the youth organization Free German Youth 
as secretary for culture and, aer his studies at the SED party school, eventually 
ran a cultural club for adolescents, came into contact with functionalist aes-
thetics through his political work. More and more, his job bled into Günter N.’s 
figure 5.5. Asian inuences in Günter Z.’s living room in a prefab building in 
Dresden Gorbitz. Photograph: Christine Starke DGPH, 1989.
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leisure time activities. He learned to play the guitar, painted, and even turned 
his living room into a pottery studio, where he created modern-looking vessels 
and vases.106 “Flowery pottery,” overuse of color, and other decorations bothered 
him. His austere cras aesthetic had transferred over to his minimalist furnish-
ing, for example, with a shelving and storage unit that was barely large enough 
to accommodate the television set. In both cases, jobs and aesthetic education 
inuenced the comfort level of the respondents with functional styles. Hubertus 
R. and Günter N. worked in elds where cultural and functional aspects of de-
sign carried great importance, and this aected their everyday practices. These 
patterns indicate that the likelihood of accepting functionalism was as much 
knowledge-driven in eastern socialist society as in western society.
The Schrankwand was ubiquitous in the Federal Republic in the 1980s as 
well. Despite the populations’ dierences in education and socioeconomic sta-
tus, across strata they used the Schrankwand to tie together the dierent liv-
ing room designs. In the photographic study Das deutsche Wohnzimmer (The 
German Living Room), Herlinde Koelbl documented this room across dierent 
socioeconomic groups in urban and rural settings in 1980. Unlike in the GDR, 
there was no comparable furnishing standard in the Federal Republic, and living 
rooms varied greatly according to family social and nancial situations—with 
the exception of the Schrankwand.
Working-class families oen did not have room to spare for a living room and 
used the kitchen for eating, working, socializing, and receiving guests. This mul-
tifunctionality expressed economic realities. Hannelore P. (30), a housewife with 
ve children and a husband who dealt in scrap metal, lived in an apartment that 
had no bathroom.107 The family shared the toilet on the landing with neighbors, 
and the nearest bathroom was three blocks away. Clearly not everybody could 
partake in West German modern domestic culture. Social stratication, income, 
and education determined access to the markers of the promoted conservative 
middle-class modernity of home ownership, modern household appliances, and 
correct consumption.
Amid the clashing patterns of wallpapers, oor tiles, couch fabric, and ta-
blecloth, Antoinette S. (47), a housewife with eight children and an unskilled 
worker husband, attested to the nancial strain that urban apartment rents put 
on the working-class family: “We cannot aord a dierent apartment. My hus-
band and I sleep in the living room.”108 Indeed, for a working-class household, 
house ownership in the 1980s entailed large sacrices, such as foregoing costly 
hobbies and vacations, and years of saving money. Seated proudly in a comfort-
ably furnished living room, new home owners Alois (55), a crane operator, and 
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his wife Katharina W. (52) declared: “We have arrived.” With the table set for 
a dinner for two, a bottle of wine on display, this living room embodied the 
reward for all of the hard work of building a safe haven from the daily trials and 
tribulations where they could recharge: “We have never gone on a vacation trip. 
First we had to work on the house and now we want to enjoy the fruits of our 
labor,” Alois and Katharina W. explained.109
Families living in the countryside, where real estate was less expensive and 
more abundant, had a dierent experience altogether. Koelbl photographed 
a married farming couple, Heinrich (63) and Elfriede B. (71), in two dierent 
spaces where they spent their spare time. The rst was plainly furnished with 
a suciently comfortable couch behind a small table with two nonmatching 
easy chairs and a wooden chair assembled around the table. They explain: “We 
spend our evenings in this room, also because of the television.”110 The other 
picture was taken in a more representational room with furniture that would be 
ttingly described as Gelsenkirchener Barock, with seating furniture joined by an 
expensive-looking corner cabinet opposite a large mirror. The mostly dark wood 
and the busy fabrics on the couch and the easy chairs, ranging from oral print 
to geometric patterns, were chosen to make an impression. “According to what 
kind of visitor we receive,” they were quoted, “he will be brought into this living 
room or the other.” This comment clearly indicates that the gute Stube (parlor) 
was reserved for important visitors and did not fulll everyday functions. While 
this room was a representational space, the other space where family life took 
place was furnished with functional designs that aligned with their needs for 
leisure and rest in the evenings. It is dicult to determine whether this sepa-
ration of representational and functional spaces indicated generational dier-
ence, though it seems unlikely. Similarly, the young farming family of Josef (38) 
and Rosa S. (31) conrmed that “We are in the gute Stube just a few times each 
year.”111 In a context where the home constituted part of professional life and 
oered spaces for hobbies elsewhere on the premises, the living room could be 
used exclusively to host guests. Couple S. lled theirs with rustic furniture that 
expressed their cultural and social identity, but as this room had no function in 
the rest of their lives, it seemed unnecessary to use it on a daily basis.
On the contrary, educated middle-class families of the 1980s oen considered 
the living room to also be a workspace where reading, thinking, and writing 
took place. City council woman Inge H. (53) explained: “We are mostly in the 
kitchen. We use the living room only when we want quiet to read or to work.”112
And cleric Josef W. (51) arms this sentiment: “I am very seldom at home and 
thus this room suces. I use it to work and spend my leisure time.”113 Large 
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bookshelves dominated both Josef W. and Inge H.’s rooms, and the small but 
functional seating furniture and coee table were not suitable for hosting a nice 
aernoon tea or a dinner party. Inge H.’s living room solely contained a desk. 
These rooms made a purely functional impression by accentuating the need for 
academic work space. Hosting guests was not a priority, and thus hardly anyone 
ever saw the only representational element: the books.
This pattern of the multifunctional living room usage among the West Ger-
man middle class was unlike the way in which Robert N. (40), an administrative 
clerk, furnished his room. Over the tiled coee table oated a crystal chandelier, 
and on the wall hung a print of a painting depicting a young lady in a leisure pose 
with a book—presumably signifying the importance of education for this family. 
The silver-plated tea service displayed on an ornamented tea trolley seemed to 
come from an entirely dierent time and place when such objects symbolized re-
spectability and high social status. The Schrankwand in dark wood towers over 
the family in the picture, next to which Robert N. is quoted as self-importantly 
saying: “Those who come to my home have to follow my volition.”114 The entire 
room is stuck in the tastes and aspirations of the nineteenth century. Neverthe-
less, this is an exception and only one of a few pictures showing representational 
living rooms of the aspirational upper middle-class styles.115
Despite what these examples suggest about the multiple functions that the 
1980s living room served in the Federal Republic, the foreword by Manfred 
Sack to Koelbl’s photographic study presented a pessimistic viewpoint on the 
inhabitants’ ability to create a functional space to live in, rather than merely to 
represent its owners.116 Sack identied the reasons for what he saw as a growing 
tendency to buy furniture that embodied social aspirations, rather than actual 
personality and circumstances of the owner, as a disenfranchisement of the 
population, a lack of education about simple laws of proportion and materiality, 
and the increasingly predetermined apartment layouts, including bathroom til-
ing and built-in kitchens. Yet such wide-ranging, unspecic conclusions reveal 
more about Sack than about the people depicted in the study. His claims ignored 
the photographic evidence in favor of architectural trends and a personal bias 
toward functionalist styles, and thus missed an opportunity to actively engage 
with the inhabitants’ appropriation of spaces and their everyday relationship 
with objects.
Oering a more deeply engaged approach, Gert Selle and Jutta Boehe’s eth-
nological study of West German living cultures in the early to mid-1980s rebuts 
Sack’s pessimistic claims.117 Their method resembles that of Letsch and Scharf ’s 
parallel study in Leipzig. Three couples, all of them homeowners, were chosen 
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from three dierent middle-class backgrounds: Mr. (41) and Mrs. S. (42) held 
white-collar jobs as a technician and a secretary at a TV station and came from 
a working-class background; Mr. and Mrs. Z. (both 43) came from the well-ed-
ucated middle class, having earned degrees as an engineer and a teacher, with 
a petit-bourgeois background; Mr. (45) and Mrs. H. (40) had an upper mid-
dle-class background, working as a social worker and a dentist. Their names were 
anonymized and the location of the study remained undisclosed. Photographic 
documentation in combination with couple interviews as well as individual in-
terviews detail the history and context of the families’ acquisition choices. The 
analysis evaluated furnishing habits vis-à-vis the participants’ personal past to 
explain the relationships the respondents had to the objects in their homes. The 
study’s subjects had been infants at the end of the Second World War and grew 
up in the western zones of occupation and later the Federal Republic, with one 
exception. They thus were completely socialized in the West; only Mrs. S. spent 
her childhood in the eastern zone of occupation and the GDR before her family 
moved to the West.
Only one of the three houses t the state-promoted modernity of the Federal 
Republic. Couple H.’s house, a bungalow made of white brick, steel, glass, and a 
little bit of wood, was the only one that the researchers call “functionalist-mod-
ern.”118 The bungalow had a special place in Bonn’s ocial architecture. In 1963, 
Sep Ruf built a at-roofed bungalow as residence and reception building for the 
West German chancellor, expressing the values of political horizontality and 
transparency with large windows and unassuming architecture.119 Couple H.’s 
heightened awareness of modernist idioms could be due to the fact that they 
both had been married before to spouses who worked in artistic professions, a 
painter and an architect respectively. With its low ceilings and skylight bands 
in place of windows, the architecture dominated the atmosphere of the dim-lit 
house. The mix of furniture styles, ranging from functionalist electronic gadgets 
over mainstream modern furniture to Ikea pieces and do-it-yourself shelving on 
trestles, interrupts the austere look of the bungalow’s severe construction mate-
rials. Meanwhile, large oriental rugs introduced a noticeably competing aesthetic 
into this house, adding warmth to the cold, drab concrete oors.
The other couples described their houses and their furniture as functional 
as well, although the architectural shells of their homes cannot be described 
as functionalist-modern. While the furniture did not closely resemble Bauhaus 
designs, they were simple with clear lines and practical shapes. One or two pieces 
were embellished, but the majority of the furniture served clearly the functions 
of storing, eating, working, hosting, and playing. Based on their preconceptions 
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about the age and profession of the couple, Selle and Boehe remark that they 
would have expected less educated Mr. and Mrs. S. to represent themselves 
dierently, perhaps with Stilmöbel or modish furniture, and that they were 
surprised by the “sober” impression of the house during their rst visit.120 The 
couple explained that aer the expense of the house they were unable to invest 
in expensive furniture as well. They therefore made do with hand-me-downs 
and acquired functional pieces bit by bit. Expensive fantasies, such as a modern 
Interlübke bedroom furniture ensemble, had remained nancially out of reach. 
A skilled handyman, Mr. S. built a similar looking set with his wife’s help.121 Do-
it-yourself thus ourished on both sides of the border and became an important 
strategy for consumers navigating the power relations between ocial taste pa-
ternalism and production.122 It has been estimated that do-it-yourself activities, 
such as fancywork and redecorations, cost the economy around 4 percent of 
West Germany’s annual GDP in the 1970s and 1980s.123 One could go as far as 
claiming that this practice undermined the modernization eort. Yet, consider-
ing its broad application, it also implies that it was part of the economic culture 
in East and West, which idealized a conservative appreciation of the cras.
figure 5.6. Living room interior of Couple H.’s house. Gert Selle and Jutta Boehe, 
Leben mit den schönen Dingen. ©1985, Rowohlt Verlag GmbH, Hamburg.
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Two of the couples recognized that certain corners of their houses exclusively 
served emotional purposes, such as the decorative and historical objects assem-
bled on an old wooden trunk and the kitschy stoneware plates ornamented with 
birds hanging next to the replace and above a rock collection in couple Z.’s 
living room.124 A porcelain piggybank sat as a lucky charm in couple S.’s living 
room. And they kept some needlework pillowcases, which had been gied to 
them. Mrs. S. commented that she always kept handicras out of respect for the 
work that went into making them, even if they did not suit her taste.125 Just like 
the respondents in Letsch and Scharf ’s East German study,126 these West Ger-
man couples explain their strong relationship to knickknacks and handmade ob-
jects through symbolic, emotional value. They remarked that these objects had 
been given or made by relatives and that these objects symbolized happy memo-
ries. The porcelain piggy bank in couple S.’s living room was a wedding present, 
and couple Z. had accumulated the rock collection during their travels.127
In both houses, these knickknacks co-existed, or rather clashed, with the 
iconic, modern Braun Hi-Fi stereo. Braun became a household name for us-
er-friendly electronic gadgets that conformed to the aesthetic austerity of neo-
functionalism. Braun designer Dieter Rams’s own design principles aligned with 
the functionalist mantras of honesty, innovation, durability, and unobtrusive-
ness.128 In the Z. and S. households, the functionalist stereo sat right next to 
memorabilia and other objects that had only decorative functions. In this way, 
the couples developed strategies to co-opt prescriptive taste regimes, and in some 
places in the house, they outright rejected the functionalist vision that the Fed-
eral Republic had modeled since the 1950s. They counterbalanced the accepted 
maxim of practicality with emotionally laden objects to add warmth and cozi-
ness to their house interiors.
At the same time, such things also presented the character of their owners to 
guests. These were not aspirational pieces meant to represent their status or even 
pretend to a higher status. The objects in the house of couple Z. demonstrated 
ve dierent interior design styles, Selle and Boehe reported: (1) timid versions 
of Stilmöbel, (2) functional-classical modernism (such as the Braun stereo and 
the TV), (3) Scandinavian inuences (Ikea), (4) historical pieces with decora-
tive character, and (5) inherited designs from the 1950s and 1960s.129 Whereas 
this style mix confused the research team, to the couple it did not present a 
contradiction. Couple Z. had personal relationships to all of these objects that 
rendered them practical from their viewpoint. e researchers supposed that 
“In this tendency [toward heavy mixing of styles] strong contradictions emerge; 
however, these are presumably largely resolved through invisible interpretational 
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and practical factors in the respondents’ consciousness.”130 It is therefore import-
ant to understand that individuals with high awareness of questions of taste 
consciously justify furnishing solutions that do not t any design prescription 
to overcome the embarrassment of their lacking rationality. In this justication 
process, functionality and practicality derive from the usage of objects in com-
bination with the accommodation of emotional needs to create homeliness.131
Individuals satisfy these needs by surrounding themselves with objects that con-
tain memories, carry familiarity, or are the products of their hobbies, resulting 
in an eclectic style mix.
It is interesting to note that neither the photographic study by Koelbl nor 
the ethnological study by Selle and Boehe included the numerous high-rises 
and so-called mehrparteien apartment blocks in the city centers of the Federal 
Republic. In fact, the prefab tower-and-slab developments, once considered at 
the forefront of modern postwar architecture, had already fallen from grace by 
the 1970s.132 Rather, the studies explore—with the few exceptions in Koelbl’s 
book—the state-funded ideal of middle-class home ownership, emphasizing 
West German social conservatism enshrined in a housing policy that celebrated 
family and respectability. The East German studies, meanwhile, seem to trace 
figure 5.7. Living room interior of Couple Z.’s house. Gert Selle and Jutta Boehe, 
Leben mit den schönen Dingen. ©1985, Rowohlt Verlag GmbH, Hamburg.
Conservative Modernity 181 
young families’ processes of becoming “bourgeois” in the GDR, which the state 
supported through a systematic combination of conservative family laws and 
progressive housing policy. The result was, in both cases, a conservative mod-
ernism in German homes by the 1980s.
The photographic sources and eld notes from the sociological studies in 
East and West show that even aer forty years, despite the best eorts of taste 
reformers, functionalism as an aesthetic remained elitist. In both Germanys, 
the better educated showed a higher likelihood of adopting modern-function-
alist idioms and did this in a more cohesive fashion.133 They tended to surround 
themselves less with bric-a-brac. One dierence that did emerge between East 
and West was the fact that West Germans looked at their kitschy belongings and 
emotional aection for things with a good amount of irony and self-mockery.134
This indicates that lacking renement in taste, as it was understood according 
to the prescriptive aesthetics of the RfF, was something of which West German 
consumers were conscious. In the GDR, however, kitsch objects were treated 
with the same respect as the most practical of objects. This might stem from the 
general experience of material scarcity and the eort that had gone into acquir-
ing or making these objects in the rst place.
Most important, the studies show that, over many decades of modernist de-
sign discourse, the populations of both East and West Germany appropriated 
functionalism as individual practicality. The interviews indicate that function-
ality, interpreted as pragmatic and useful, was held in high esteem across the two 
Germanys. Yet the distancing irony with which West Germans talked about 
their bric-a-brac showed that the discourse of taste education was more perva-
sive in the West than in the East. This nding is not surprising considering 
that the SED rehabilitated functionalism only in the 1960s. Some solutions that 
found approval from designers, politicians, and economic planners, such as the 
Schrankwand, were convincing to the population because of the storage they 
provided or the multifunctionality they oered. The pattern that emerges in 
postwar Germany shows that the population had a good grasp of what function-
alist furniture does and is.
The overall impression that the interiors of houses and apartments oered, 
however, was far removed from the aesthetics of modernist designers and design 
councils who adopted functionalism as a political style, symbolizing modernity. 
Consumption choices proved that the population did not wholeheartedly buy 
into the political constructions that both the FRG and the GDR had tried to 
create around functionalism as a source of national belonging. In the early post-
war decades, consumer counseling and taste education continued the prewar 
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discourse on what it meant to live like a German.135 Once functionalism revealed 
itself as a dogma in the late 1960s, the national emphasis on correct consumption 
stopped, yet the striving for modernity continued in both parts of Germany. The 
population did develop a sensitivity to practical design that served the needs of 
their family life. However, they accepted the functionality discourse on their 
own terms and created areas that fullled their emotional needs.
The analysis suggests that functionalist discourse diused German society, 
yet not with the consistency that the disciples of modernism would have liked. 
It was a conservative modernity that showed widespread awareness of the right 
materials, the wrong embellishments, and the need for the emotional comfort 
of traditions and social relations. The population accepted the practicality of 
functionalism’s clear lines and rectangular shapes for small apartments. How-
ever, it did not accept the emotional emptiness of the functionalist extreme. 
These conclusions align with sociologists’ ndings about the diversication of 
lifestyles gaining momentum in the 1960s. Individualization of space through 
the personal appropriation of general guidelines for functional living, in the end, 
made the populations of the GDR and the Federal Republic cautious partici-
pants in an economic culture in which, for quite dierent motives in East and 




e Ties at Never Broke
B y the late 1980s, the dynamics of German-German economic com-petition in the realm of living standards had created an unsustainable sit-uation for the GDR. e high costs of the promised socialist consumer 
society under Honecker’s Unity of Economic and Social Policy program had 
incurred mounting debts, a strategy that relied on short-term borrowing from 
the West to patch holes in domestic consumer good production. is entangle-
ment with the Federal Republic opened up the possibility of rethinking the Ger-
man-German relationship. In early winter of 1989, East German demonstrators 
changed their chant from “We are the people” to “We are one people.” What 
turned a gentle revolution, or an insistence on long-overdue reforms within 
socialism, to a clear avowal for German unity that December? e question 
is particularly important because it became quite quickly evident that such a 
course of action would mean the disappearance of the GDR as a state and, with 
it, the end of the socialist experiment on German soil.
Much of the historical discussion addressing this question has centered on the 
economic performance of the GDR and the consumer history of its population’s 
privations. What has been less analyzed is the courage East Germans displayed in 
turning the very understandable request for reform of an oppressive state system, 
one that spied on its own citizens, decisively hindered their mobility, infringed 
on their civil rights, and was unable to deliver on its consumer promises, into a 
complete rejection of that state and the social security it provided. East Germans 
voluntarily le behind the safety net of the GDR, where the “welfare dictator-
ship” protected them against poverty, oered high social wages, and heavily sub-
sidized consumer goods that qualied as a “need.”1 is study suggests that, long 
before 1989, the two Germanys came to operate under one economic culture 
marked by interdependencies and shared expectations, which made the transi-
tion from reform to unity plausible and feasible in German minds. Moreover, 
the dynamics that four decades of intra-German trade had created also put West 
German politicians in a position to shape East Germany’s future. For all intents 
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and purposes, the Federal Republic had co-nanced the economic reforms in the 
East, supporting Honecker’s Unity of Economic and Social Policy via generous 
Swing credits in the intra-German trade. When the new GDR head of govern-
ment Hans Modrow asked West German chancellor Helmut Kohl for a DM 15 
billion solidarity payment to avoid state bankruptcy during the tumultuous days 
in late 1989, Kohl contemplated helping at rst, yet withdrew this commitment 
in January 1990.2 With this the Federal Republic nally pulled the plug on an 
economic Deutschlandpolitik that had propped up the East German regime. It 
also foreclosed any chance for survival of a reformed GDR, as nancial solidarity 
was now closely linked to political unity.
Across four decades of Deutschlandpolitik the Federal Republic consistently 
supported intra-German trade, not least by providing credit to the GDR. Yet 
the more important point is that it upheld the line that economic exchanges 
did not imply de facto political recognition. e government minimized regu-
lation of the economic contacts with the GDR but rather let the private sector 
deal directly with the economic structures in the East. In this way, the political 
question remained separate from private economic interests in the West, and 
this depoliticization decoupled intra-German trade from party politics to some 
extent. Of course, one must not forget the many heated debates among and be-
tween CDU and SPD over Ostpolitik in its dierent iterations ranging from 
Adenauer’s policy of strength to Brandt’s policy of compromise.3 e economic 
principles on which German-German trade relations were built, namely the 
1951 Berlin Agreement and the 1958 Protocol on Intra-German Trade, spanned, 
however, both major parties’ periods in government. Hence, there was a basic 
political consensus on this kind of cooperation across the forty years of German 
division, broadly supported by the West German population, who continued to 
feel a bond with their socialist neighbors to a certain degree.
Western modes of rapprochement eventually engaged people in the GDR on 
all levels, ranging from politicians to company managers to workers who did 
contractual work for the West. Meanwhile, the GDR utilized West German 
interest in a sustainable relationship via intra-German trade to increase exports 
and to yield more foreign currency. In order to establish itself and survive in 
an international market, the East German production aesthetic converged with 
western ones. With the continuous interconnection of the two national econo-
mies, and the relatively high level of living standards in the GDR that western 
credits enabled, East and West Germans, knowingly or not, worked on design-
ing one nation. ese ties facilitated making the step from reforming commu-
nism to joining the capitalist system.
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With the conceptual framework of the economic culture approach it is pos-
sible to explore the intricate nature of the German Cold War in the realm of 
the economy, looking at possibilities, rather than solely at outcomes, and the 
opportunities and limitations that designers faced in the implementation of 
aesthetic discourse in the production and consumption processes. In the early 
reconstruction years, elites focused on pronounced national aesthetics for polit-
ical rather than social purposes. Alongside the cultural identication with the 
West, such aesthetics expressed Adenauer’s policy of strength on the German 
Question, based on the logic that Westbindung, rearmament, and NATO mem-
bership would eventually bring about German unication. In reaction to Bonn’s 
position, the GDR followed a policy of demarcation from the West by showing 
allegiance to the Eastern Bloc, both ideologically and culturally. However, when 
one examines design discourse beyond initial bloc alliances, it becomes evident 
that the ideologically loaded Cold War climate limited the elite’s ability to in-
scribe material culture with a spirit of social reform. ese developments con-
tributed to an emerging economic culture that was profoundly outward looking, 
while deeply imbedding production ethics that would come to be known as the 
“made in Germany” brand: durability, functionality, material thri, and mod-
ern aesthetics.
Looking at values and norms inscribed in product culture, the economic 
culture approach levels the playing eld for the GDR, which from the outset 
was disadvantaged in its economic competition with the Federal Republic. e 
transfer of goods across the border shaped eastern and western understandings 
of what it meant to be a modern industrial nation. e economy served as a eld 
for competition until these adversaries developed a shared language of progress 
and security, enabling trade contacts and mutual projects that reproduced inter-
connections on the institutional and the personal level. e two German states, 
located geographically at the heart of the confrontation between Eastern and 
Western ideologies, created a political space that magnied the precariousness 
of the Cold War in Europe. At the same time, this space also amplied the mo-
ments of rapprochement in later decades that unfolded on a global scale in the 
East-West con
ict: economic cooperation, political détente, and peaceful coex-
istence. Bringing these areas of cooperation into focus enables an appreciation 
of the continuous ties between the FRG and GDR that opened up a sustainable 
dialogue and maintained a certain degree of mutual understanding throughout 
the Cold War.
Signicantly, what this process produced were not two dierent kinds of mo-
dernity, a socialist and a capitalist one, but one German conservative modernity 
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based on a shared value system in the production and consumption processes, a 
pan-German economic culture that emerged due to the diplomatic necessities 
and economic practicalities of the German Cold War. It developed between the 
extremes of fast-paced American production cycles, creating demand by bring-
ing the next big thing to the market, and the static structures of the Soviet-style 
centrally planned economy that supplanted market mechanisms with state in-
terests. Industrial design, which had for so long served as a eld for Cold War 
competition, became an arena in which to mediate inter-German relations. e 
pan-German economic culture developed a vocabulary of transparency, human-
ity, and morality that shaped German eorts for peace in Europe in the 1980s. 
When the superpowers ended global détente and entered the Second Cold War 
by stationing new nuclear missiles in Europe, the two German states took the 
opportunity to dene their own positions.
is outcome was not clear from the beginning. From the 1950s to the build-
ing of the Berlin Wall in 1961 was a time of pronounced demarcation and adver-
sarial relations from both sides. Yet this period of delineation proved to be only 
a prelude to the détente of the 1970s. Many of the early policies that facilitated 
East-West contacts, such as the Berlin Agreement and the EEC Protocol on 
Intra-German Trade, in fact papered over major cracks. Contemporaries feared 
that European integration and German unity were necessarily opposed to each 
other, and it was therefore imperative to develop a European economic foreign 
policy that achieved maximum 
exibility in the German Question. erefore 
a “natural” alignment of West German national interests and European inte-
gration during the Cold War, which current debates oen assume, cannot be 
claimed. Similarly, Germany’s change from re
exive multilateralism, expressed 
in Germany as a reliable partner of the Western alliance with a normative com-
mitment to European integration, to a more instrumentalized multilateralism 
in the service of post-reunication national interest has been deemed a new phe-
nomenon.4 e opposite was in fact the case; postwar Germany has always fol-
lowed a national interest–guided policy in Europe. is conclusion is supported 
by the way in which the Federal Republic handled the question of intra-German 
trade within the EEC.
It was this early foundation on which a thriving economic and even cultural 
exchange across the inner-German border were built. e decisive later decades, 
in which GDR decline became palpable on an everyday level, show how delin-
eation and demarcation policies were overcome on political, economic, and per-
sonal levels. Additionally, the examination of the 1970s and 1980s introduces 
the relational aspect of trade with the West into East German eorts to build a 
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sustainable vision of GDR modernity, which indicates where propaganda ended 
and economic reality set in. Pragmatism not only trumped ideological dogma, 
but also revealed the GDR’s underlying economic-cultural values and aspirations 
for a place among modern industrial nations, a goal the Federal Republic shared. 
By creating direct contact between the populations of East and West Germany 
with a gradual decrease in state involvement, which came to a head with the 
opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, the German Question moved 
beyond the reach of the GDR government and eventually co-opted even the 
staunchest critics among the Allies into a plan for a unied German future.
Despite their systemic dierences, the FRG and GDR co-created an eco-
nomic culture in which designer, producers, retailers, and consumers increas-
ingly agreed on the same values and norms that governed economic interaction 
and inspired shared ideas of modern living standards. It was conservative not just 
in form, but also in content. Two Germanys developed large welfare states to de-
mocratize industrialization under the auspices of both capitalism and socialism. 
e fact that the Federal Republic had such a security net in place, to some ex-
tent thanks to the pressures exerted by the socialist alternative across the border, 
enabled a rather smooth reunication, where East Germans were successfully 
integrated in the pension insurance scheme and unemployment benets, even 
at high costs and with enormous eort on the part of the German tax payers. 
Of course, there is much evidence that suggests that the realities of the market 
quickly disillusioned enthusiastic East Germans; it took time to adjust to the 
level of personal initiative needed to succeed in the labor market or to navigate 
the commodied insurance sector. Industrial output in the neue Bundesländer 
contracted by 60 percent in the rst two years following unication.5 Many hard 
lessons were learned. A term was dubbed for the long-term unemployed and 
those in the low-income groups in Eastern Germany: Einheitsverlierer, literally 
losers of unication.6 is experience of displacement has given rise to Ostalgie, 
nostalgia for the East German past, a much-debated phenomenon, especially in 
the realm of consumer goods.7
Indeed, the country’s collapse immediately endangered its material culture. 
Not only did GDR industrial production slow down, but, once the border was 
open, the novelty of the western product culture also attracted GDR citizens 
who could cross the border unhindered. East German interior design was 
quickly replaced with western furniture and domestic appliances. Wolfgang 
Becker’s lm Good Bye Lenin approaches the topic from a tragic-comical per-
spective.8 To shelter his fragile mother from the fatal shock aer a long coma, 
a young man re-creates a socialist lifestyle to keep her from learning that her 
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beloved GDR was about to disappear. e ruse quickly turns into a struggle be-
cause East German food products already begin to disappear from store shelves. 
Several scenes show sidewalks lled with discarded furniture that neighbors 
who moved to the West le behind or those who stayed traded for western items. 
Ikea posters advertise aordable storage furniture, some of which ironically was 
produced in the GDR.9
Entertaining as this lm is, it blends reality with ction not just through its 
use of archival footage. A sense of looming loss set in as soon as the rst free East 
German elections in March 1990 paved the road to reunication. AiF employees 
and aliates of the institute’s design product collection Sammlung industri-
elle Gestaltung went on a last shopping spree across East Berlin in the spring 
of 1990.10 e approaching monetary union of 1 July jeopardized the future of 
thousands of East German companies. Outdated machinery and low technical 
standards clearly disadvantaged them on the capitalist market. With the arrival 
of the D-Mark their products became more expensive, and when European 
socialism collapsed the following year, the COMECON market broke away 
as well. Privatization of national industries kept many workers in limbo until 
mostly western investors bought a company, only to sell it for parts or restructure 
it for greater protability aer years of Treuhand trusteeship.11
e western Werkbund noted as well that reunication had strained East 
German product culture and made an eort to engage with it. e design show 
From Bauhaus to Bitterfeld: 41 Years of GDR Design of December 1990 and the 
accompanying exhibition catalog aimed to address “the diculties of transi-
tioning from one social order to another” and to document “the work done to 
avoid loss of identity.”12 Nonetheless, in the catalog West German design his-
torian Gert Selle observed that “the people have not only had their national 
state supplanted by a foreign state but also seem to have lost the world of their 
experienced material and immaterial cultures. Objects that once lled the stage 
of daily ritual as familiar props and that, in their meager charm, could remind 
one of the dead or dying culture, now age at a highly accelerated rate.”13 Among 
the catalog’s contributors were a number of East German industrial designers, 
art historians, architects, and former AiF employees who joined in this requiem 
for GDR product culture. To explain the fast depreciation, they quickly pointed 
to the country’s inability to reform economically, the scarcity of resources, and 
empty ideological discourse about certain design styles and products. ese 
voices solidied the picture of a bygone era already in the process of being his-
toricized. e usage of black-and-white photography in the catalog further un-
derpinned this obsolescence.
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But it was not only the populations’ excitement for western consumer goods, 
a lack of sentimentality among East German professionals, or a lack of aware-
ness on the part of western investors that sidelined GDR material culture and 
industrial design aer 1990. Political circumstances necessitated an immediate 
confrontation of dictatorial power structures in the former GDR. Inltration 
of institutions and organizations by informants especially came to the forefront 
of discussion when the Stasi les were declassied in 1992. Two organizations 
that had represented industrial design interests, the Association of Artists in the 
Applied Arts (Verband Bildender Künstler, VBK) and the AiF, were questioned 
about the nature of their support for the SED regime. Former VBK president 
Clauss Dietel defended the association but claimed to speak for many GDR 
industrial designers when he criticized the AiF’s style diktat and ideologization 
of aesthetics.14 ese comments were made in an interview with RfF magazine 
Design Report in response to the question “What remains of GDR design?” It 
thus seems that what remained was a politically implicated profession and its 
products, which had given shape to the goals of German socialism, but had no 
place in the newly reunied Germany because of the complexity of this past 
association.
irty years aer the fall of the Wall, a united Germany has developed not 
only domestic stability but also leadership in Europe and international diplo-
macy. As one of the worldwide leading export nations, Germany receives in-
ternational acknowledgment for its economic policies and contributions to 
European integration and peace. Here the experience of the economic foreign 
policy strategy vis-à-vis the GDR seems to inform Germany’s current position 
as a “reluctant hegemon” in Europe and its continued skepticism toward mil-
itary leadership.15 e checkbook diplomacy of the Cold War era has set the 
tone for a foreign policy that uses economic cooperation as a means for con
ict 
resolution and a path toward increasing political opponents’ receptiveness for 
German interests.
Trade policy, it has been argued here, provided similar incentives for modern-
ization in East and West and forged conditions conducive to deepened cultural 
relations, which in turn rekindled notions of a pan-German identity. Design, 
taste, and consumption were at the center of this postwar identity discourse in 
both parts of Germany. ese realms help to explain why German unity came 
about without further great social upheavals or political disruptions in the fall 
of 1990. Shared visions of economic prowess, cultural belonging, and Germany 
taking its place among modern industrialized nations in a sense paved the way 
for reunication. Given the challenging process of two dierent political and 
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economic systems growing together, it is remarkable that such past negotiations 
in the eld of economic culture have not played a greater role in the current 
debate over united Germany’s identity, especially because its economic strength 
continues to decisively shape German political culture and foreign policy. De-
signing One Nation thus proposes that we need to stop thinking about the two 
Germanys in isolation from each other in order to see how much they still had in 
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